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SUMMARY 
This thesis is a proposal for a theory-synergetic approach to multi-theoretical pluralism 
in International Relations. It represents an application of IR paradigmatic matrix upon 
the substantive problem-field of international oil politics – an empirical case-study used 
here to demonstrate how theory-synergetic analysis might be applied to attain a 
deeper, more holistic understanding of the given puzzle than would be possible within 
a single-paradigm research mode.  
Theory-synergetic approach is grounded in IR disciplinary discourse and is called to 
respond to the challenges of the latest Great Debate – a maelstrom of competing 
epistemological, ontological and normative contestations, with profound foundational 
implications for the future of IR as social scientific project. However, it is argued here 
that theoretical diversity has knowledge-producing and maximising potential and 
pluralism does not impede academic progress. Focus on empirical convergences 
between theoretical accounts normally posited separately provides the broad 
analytical framework for activating theoretical synergy.  
By bringing these insights to bear upon questions and issues in international oil politics 
it is shown that synergetic analysis allows for more complex, multidimensional and 
multi-layered understanding of the problem-field than single-paradigm research. It is 
shown that applying different theoretical models upon the same substantive problem-
field reveals different realities of that same problem field; yet the resultant synergetic 
whole is greater than the sum of its constituent paradigmatic parts.  
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Introduction 
Has International Relations1 failed as an intellectual project? That was the question 
posed by Barry Buzan and Richard Little in their seminal paper in the Millennium - 
Journal of International Studies (30(1), 2001). Is IR theory at an end? What is IR? Can 
it still be even described as an academic discipline? Should it try to be one? These 
and similar questions are increasingly being repeated in the wake of the major 
upheavals of the Fourth Debate (Lapid, 1989, Darby, 2008; Wæver, 2013; see also 
the special issue of The European Journal of International Relations (Wight et al, 
2013).  
 
This may seem strange given that IR remains an attractive subject for an ever growing 
number of students and scholars, with expanding research and teaching programmes 
(and budgets) at universities worldwide, not just in the US and Europe. There has been 
a marked growth in academic literature on IR, specialist publications, and research 
centres devoted to its study. By some accounts International Relations has made 
major advances in methodology, scope of enquiry, adding new themes and 
dimensions to the discipline which, “[] now straddles the globe and provides a common 
language with which to analyze world politics” (Darby, 2008, p. 94).  
 
Yet those concerned with the apparent decline and stagnation in International 
Relations point to the discipline’s peculiar insularity from other Social Sciences. As 
Buzan and Little argue this insularity “[] allows ideas from other disciplines to filter into 
IR, but seems to block substantial traffic in the other direction” (Buzan and Little, 2001, 
p. 19). International Relations borrows heavily from other disciplines – from philosophy 
and economics to anthropology and psychology. Yet one would be at a great difficulty 
identifying any substantial intellectual impact or influence of IR upon wider social 
sciences.  
 
Even on the issue of theoretical development and the endless quest for a Grand 
Theory International Relations is at a disadvantage. As Brown argues IR has been a 
consumer not a producer of Grand Theory, borrowing extensively from other social 
                                                          
1 Capitalised form of IR is used to to refer to the academic discipline and the general 
term “international relations” to refer to the processes and practices.  
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science disciplines and making little by way of own contribution (2013, p.485). He goes 
further in identifying the effect of this uneven exchange and suggests that this 
disciplinary insularity had obstructed IR from having a wider impact, beyond academia 
(Ibid, p.484).  
 
Whilst IR had arguably always been multi-disciplinary it appears this multi-disciplinarity 
simply masks “dependency on other disciplines” (Buzan and Little, 2001, p. 21). 
Meanwhile these other disciplines maintain a self-conscious distance from IR and for 
many International Relations is an intellectual minefield best avoided. Or as historian 
John Lewis Gaddis puts it in his explicit eschewal of IR – international relations theory 
is “a field that has troubles enough of its own without my adding to them” (2007, ix). 
 
Moreover, debates and discussions within IR had not captured public imagination in 
the way history and economics, for example, had. IR’s big names, the stars of the 
discipline such as Kenneth Waltz, are hardly known in the wider political science and 
even less in the world beyond. Some prominent IR figures, such as Zibgniev Brezinski 
and Henry Kissinger did gain a higher public profile, but this was due largely to political 
posts they held rather than their scholarship (Buzan and Little, 2001, p. 21).  
 
Furthermore, Brezinski and Kissinger are exceptions that appear to prove the rule. In 
an article in The Washington Post Joseph Nye (2009) pointed out that the Teaching, 
Research and International Policy (TRIP) poll by the Institute for Theory and Practice 
in International Relations revealed that only three of the twenty five scholars rated as 
producing the most interesting scholarship during the preceding five years had ever 
held policy positions (one at the United Nations Organisation and two in the US 
Government) (Jordan et al, 2009).  
 
For Nye (2009) the responsibility for this lies not with governments but with the 
academic community, which has neglected policy-relevant research in favour of “[] 
mathematical models, new methodologies or theories expressed in jargon that is 
unintelligible to policymakers”. This lack of relevance to “real world” policy-making and 
the neglect of the practice of international relations marginalise IR and reduce its social 
impact. A growing concern over this gap between theory and policy and a desire to 
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make the discipline more relevant are the driving forces behind the recent turn towards 
pragmatism and pluralism in IR (see below) (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010). 
 
If disciplinary insularity, lack of wider public impact and marginalisation from the 
practice of international relations are the symptoms of the apparent malaise afflicting 
IR, then theoretical fragmentation is often seen as its cause (Buzan and Little, 2001, 
p. 31). There are clear delimitations within the theoretical framework of IR that shape 
both ontological and epistemological foundations of all research in the field, making it 
in practice “a discipline of theoretical disagreements” (Burchill, 1996, p.3). Early 
dominance of positivist, state-centric approaches ensured that, for much of its history, 
IR paid little attention to issues such as ethics and political norms, deemed to be 
outside the scientific study of the material structure of world politics.  
 
Buzan and Little (2001, pp. 22-28) identify and locate the a-historicism, even anti-
historicism, of IR’s tradition in what they call “IR’s Westphalian Straightjacket” – a 
Euro-centric focus on the state and its role in international relations. The straightjacket 
did not hold for long. The reflectivist critique threw a major challenge to mainstream 
theoretical orthodoxy, undermining dominance of positivism and ending its ‘...role as 
the only legitimate epistemology within the discipline’ (Langlois, 1997, p 155). The anti 
and the post-positivist turns are seen by many as marking a fundamental shift in meta-
theoretical discourses in IR (Lapid, 1989).  
 
The so-called “great debates”, often characterised by “frenzied emotionalism”, have 
collectively shaped and structured the discipline of IR, leaving it “divided, directionless 
and disputatious” (Buzan and Little, 2001, p. 32). The three “great debates” (or four, if 
one accepts Ole Wæver’s inclusion of the inter-paradigm debate (Wæver, 1996)) have 
often been used as the conceptual matrix through which to view the discipline. This 
produced a narrative according to which scholars in IR assumed positions within sets 
of warring “isms” (realism, liberalism, constructivism and so on) and engaged in an 
ultimately fruitless battle to establish their preferred model as the dominant universal 
theory of International Relations, or at least, have it acknowledged as a superior one 
to others. Paradigm-specific research and teaching continue to dominate the discipline 
(Jordan, et al. 2009, p.18).  
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As Lake argues, IR is organised into “[] academic “sects” that engage in self-affirming 
research and then wage theological debates between academic religions” (Lake, 
2011, p. 465). Whatever the stated objectives of various theoretical approaches in IR 
may be, the end result is to drive focus away from the substance of international 
politics to an endless, self-reflective insular debate about inherent superiority of this or 
that assumption – a sort of an ongoing game of intellectual one-upmanship. Presently, 
at the tail end of the most recent, fourth “great debate”, IR community appears no 
closer to any concrete resolution, with most scholars either explicitly or implicitly 
accepting this ambiguous status quo.  
 
The much heralded end of IR Theory is subject of intense debate and discussion. For 
example, a special issue of European Journal of International Relations entitled ‘The 
End of International Relations Theory?’ (Wight et al (Eds.), September 2013; 19 (3)) 
was complimented with a novel online symposium dedicated to the issue of the future 
of IR in the “post-Grand Theory” era (Nexon, 09.05.2013).  Meanwhile, a quarter of 
the century since the publication of Yoseph Lapid’s seminal paper “The Third Debate: 
On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era” (1989) International 
Studies Quarterly also hosted an online symposium to mark the anniversary, assess 
the state of the discipline and examine if IR is at an end of its “great debates” (Jackson, 
20.03.2014)2.   
 
As David Lake (2013) argues elsewhere, “[if] grand theory was king, it was an evil 
tyrant” (p.568). This move away from grand-theoretical development and contestation 
is exemplified, especially in American IR, by a growing interest in pragmatist, multi-
theoretical models and a new-found focus on mid-level theories grounded in practical, 
substantive discourses in International Relations. An example of this approach is the 
                                                          
2 Lapid himself is quick to recognise that his approach to sequencing and defining issues and milestones 
in IR theoretical evolution introduced “unnecessary confusion into the “great debates” story” (20.03.14). 
There is now a clear recognition that Weaver’s clarification of the issues is not only accurate but 
essential to understanding the current state of affairs in IR (1996). Without re-treading a familiar 
narrative, it is sufficient here to accept the designation of the Third Debate as the inter-paradigm debate 
of the 1970s and 1980s leading to a kind of rationalist synthesis between neorealism and neoliberalism.  
Whereas the reflectivist critique of rationalist IR - presenting as it does a foundational challenge to 
positivism - constitutes the Fourth Debate. Summarising Weaver’s argument, Schmidt (02.02.2014) 
defines this fourth great debate as being “characterized by a schism between reflectivist approaches, 
which includes critical theory, post-structuralism, postmodernism and specific versions of constructivism 
and feminism, that fall under the post-positivism label, and rationalist approaches that define the 
mainstream theories of neorealism and neoliberalism”. 
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analytical eclecticism advocated by Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein (Katzenstein and 
Sil, 2008; Sil and Katzenstein, 2010). Their pragmatist vision of the kind of knowledge 
that IR can and should produce has rapidly become part of mainstream discussions 
within the discipline, although it is now beginning to be seriously examined, assessed 
and critiqued (Reus-Smit, 2013, p.591).  
 
However, it will be argued in this thesis that pessimistic readings of the state of the 
discipline are misplaced. First, it is not necessary to discard the heritage of the Great 
Debates – in fact they may be viewed as essential elements in the genealogy of the 
discipline (Smith, 1995, pp.1-37; Schmidt, 2013, pp. 3-28; Waever, 2011, p.98). 
Second, it will be argued that the Fourth Debate reconstituted International Relations 
as an academic discipline and recast it as a meta-social science. It massively 
expanded IR ontology and widened its epistemological reach far beyond the narrow 
confines of positivism. It opened up IR from below and from outside, inviting in voices 
that had not ordinarily been heard in the past. And this all has profound implications 
for the kind of empirical output IR research has the potential to produce.  
 
IR today, it will be argued, is a multi-theoretical, supra-disciplinary, intellectual 
enterprise, animated by normative commitments. Whilst its “geography” is still 
dominated by a Euro-Atlantic pivot, it is far less an American science today than twenty 
or thirty years ago. It is an increasingly a self-reflective discipline, more aware of its 
history of privileging certain culturally determined social scientific approach, and its 
relationship to power. As historicism and recognition of the historical in International 
Relations takes centre stage there is a growing awareness of the relationship between 
the material and the ideational, structure and agency.  
 
In 2001 Buzan and Little set out an ambitious vision of what IR could be – “a kind of 
meta-discipline, systematically linking together the macro-sides of the social-sciences 
and history”: “If IR has an obvious role in the intellectual and academic division of 
labour, it is precisely to build bridges and establish a common ground in ways that 
transcend disciplinary boundaries. Its comparative advantage lies in its potential as a 
holistic theoretical framework, which should be able to speak equally well to political 
scientists, economists, lawyers, sociologists, anthropologists, and historians” (p. 22).  
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In the post-Fourth Debate IR this ambitious vision is in fact reasonable. The problem 
is how to systemise or at least make sense of IR theoretical pluralism. First, it is 
important to state outright that the task is not to discipline knowledge-production. It is 
doubtful that theoretical synthesis is possible and those dismissing the 
incommensurability dilemma outright are clearly not sufficiently mindful of important 
epistemological and foundational claims in IR. Mid-range theorizing and eclectic 
approaches, on the other hand, are limited in their pluralist applications by their 
restricted ontologies and metatheoretical assumptions. Meanwhile, continued 
theoretical disengagement is also not an option – it leads to fears of fragmentation and 
claims that IR theory, or even International Relations as a discipline, is at an end.  
 
The solution might be in reconceptualising the identity of the discipline. It will be argued 
in this thesis, that what is needed is a common language through which to 
communicate across the breadth of IR spectrum and with the world beyond; a 
language to express theoretical pluralism and the expanded ontology of International 
Relations; a language that would reflect theoretical diversity through establishment of 
a type of scholarly culture of IR. The language needs to be expansive and its 
vocabulary rich enough to accommodate the sheer breadth of knowledge created over 
the past century.  
 
Bracketing this knowledge is counterproductive – IR is empirical and theoretical 
scholarship; concerned with both the material and the ideational, with a normative 
mission at its heart. As the 1919 anniversary approaches ‘one hundred years of 
solitude’ and introspection could come to an end and the redemptive foundational 
ethos of International Relations – “... a global vision, forged in the fires of war, aimed 
at repairing the shattered family of nations...”- must be re-established3.  
 
IR scholarship should be relevant to the practice of world politics, providing that the 
normative commitments are set out throughout the intellectual endeavour. In 
determining the contours of theoretical pluralism issues of theory selection cannot be 
reduced to questions of “usefulness” or limited by arbitrary notions of “suitability”. The 
full spectrum of IR theoretical power must be utilised, harnessed and brought to bear 
                                                          
3  From the University of Aberystwyth, Department of International Politics website. 
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upon substantive matters in international politics. Developing an approach that would 
achieve the above aims requires adopting a particularly expanded notion of pluralism 
of IR and a specific scientific research model to accommodate it.  
 
This is not a question of a grand-methodology – as we have seen methodological 
pluralism is itself a major achievement of the Fourth Debate. Rather it is a matter of 
science as method, as articulated by Karl Pearson over a century ago: “The field of 
science is unlimited; its solid contents are endless, every group of natural phenomena, 
every phase of social life, every stage of past or present development is material for 
science. The unity of science consists alone in its method, not its material” (1892, 
p.15). 
 
What is required in order to harness the inherent power of IR theoretical pluralism is a 
common methodological culture – a language, an analytical toolkit - by means of which 
scholars can utilise and apply different theories to the limitless substantive field of the 
science of international relations. A metaphor for IR theories as lenses through which 
to see different aspects of the same material reality has sometimes been employed 
(Smith, 2014). A different metaphor would be to see the world of International 
Relations as a picture tapestry and each theory as a particular thread in that picture. 
The incommensurability problem arises only if the attempt is made to synthesise the 
threads or have them work within the picture together but separately. Instead it is 
possible to envisage them operating in synergy4, to constitute a picture greater than 
the sum of the individual threads that make it up. 
 
The idea that stories in IR can be told simultaneously in real time and in the resulting 
narrative produce a whole greater than the constituent theoretical parts that make it 
up is the defining feature of the theory-synergetic approach or TSA. But it is an idea 
that is grounded in IR foundational problems and is characterised by the implications 
of the Fourth Debate. These issues are addressed and the state of IR, post-Fourth 
Debate, is assessed in Chapter I.  
 
                                                          
4 From Greek synergia, from synergos,(συνεργός), meaning "working together". 
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This thesis, therefore, is driven by a primary objective is to make an argument for a 
synergetic approach to theoretical pluralism and to demonstrate its working on the 
case-studies of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Southern Gas Corridor pipelines. The aim 
here is to show how using theoretical tools synergetically can be useful in 
understanding substantive problems around these energy projects, for example, 
issues of environment, or more specifically, the role of oil companies or debates 
around international financing of these projects.  
 
In Chapter II a proposal for TSA is advanced in the context of a wider discussion of its 
place in IR foundational and theoretical debates and how it can contribute to advancing 
the discipline’s empirical priorities. It is essential to demonstrate how synergetic 
theorising might work in practice when applied to concrete substantive problems in 
international relations. The problem field of international oil politics and the case-
studies of BTC and SGC pipeline projects are then introduced as the proposed 
empirical testing ground for TSA. Key elements of synergetic theorising, TSA 
analytical tools and processes of sequencing – from theoretical modelling to 
identification of conceptual overlaps and thematic commonalities to construction of 
inter-paradigmatic pivots – are explained. 
 
In Chapter III the empirical field of international oil politics is examined in greater detail; 
its properties as a substantive case-study for exploring theory-synergetic approach 
are characterised and investigated. Single-paradigmatic models of international oil 
politics are then set out in Chapters IV and V - Rationalist and Reflectivist respectively. 
By focusing on various events, issues, debates in the history of oil politics it will be 
shown how different paradigms tackle different aspects of the same substantive 
matter, treading the same empirical ground of Baku oil, but together comprising a 
whole picture of world oil (and gas) politics, which is ontologically greater than the sum 
of its rationalist or reflectivist parts.  
 
This theory-synergetic approach to international oil politics is explored in Chapter VI. 
Building on the single-paradigm models of BTC and SGC pipeline projects set out in 
preceding chapters, synergetic readings of the problem-field are developed to 
demonstrate how harnessing IR multi-theoretical potential properly can amplify 
empirical accuracy of research outputs; and how excluding different strands of 
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knowledge or theoretical claims based on a priori assumptions or foundational 
commitments can have empirical costs, undermining explanatory and predictive 
qualities of scholarship. In Chapter VI these claims are explored by focusing on 
examples of thematic commonalities and convergences around common empirical 
material. TSA is operationalised on specific ontological overlaps identified between 
single-paradigm models of energy politics. It will be shown how using these analytical 
techniques can help produce empirical outcomes which better correspond to the reality 
of world energy politics than single-paradigm and eclectic approaches, amplifying both 
explanatory and predictive qualities of theoretical claims and scholarship on complex 
international phenomena such as BTC and SGC pipelines.  
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I 
 
Foundational and Theoretical Debates in 
International Relations 
 
Introduction 
The story of the Great Debates shapes the structure and self-image of International 
Relations and in large part forms the core of traditional chronicling of IR history (see, 
for example, Smith, 1995 in Booth and Smith (eds); pp. 1-37; Schmidt, 2013 in 
Carlsnaes et al (eds.) pp. 3-28). Any proposal for pluralist, multi-theoretical 
engagement in IR requires at least an implicit acknowledgement of their integral role 
in development of intellectual and social structures of the discipline (Waever, 2011, 
p.98).  
 
However, the contentious and unresolved nature of these theoretical debates in IR is 
further compounded by distinct foundational philosophical disputes, which run in 
parallel and overlap with the paradigmatic ones (Monteiro and Ruby, 2009, p.19). At 
the core of these “science” debates are questions about IR’s position as an intellectual 
enterprise. As such, this is philosophical debate and it is essential here to recognise 
the role of another discipline, Philosophy of Science (PoS), in shaping foundational 
disputes in International Relations (Ibid.).  
 
Whether or not IR is a science, what counts as science in IR and other foundational 
questions are ostensibly posited in order to establish criteria for validity; to serve 
internal disciplinary structures (academia, journals, etc.); to attain disciplinary 
credibility in the eyes of the practioners and policymakers (Ibid. p. 16). In practice 
these questions carry significant implications for theoretical debates and the state of 
the discipline more generally. They go to the heart of epistemological and ontological 
contests as well as issues of methodology and politically important matter of what 
counts as valid, ‘acceptable’ knowledge.  
 
Perhaps it is useful, therefore, to begin with an explicit acknowledgement of the 
symbiotic and mutually reinforcing dynamic of foundational-philosophical and 
theoretical/paradigmatic debates in IR. Indeed, proposal for theory-synergetic 
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approach, as set out in Chapter II, is informed by problems and challenges thrown up 
by the latest of these debates. Questions of epistemology and ontology are central to 
understanding prospects for a pluralist International Relations.  
 
This Chapter, therefore, begins with a comprehensive overview of the four theoretical 
Great Debates and the two Foundational debates, set out in a common chronological 
timeline and a single analytical framework. Implications of the latest of these debates 
are then examined with the aim of assessing current state of the discipline and its 
prospects for theoretical and scientific development. It will be argued that rather than 
heralding the end of International Relations theory, the latest scientific and theoretical 
debates have opened the discipline up to a possibility of greater intellectual pluralism 
and created opportunities for innovative multi-paradigmatic engagement with 
substantive issues in the field of global politics.  
 
The Chapter concludes with a brief review of some of these efforts to move away from 
meta-theoretical concerns and grand-theory construction. Yet such efforts at inter-
paradigmatic synthesis, mid-range theorising and multi-methodological research 
models are fraught with their own difficulties and shortcomings. The overall aim here, 
therefore, is to examine conditions necessary for emergence of credible multi-
theoretical approaches in International Relations in the context of theoretical and 
foundational challenges thrown up by the latest of the Great Debates.  
 
Epistemology, ontology and Philosophy of Science (PoS) 
 
Epistemology is the philosophy concerned with establishing the scope and nature of 
knowledge, the means by which it can be acquired, and the extent to which it can be 
justified. It is about how and what we know. Ontology is the philosophical study of 
reality and existence. It deals with what the world is made of in the literal sense of 
being, and which entities, and categories of entities, can be determined to actually 
exist. Epistemological and ontological commitments (what is to be studied and how) 
form the basis of philosophical foundations of scientific knowledge and define its scope 
(Reus-Smit, 2013, p.592; Monteiro and Ruby, 2009, p.25).  
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Foundational knowledge is by definition a priori knowledge, which does not require its 
truth-status to be proven or upheld. Commitment to such foundational knowledge 
means there are no further or other commitments by which standards of knowledge 
might be determined or justified. What makes a foundational philosophical position 
foundational is that it has pretensions of infallibility, and irrefutability. If this is really 
true then such position cannot be complimented or made compatible with other 
foundational positions (Monteiro and Ruby, 2009, p.25-26).  
 
As noted above academic discipline of International Relations has been especially 
prone to existential debates concerning foundational issues of epistemology and 
ontology, which informed much of the quest for a grand meta-theory of IR (Kurki and 
Wight, 2013, p. 14). Foundational debates are at the forefront of IR disciplinary 
divisions, with majority of scholars in the TRIP survey, for example, clearly identifying 
with either positivist, anti-positivist or post-positivist positions (Jordan et al, 2009, 
pp.10-11).  
 
Uneasy about its philosophical foundations IR turned for reference to another 
academic discourse in order to reinforce its status as a social science. Contemporary 
Philosophy of Science5 (PoS) – the branch of philosophy concerned with foundations 
of science – emerged as a distinct analytical field in the mid-Twentieth Century; its rise 
to prominence is associated with the works of Karl Popper (1959) and Thomas Kuhn 
(1962). PoS essentially deals with a priori foundational sets of questions – how science 
should be conducted? How science is conducted? What is the purpose of science?  
 
In “IR and the False Promise of Philosophical Foundations” – their critique of PoS 
influence on International Relations - Monteiro and Ruby (2009) identify this first set 
of foundational questions as granting the PoS “[] the status of a special discourse – a 
normative discourse capable of evaluating science and legislating its boundaries and 
practices” (p.24). Although Kurki and Wight (2013, p.16) argue that IR has not taken 
PoS seriously, it is evident that at least from the behaviouralist turn in the 1960s-1970s 
onwards, PoS provided IR with its key foundational positions.  
                                                          
5 For a recent review of the field see Rosenberg, 2012.  
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Further, it can be argued that as the discipline evolved and sought to ground itself ever 
more firmly within wider scientific enterprise, it sought (either explicitly or implicitly) 
ever greater validation and legitimisation through self-conscious adoption of 
established foundational philosophical positions within PoS (Monteiro and Ruby, 
2009).  
Table 1. International Relations and the PoS 
International Relations Debates Philosophy of Science Positions 
Behaviourism versus Tradionalism 
(Second IR/First Foundational) 
Logical Positivism 
Neo-realism versus Neo-Liberalism  
(Third IR/Neo-Neo Synthesis) 
Instrumentalism 
Reflectivism versus Rationalism (Fourth 
IR/Second Foundational) 
Social Constructivism                        
Scientific (Critical) Realism 
 
Monteiro and Ruby point out a continuous chronological overlap in the development 
of IR paradigmatic matrix and the rise and fall in prominence of various philosophical 
traditions in PoS ( see Table 1; Ibid, pp.19-20). Their analysis does gloss over myriad 
philosophical differences as they tag competing paradigmatic camps in IR by their 
corresponding philosophical positions in the Philosophy of Science; and they 
acknowledge that their “simplifications are often ruthless” (Ibid. p.26). Yet their 
approach provides a useful framework through which to analyse the relationship 
between International Relations and PoS, and is followed here in broad terms. 
 
The four Great and two Foundational Debates 
 
The first Great (theoretical) Debate between Idealists and Realists in the 1930s and 
1940s was the first time foundational questions about IR were posed but it was not a 
foundational debate in strictly PoS terms. The so-called Idealists envisioned the 
discipline as an academic tool for furtherance of peace, abolition of war and conflict 
between states, and creation of institutions of global governance and international law, 
such as the League of Nations. Realists consequently dismissed such liberal idealism 
as naïve and lacking objective, scientific criteria by which its claims could be assessed. 
Europe’s slide to WWII gave credence to realist critique of apparent utopianism of 
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early IR and led E.H. Carr to herald Realism as the starting point in the scientific 
development of the discipline: 
 
“The course of events after 1931 clearly revealed the inadequacy of pure aspiration 
as the basis for a science of international politics, and made it possible for the first time 
to embark on serious critical and analytical thought about international problems.” 
(Carr, 2001 (1981;1939), p9). 
 
Traditional or Classical Realists may have called for a more rigorous, analytical 
methodology in International Relations, yet they sought to explain world politics in 
terms of “objective laws that have their roots in human nature” (Morgenthau, 1985, 
p.4). Indeed, Morgenthau’s “six laws” of political realism rely not so much on 
observable data or other verifiable evidence as on arguably untested assumptions 
about what constitutes power and interests. As influential as it subsequently proved to 
be and for all its scientific pretensions, traditional Realism was not a foundational 
argument, certainly not in PoS terms. 
 
If anything, in terms of IR disciplinary development, it is the Idealists who had 
performed the most important, literally foundational, function – in the aftermath of the 
horrors of WWI they had established the discipline of International Relations (see 
Introduction).  Although they had no clear conception what kind of science would 
constitute this discipline they had set its normative course towards the aim of abolition 
of war through pursuit of knowledge about human affairs (Kurki and White, 2013, 
pp.16-17).  
 
It was the behaviouralist turn in the 1950s and 1960s – the second Great (theoretical) 
Debate – that marked the first time a philosophical position from PoS was explicitly 
adopted as a foundational discourse in IR. Behaviouralists sought to apply 
methodologies of natural sciences to social scientific scholarship and in the first 
instance adopted Logical Positivism in their attempt to provide International Relations 
with a firmly grounded scientific status. This marks the first time that PoS becomes “[] 
central to field’s self-definition as science” (Monteiro and Ruby, 2009 p.20). Logical 
Positivism was the dominant philosophy of science in the early and mid-20th century 
and was defined by its commitment to empiricism. As a theory of knowledge Logical 
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Positivism holds that the truth-status of knowledge claims can only be ascertained 
through logical or empirical verification.  
 
This emphasis on verifiability of scientific statements is reinforced by a rejection of 
mind-independent reality. According to Logical Positivism scientific method must 
exclude all talk of unobservable (therefore unverifiable) aspects of nature. Instead 
scientific enterprise is envisaged as a systematic search for natural laws through 
rigorous empiricism with an emphasis on mathematical and attendant logical 
processes; theory-production and explanation are thus subordinate to theory-testing 
and analysis (for a review of Logical Positivism see Friedman, 1999). It was in the 
Second Great Debate that issues of what constitutes science in IR were first explicitly 
and systematically addressed. The behaviouralist ascendancy had made Logical 
Positivist epistemology, ontology and methodology, the foundational orthodoxy in 
International Relations for a generation, with traditional historical analytical methods 
being abandoned in favour of hard empiricist methodology. This First Foundational 
Debate in IR accounts for the wider historical preponderance of positivism in the field. 
Importantly, it also ensured that PoS would continue to shape and influence 
foundational debates in IR to this day (Monteiro and Ruby, 2009, p.29).  
 
By the time of the neo-realist/neo-liberal inter-paradigm debate in the 1970s - 1980s 
(the Third Great Debate), Logical Positivism had come under sustained critique in the 
Philosophy of Science and new positivist PoS positions, in particular Instrumentalism, 
emerged to challenge its dominance. Instrumentalism is an expressly non-realist 
philosophy of science. It shifts the focus of evaluation of knowledge claims away from 
ontological realism (descriptive explanation), towards analysis of the predictive 
qualities of a given explanation. Instrumentalism emphasises empirical epistemology 
over preoccupation with ontology; its empiricism is more refined and attenuated than 
that of classical Logical Positivism. Predictive success of a scientific endeavour to 
explain an observed reality is considered more important than strictly truthful, verified 
description.  
 
Theories are thus evaluated on the basis of their empirical reliability in predicting 
observed phenomena – “useful instruments in proving our understanding of the 
observable world – thus the name ‘Instrumentalism’” (Monteiro and Ruby, 2009, p.27). 
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Instrumentalists recognise that assumptions and causal mechanisms underpinning 
scientific theories ordinarily cannot be observed (e.g. in quantum physics or 
astronomy) and treat them ‘as if’ they are true (Ibid).  
 
This approach has made Instrumentalism in social sciences particularly popular in 
economics, where scholars postulate about fictional actors and processes in an 
abstracted fashion, ‘as if’ they were true, and make predictions accordingly.  As Milton 
Friedman, a key proponent of Instrumentalism in economics, argued in his essay "The 
Methodology of Positive Economics" (1966), “[ ] the only relevant test of the validity of 
a hypothesis is comparison of its predictions with experience”: “Viewed as a body of 
substantive hypotheses, theory is to be judged by its predictive power for the class of 
phenomena which it is intended to "explain." Only factual evidence can show whether 
it is "right" or "wrong" or, better, tentatively "accepted" as valid or "rejected."” (pp.8-9). 
 
This emphasis on instrumentality of theory is the defining feature of Instrumentalism 
as a philosophy of knowledge. In International Relations a quintessential example of 
Instrumentalism is Kenneth Waltz’s seminal 1979 classic “Theory of International 
Politics”. Waltz clearly delineates between observable reality – laws, and theories as 
instruments that explain these laws: “Because a law does not say why a particular 
association holds, it cannot tell us whether we can exercise control and how we might 
go about doing so. For the latter purposes we need a theory” (p.6).  
 
In his pursuit of a parsimonious, structural, non-reductionist theory of international 
politics Waltz treats unobservable entities ‘as if’ they exist, and uses them to explain 
and predict observable phenomena in international politics (Monteiro and Ruby, 2009, 
pp.27-28). It is this instrumentalist approach (and its attendant methodology borrowed 
heavily from economics) that made neo-realism and its synthesis with neoliberal 
institutionalism possible.  
 
In the course of the third Great Debate, Neo-Liberal Institutionalists such as Robert 
Keohane fully accepted rationalist scientific project and Instrumentalist positivist 
epistemology of the Neo-Realists (Keohane and Nye, 1977, pp.42-46). Nevertheless, 
they argued that structural theory overlooks and underestimates the role of 
transnational actors and processes and called for what Keohane called, “something 
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in- between: systemic theories that retain some of the parsimony of Structural Realism, 
but are able to deal better with differences between issue-areas, with institutions, and 
with change” (1986, p. 197).  
 
Rationalist consensus emerged directly as the result of universal adoption of 
Instrumentalist philosophy of science and its dominance of IR. Regardless of whether 
or not the neo-realist/neoliberal inter-paradigm debate was a ‘debate’ at all, it was 
certainly not a foundational debate – the foundations of IR as science were hardly 
debated and a considerable degree of convergence around a positivist centre-core 
took place within the discipline (Kurki and Wight, 2013, p. 19).  As Stein (2008) argues:  
 
“The use of game-theory and the demonstration that institutionalized cooperation 
could be explained from a starting point of the power and interest of independent 
actors made possible not only a rapprochement between realists and neoliberal 
institutionalists but even an intellectual union in a perspective some dubbed as 
rationalism” (p.205). 
 
Yet despite this high degree of foundational convergence in the mainstream rationalist 
IR there remained a set of problems relating to theory choice, especially that of alleged 
incommensurability of different paradigmatic approaches. The concept of paradigms 
in IR is also borrowed from the Philosophy of Science. It was introduced in the early 
1960s by Thomas Kuhn who defined paradigms as problem-solving achievements “[] 
that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the 
foundation for its further practice” (1962, p. 10). In his seminal work “The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions” Kuhn (1962) identifies scientific progress proceeding in two 
phases – normal science and scientific revolution.  
 
In the first instance knowledge production progresses within a commonly accepted 
theoretical framework, a dominant paradigm generally accepted and adopted by a 
scholarly community. In the second phase theoretical innovation occurs as the 
dominant paradigm faces growing number of anomalies and either attempts to 
address them or faces a challenge from an alternative paradigm, which claims to 
address those anomalies; as the alterative paradigm gathers greater support and 
acceptance it becomes the new dominant paradigm. Different competing paradigms 
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just as, for example, different political ideologies or systems, are incommensurable, 
claim to solve different problems and employ their own distinctive properties which 
makes it impossible to evaluate truth claims (Ibid. p.93). 
 
Instrumentalists embrace Kuhn’s emphasis on problem-solving as key component of 
scientific practice as the most important determinant in theory-choice. For Waltz, for 
example, the search for a parsimonious structural theory of international politics was 
informed in part by a pressing need to avoid the pitfalls of reductionist approaches with 
their inherent incommensurability problems. For instrumentalists there is a need for IR 
to adopt a single paradigmatic model around which research could converge, and this 
may help explain the discipline’s perennial search for a Grand Theory.  
 
Yet it is clear from Kuhn’s own analysis that empiricism on its own is not sufficient to 
account for the dominance of this or that paradigm at any given time and the “[] issue 
of paradigm choice can never be unequivocally settled by logic and experiment 
alone...” (1962, p. 93). Kuhn argues: “As in political revolutions, so in paradigm 
choice—there is no standard higher than the assent of the relevant community” (Ibid). 
It is a growing acceptance of a particular theoretical position within a particular policy 
community or scholarly circle that determines its paradigmatic dominance and Kuhn 
goes to great length to provide a historical overview of an ever-changing pattern of 
dominant paradigmatic positions.  
 
It follows from the above observation that scientific-claims are conditioned not by some 
universal standards of objectivity and truth but by the social practices and discourses 
of a scientific community. Subsequent challenges to Kuhn’s framing of theories as 
paradigms are also, to a lesser or greater extent, ambiguous in their judgement of 
what constitutes scientific progress. Lakatos re-characterised theories as ‘research 
programmes” but agreed that core foundational assumptions of these research 
programmes cannot be easily falsified or even subjected to empirical testing (Lakatos, 
1970). Laudan’s (1977) looser concept of ‘research traditions’ as an alternative to 
paradigms and research programmes seeks to move away from the idea of science 
as competing centralised theoretical clusters. As such it is even more vague and 
relativistic on the issues of theoretical progress and theory choice (Bennett. 2013, 
p.464).  
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Scientific truth is not discovered but is invented and established by social acceptance, 
rather than the world per se. Whilst different conceptualisations of theories as 
paradigms, research programmes or research traditions may differ in their assessment 
of what constitutes scientific progress, they all acknowledge its social condition. This 
focus on social construction of knowledge-claims is at the heart of the third key 
Philosophy of Science to make a major impact on International Relations - Social 
Constructivism6. 
 
For PoS social constructivists all knowledge is constituted by linguistic discourse and 
social practices, with language as the central determinant of meaning in the world. The 
distinction between epistemology and ontology is less prominent in social 
constructivism because these are seen as deeply enmeshed, mediated as they are 
through language and social context. Therefore, possibility of objective knowledge of 
reality is dismissed. For social constructivists the purpose of scientific inquiry is not the 
search for truth as such but the process of unmasking how such truth-claims are 
themselves product of power-relations in a socially-produced consensus.  
 
For example, Nelson (1994) employs Constructivist Counterfactual Argument to point 
out that what are considered to be scientific facts are not simply contestable but that 
this contestability is due to scientists making certain choices and not others, and that 
other choices could have been made: “If scientists had chosen to confer facthood 
otherwise than they actually did, then subsequent history would reflect this in world-
view consistent with the choice they counterfactually made. Therefore, the ‘facts’ are 
determined by scientists’ choices, not by ‘objective reality’” (p.541 in Kukla, 2000, p. 
3).  
 
In International Relations the Social Constructivist philosophy of science is taken up 
by critical theory, post-structuralism, feminism and pragmatic approaches, and forms 
the cornerstone of the fourth Great Debate. These reflectivist approaches reject 
positivist dominance of IR and emphasise “[] reflexivity and non-neutral nature of 
                                                          
6 Social Constructivism in PoS is not to be confused with social constructivist theory in International Relations, 
which takes up Scientific Realist philosophy of science as its foundational basis.  
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political and social explanation (Kurki and Wight, 2013, p.24). Poststructuralists and 
other anti-positivists may well reject any notion that they are engaging in foundational 
debates but the very fact of their explicit commitment to social construction of 
knowledge makes them Social Constructivist in the PoS sense.  
 
Critical theory’s starting point is the Marxian dictum that the purpose of science is not 
only to understand but to change the world – a commitment to a classical idea of 
practical philosophy (Shapcott, 2008, p.327). At the core there is a normative 
commitment to a scientific emancipatory project, which firmly ties critical theory to a 
practical discourse on possibilities and conditions of human freedom. It may be an 
anti-positivist paradigm but is nevertheless laden with far-reaching foundational 
commitments.  
 
The latter are rooted in the Social Constructivist PoS. For example, the Frankfurt 
School theorists’ emphasis on the dialectical imagination as the driving force of the 
emancipatory project is rooted in the idea that “[] it is the imaginational that allows one 
to connect the social purpose of ideas and creative faculties with the radical desire for 
social change” (Roach, 2013, p.183). Thus critical theory harvests Social 
Constructivist PoS exploration of the dynamism between linguistic expression and 
material action.   
 
Critical theory rejects neutrality of knowledge and emphasises its social and political 
dimensions – “Theory is always for someone and for some purpose (Cox, 1986, 
p.207). Simultaneously its proponents explicitly assume a highly normative, 
foundational purpose for the science of IR. As Cox argues: “The study of international 
relations should focus first on the key issues affecting the biological survival of the 
human race; and then on the pursuit of justice in the condition of peoples, which is 
essential to maintaining their support for a survivable world order” (2008, p.87). This 
far-reaching philosophical framework of IR as envisaged by critical theory is in itself a 
metanarrative of emancipation – science as a practical, normative project.  
 
Similarly, feminism and poststructuralism represent a set of foundational projects, 
grounded in the Social Constructivist PoS.  Postmodern or poststructuralist strand of 
critical theory represents a self-consciously combative effort to challenge dominant 
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practices and conceptualisations in IR. The aim and motivating force behind this 
challenge are explicitly normative – to uncover, unmask, debunk modern institutions, 
structures, events and show them as historically contingent products of human action, 
language and thought (Burke, 2008, p. 359). Existence of a mind-independent reality 
or Objective Truth is thunderously rejected.  
 
Poststructuralism is explicit in its anti-foundationalism but as such it constitutes a 
meta-theoretical critique of positivist IR. As Campbell defines it, poststructuralism is “[] 
a critical attitude, approach, or ethos that calls attention to the importance of 
representation, the relationship of power and knowledge, and the politics of identity in 
an understanding of global affairs” (2013, p.225). This is simultaneously a critique of 
the discipline of International Relations and an expose of the practice of international 
relations, and a critical exploration of the relationship between the two. 
 
The strong influence of the linguistic turn - a philosophical tradition focusing on the 
relationship between philosophy and language – and the works of Michel Foucault, 
places language at the centre of poststructuralist analysis; and this binds 
poststructuralism firmly to the epistemological and ontological foundational 
commitments of the Social Constructivist philosophy of science. As Burke argues, 
when it comes to the ethics of poststructuralism, its critique of positivism and rationalist 
IR aims to “[] unmask the operations of power in the “knowledge” of global politics, and 
to uncover its formal and rhetorical structures, so as to open up suppressed choices 
in policy-making and bring out the voices of the marginalised and the oppressed” 
(2008, p. 354). Poststructuralism, therefore, constitutes not just a foundational 
metatheory but a fully developed normative political mission. Campbell (2013) is only 
too right when he demands that critiques of poststructuralism “need to engage it on its 
own terms” (p.244) - because that is what one does with metatheoretical, foundational 
arguments.  
 
Feminist theory of international relations is similarly explicitly and positively a 
normative project (True, 2008). Determinations of masculinity and femininity in 
international relations matter because they determine forms of exclusion and inclusion 
in decision-making and distribution of power (Enloe, 2007). Furthermore, feminists 
insist that simply acknowledging gender is not enough. When traditional IR is not 
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ignoring gender the discipline engages with the concept in a highly depoliticised 
fashion, which “[] removes from it any examination of the ways in which relations of 
power sustain (or sometime challenge) prevailing assumptions about men and women 
and masculinity and femininity” (Whitworth, 2008, p. 392).  
 
By placing gender as a social construct at the heart of their international political 
analysis, feminists are making a foundational truth claim – that gender is a key, central 
factor in the ideational, material, historical, and institutional configurations of power 
(Ibid, p.400; Tickner and Sjoberg, 2013, p. 205). From a metatheoretical viewpoint, 
feminist IR theory shares common reflectivist scepticism about possibility of objective 
knowledge and scientific truths. With its emphasis on politics of identity, feminist IR is 
an example of Social Constructivist PoS analytical framework.  
 
The pragmatic turn in IR is also circumscribed by foundational claims rooted in Social 
Constructivist PoS (Monteiro and Ruby, 2009, p.29). It is counterintuitive to assume 
so if one takes IR pragmatism’s expressed prioritisation of the practical and its 
pluralist, anti-foundational claims at face value. However, pragmatism is bound by 
empirical-theoretical commitments which establish it as fully-fledged metatheoretical 
framework.  
 
Pragmatist philosophical epistemology has wide-ranging implications for Philosophy 
as a whole and the Philosophy of Science specifically. Yet this influence is highly 
heterogeneous and intellectually diverse, reflecting perhaps pragmatism’s 
epistemological agnosticism. Pragmatism7 is a 20th century American philosophical 
tradition, commonly associated with the works of John Dewey, William James, Charles 
Pierce; it is based on the principle that science is to be practical, useful and judged 
upon predictive quality of its inquiry, rather than representative, descriptive accuracy.  
 
In the Philosophy of Science, a broader pragmatist influence was brought to bear on 
Instrumentalism and Logical Positivism, as well as Social Constructivism and Scientific 
                                                          
7 For a review of classical and contemporary pragmatist philosophy see Goodman, R. (ed.), 2005.  Pragmatism: Critical Concepts in 
Philosophy, London: Routledge; Haack, S. (ed.), 2006. Pragmatism, Old and New Amherst NY: Prometheus; Talisse, R. and S. Aikin (eds.), 
2011, The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce through the Present, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
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Realism. Yet in IR, the pragmatic turn came from an expressly Social Constructivist 
PoS standpoint. It is characterised by a deep scepticism over possibility of any 
meaningful resolution to epistemological and ontological debates (Sil, 2000, p.354). 
For IR pragmatists there is no way to settle arguments of what constitutes truth or 
about validity of moral claims. Epistemological disputes are thus seen as excluding 
possibility of other rationales and purposes for social enquiry, for example the search 
for solutions to real-world problems and addressing immediate concerns of policy-
makers and other practioners. 
 
For Monteiro and Ruby (2009, p.29) the pragmatist turn in IR is bound by a 
foundational commitment to the practicality of knowledge – “[] inquiry is inextricable 
from intervention in the world, in effect ascribing common normative goals to the 
discipline as a whole”. This sets pragmatic approaches in International Relations, such 
as Sil’s and Katzenstein’s Analytic Eclecticism (2010), within a clearly structured 
metatheoretical framework – “a distinctive kind of social-scientific project, one with 
particular boundaries and particular content” (Reus-Smit, 2013, p.596).  
 
What all reflectivist theories of IR founded upon Social Constructivist philosophy of 
science share is a deep scepticism on the possibility of objective knowledge and 
agnosticism about (and often denial of) reality that exists ‘out there’, independently of 
human mind. Above all they represent a critical discourse on the practices of IR as a 
discipline itself. These practices influence and shape the world IR scholars claim 
merely to be observing. From this follows that when it comes to science, interpretation 
and critiques are the best that can be done. Thus the anti-positivist discourse of the 
Social Constructivist PoS had had a profound impact on the course of the Fourth 
Debate in IR, challenging the very notion of what constitutes science of international 
politics. This marks it as the second Foundational Debate.  
 
Scientific Realism and IR 
By contrast Scientific (Critical) Realist8 philosophy of science is “committed to (indeed 
founded upon) the possibility of scientific progress” (Monteiro and Ruby, 2009, p. 31). 
                                                          
8 See Archer et al (Eds.), 2007, Critical Realism: Essential Readings, London and New York: Routledge 
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As a philosophy of science Scientific Realism holds that the world is knowable in 
principle, especially since science had already produced considerable progress. 
Knowledge about the world therefore corresponds to the truth of how the world really 
is. This truth is accessible to scientists and there should be no limitations on the pursuit 
of the scientific enterprise. As Leplin argues: “What realists do share in common are 
the convictions that scientific change is, on balance, progressive and that science 
makes possible knowledge of the world beyond its accessible, empirical 
manifestations” (1984, p.2). 
 
Scientific Realism challenges epistemic scepticism of other PoS positions. Observable 
and unobservable elements of scientific theories must actually be true and correspond 
to the reality of the world out there. Otherwise there would be no accounting for the 
technological successes of modern science without recourse to miracles – the so 
called “no miracles” argument (Monteiro and Ruby, 2009, p. 30; Putnam, 1984, p.141). 
At the heart of Scientific Realism is a foundational commitment to a ‘correspondence 
theory of truth’ (Ibid, p. 140).  
Table 2. Fourth IR/Second Foundational Debate 
International Relations Theories PoS Positions 
 
Critical Theory 
Poststructuralism 
Feminism 
Eclecticism  
 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM 
Social Constructivism SCIENTIFIC (CRITICAL) REALISM 
 
 
This ontological realism is coupled with epistemological relativism and methodological 
pluralism. Scientific realists posit that there should be no a priori limitations on what 
and how can be known about the world. This epistemological relativism does not, 
however, prevent possibility, in principle, of choosing between different competing 
theories or explanations - what Patomaki and Wight call “judgemental rationalism” 
(2000, p. 224). 
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There is a degree of confusion and conflation when it comes to determining between 
Scientific and Critical Realism9. For Monteiro and Ruby there is no distinction between 
the two versions, as “the boundaries between Critical and Scientific Realism are fuzzy” 
(2009, p.31). Indeed, the terms are often used interchangeably and both share 
common philosophical foundations and commitments. What distinguishes Critical 
Realism as a more nuanced and attenuated upgrade on the original is a critical stance 
towards truth claims and the attendant notion of deep ontology (Patomaki and Wight, 
2000, p. 225). 
 
Critical Realists build on the work of the philosopher Roy Bhaskar (1975) to argue that 
social outcomes are produced by the dynamics of both ideational and material factors:  
“According to critical realists, the question of whether material factors or ideational 
issues are the most important in determining outcomes is an empirical matter that can 
be decided only on the basis of research that examines the relationship and interplay 
of both” (Kurki and Wight, 2013, p.26). 
 
It follows, therefore, that the social reality is more than its experiential qualities and 
intersubjective elements. The concept of deep ontology emerges from an 
understanding that this social reality consists of more than can be experienced and is 
not exhausted by intersubjective meanings. In fact, “the surface appearance of inter-
subjectivity, although possessing causal power, is typically distinct from its underlying 
- and potentially hidden, reified, or mystified – essential relations” (Patomaki and 
Wight, 2000, p.225). Critical Realism is thus an ontological endeavour, committed to 
the notion of perpetual science where “no claim is ever immune from challenge” (Ibid. 
p.218), and which “[] rather than being committed to a dogmatic insistence on the 
certainty of its claims, rests on a commitment to constant critique” (Murki and Wight, 
2013, p.25). 
 
Critical and Scientific Realism form a single PoS super-structure that consists of a) 
prioritisation of ontological realism; b) general epistemological relativism; and c) 
                                                          
9 For a review of Critical Realism see Archer, M., et al. 1998, Critical Realism: Essential Readings. London: Routledge. For a 
review of Scientific Realism see Leplin, J. (ed.) 1984. Scientific Realism. London, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press. 
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judgemental rationalism – the view that despite epistemological relativism it is still 
possible to establish justifiable criteria for theory/explanation choice (Ibid. p.31). 
Distinctions emerge where Scientific Realism focuses its broad attention on the 
correspondence theory of truth, calling on science to adhere to strict ontological 
discipline and to get at the way the world really works (Leplin (ed.), 1984; Wight, 2006; 
2007).  
 
Meanwhile Critical Realism adopts a vision of science as a perpetual and open-ended 
endeavour to test and challenge truth claims about the world constructed of the 
interplay between the material and ideational elements (Bhaskar, 1975). Whether 
treated as a single analytical framework or via its component perspectives, realist 
philosophy of science stands out within the PoS by its central and contentious claim 
that science provides a roadmap to mind-independent reality (Monteiro and Roby, 
2009, p.32).  
 
Scientific and Critical Realism have been enthusiastically endorsed in International 
Relations, predominantly by proponents of social constructivism (Wendt, 1999; 
Patomaki and Wight, 2000; Chernoff, 2002; Wight, 2007; Joseph and Wight, 2010; 
Kurki and Wight, 2013). By prioritising ontology, epistemic relativism and 
methodological pluralism Scientific Realism is seen as carrying a post-positivist 
potential to bridge IR’s foundational divisions. Alexander Wendt, a key proponent of 
Scientific Realism, argued in “Social Theory of International Politics” that Scientific 
Realism “captures what IR scholars of all stripes already do” (1999, p.67).  
 
Patomaki and Wight dismiss IR inter-paradigmatic debates as an arbitrary 
“epistemological speculation in an ontological vacuum” and endorse Critical Realism 
as “a broader, non-reductive perspective, capable of incorporating the strengths of all 
(2000, p. 227). Critical Realism is seen as a philosophical foundation upon which a 
multi-theoretical, multi-methodological IR framework can be built, thus providing the 
discipline with the elusive post-positivist consensus. As Monteiro and Ruby define it, 
Critical Realism comprises “…relativism at the epistemological level (making for 
pluralism by allowing all sorts of approaches, theories, paradigms, research traditions, 
etc., to operate side-by-side within a discipline) and realism at the ontological level 
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(continuing to view scientific knowledge as getting at the way the world really works, 
independent from our efforts to know it” (2009, p.31).  
 
Implications of the fourth Great Debate 
International Relations today may be seen as an intellectual maelstrom of competing 
philosophical frameworks and normative and theoretical visions, with little internal 
coherence or external relevance. Janice B. Mattern describes it as “an (un)discipline” 
- “less of a discipline than a collection of insular research communities” (2008, p.692). 
She proposes return to metatheoretical discussion and a search for a singular 
theoretical framework, albeit more permissive of internal pluralism (Ibid. pp.696-697).  
 
Yet today even realists like Randall Shweller are sceptical of the very possibility of IR 
theory and question its potential as scientific enterprise. In “Maxwell’s Demon and the 
Golden Apple: Global Discord in the New Millennium” (2014) Shweller argues that 
contemporary international relations are increasingly characterised by growing 
entropy – unpredictability, randomness and inexorable chaos, on macro and micro-
levels, which over time reduce IR’s explanatory power as it becomes ever impossible 
to predict and explain world events.  
 
Shweller’s is a complex argument about the future of global affairs and the role of 
states in the international system. This is not the place to examine it in detail but what 
is most interesting about it is its use of novel scientific concepts/metaphors rooted in 
physics, specifically in thermodynamic theory. “Maxwell’s Demon and the Golden 
Apple” is a highly eclectic book, combining discussions of ancient Greek myth of the 
Golden Apple of Discord with the second law of thermodynamics. It employs rolling 
descriptive narrative and wide-ranging analogies complete with pop culture 
references. Yet IR scholars will immediately recognise familiar concepts such as 
anarchy, polarity and hegemonic wars, well represented across Shweller’s analysis. 
Given his traditionalist academic background, previous publications and IR 
scholarship grounded in Realism, this book is particularly surprising, not least because 
it has an almost postmodernist quality to it. This suggests that at the very least even 
orthodox IR approaches are more tolerant of intellectually diversity.  
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If Positivist dominance is at an end, then the last Great Debate cannot be considered 
as having been completely inconclusive. Its outcomes and implications are complex 
and it is difficult to characterise the Fourth Debate in terms of conventional IR 
historiography (Schmidt, 2013, p.19). And few would actually agree that IR theory has 
come to an end in its wake. It is therefore important to examine future directions of 
theoretical development and how these could contribute to meeting the challenges 
facing the discipline of International Relations.  
 
Indeed, the editors of the special issue of European Journal of International Relations 
dedicated to the question - ‘The End of International Relations Theory?’ cautiously 
concluded that the Fourth Debate does not mean “theoretical peace” or a return to a 
paradigmatic ‘war of all against all”. Instead they argue that “...one of IR’s comparative 
advantages over other disciplines might just be its strong sense of being a theory-led 
and theory-concerned field” (Dunne et al, 2013, p. 420).  
 
Other contributors similarly argue that the state of IR theory is in much better shape 
that is generally thought (Jackson and Nexon, 2013, p. 544). Charlotte Epstein (2013) 
goes further to argue that the last Great Debate was a reformative process which 
greatly expanded the “world” of IR and the scope of the discipline. Rather than decline 
or diminution of theory the process instead is one of theoretical consolidation, as IR 
acquires a stronger grasp of its enlarged subject matter and seeks to deepen 
understanding of its workings (p. 500). There is no sense here that theoretical 
pluralism is detrimental to the intellectual enterprise of IR. 
 
Elsewhere, Ole Wæver underlines this implicit connection between theoretical inquiry 
and knowledge of real world – the ideal of “relevance through theory” (2013, p.324). 
Development of theoretical debate within IR is indeed a formative function for the 
structure of the discipline: “The debates serve to focus the discipline and to define both 
a hierarchy of forms of work [] and to give a meaningful role to larger parts of what 
goes on” (Ibid. p.317).  Casting the discipline in terms of “great debates” should not 
therefore be seen as having a disabling effect on IR, as is often argued. Instead, as 
Wæver points out, the Debates are a framework for intellectual continuum – a process 
of knowledge production in IR, with new theories emerging from and of a pre-existing 
IR setting (2013, p. 318).  
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Abandoning this framework and adopting a narrow empiricist approach to theory risks 
reducing the discipline to “IR for IR’s sake” (Ibid. p. 323). Treating the discipline as an 
end in itself is erroneous in the case of IR because of the importance of its subject 
matter – a view of International Relations as a scientific enterprise “ultimately justified 
by the severity of its issues” (Ibid, p. 324). Implicit in Wæver’s argument is recognition 
of the symbiotic relationship between theoretical and practical and the inherently 
complimentary nature of epistemological and ontological inquiries in IR: “In a diverse 
discipline like IR, the challenge is not to achieve knowledge, but how to understand 
multiplicity of it, and this is only possible when we understand both the world and the 
processes through which our understanding of it came about. By knowing how we 
know, we know more about what we know” (Ibid. p.  324). 
 
Thus one area of consensus in the post-Fourth Debate IR may be a general 
recognition that theory should and does remain at the heart of IR and animates its 
intellectual vigour – there is a “shared commitment to the importance of theory in 
understanding the world” across IR paradigmatic matrix (Smith, 2013, p. 8; Guzzini, 
2013: Mearsheimer and Walt, 2013). As Reus-Smit and Snidal argue, “[] theoretical 
assumptions (and debates surrounding them) determine the contours of the field and 
inform even the most empirical research (2008, p.5). Similarly, theory shapes the 
discipline’s relevance to the real world – “In practice, theory is unavoidable” (Nye, 
2008, p.648). 
 
What is being energetically contested, therefore, is not whether there is theory or that 
it is at an end but rather what constitutes theory in International Relations? Indeed, 
what emerges from the overall reading of the special issue of the European Journal of 
International Relations on the end of IR theory is that approaches to the issue are 
largely determined by different conceptions of theory (Berenskoetter, 2013). When 
Lake, for example, declares theory dead he expressly means “grand theory”, not all 
theory (2013, pp. 567-568). His conception of theory reflects a wider turn in IR towards 
mid-range theorizing, focused on producing practice-relevant real -world knowledge, 
and placed outside grand-theoretical debates (Ibid., pp. 571-572).  
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Mid-level or eclectic theorizing of the type proposed by Sil and Katzenstein (2010) and 
championed by Lake (2013), is called upon to provide a way out of paradigmatic wars 
of the “isms” and to offer a multi-theoretical analytical framework capable of 
illuminating  “[ ] substantive relationships and revealing hidden connections among 
elements of seemingly incommensurable paradigm-bound theories, with an eye to 
generating novel insights that bear on policy debates and practical dilemmas” (Sil and 
Katzenstein, 2010, p.2). Other mid-level theoretical models similarly focus on 
explanation via study of causal mechanisms in international relations, but take a more 
structured approach (Bennett, 2013). What they have in common is explicit disavowal 
of Grand Theory – Lake’s “evil tyrant” (2013, p.568) – and prioritisation of practice-
orientated academic work, free from dogmatic constraints of inter-paradigmatic 
contestation.  
 
Yet as Reus-Smit persuasively argues, metatheoretical assumptions cannot be 
avoided no matter how much they are bracketed (2013, p.590). Even the most 
explicitly pragmatic and self-reflectively eclectic approaches are structured by implicit 
epistemological assumptions which constitute metatheoretical constraints, 
undermining their very goal of producing practically-relevant knowledge (Ibid, p.602). 
The kind of knowledge required to address key questions in global politics cannot be 
produced by a purely empirical inquiry. Such knowledge by definition demands 
normative analysis and awareness (Ibid. p.606).  
 
New prominence of norms and ethics in international relations is therefore another 
characteristic feature of the post-Fourth Debate IR theoretical pluralism. As Robert 
Keohane put it, “We do not study international relations for aesthetic reasons, since 
world politics is not beautiful” (2008, p.708). For all the theoretical diversity a 
characteristic feature of contemporary IR is the serious attention increasingly being 
paid to normative questions and issues of morality and ethics in world politics (Erskine, 
2008; 2013).  
Normative IR theory can be viewed as a distinct body of scholarship focused on 
international ethics (Nardin, 2008). But, as Smith argues, in contemporary post-Fourth 
Debate IR, all theoretical approaches should be seen as having normative 
commitments (2008, p. 727). When, for example, Brown cautions against abandoning 
the aspiration to produce “Grand Theory”, he qualifies it with a need to make such 
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theory ‘action-guiding as well as world-revealing’, concerned with “critical problem 
solving” and addressing the challenges facing disempowered communities – 
rationalist IR as a normative theoretical pursuit (2013, p. 494). 
 
Multi-theoretical, pluralist and self-reflective – contemporary IR is an expanding field 
and this is reflected in growing attention being paid not only to different conceptions of 
theory and its functions, but its normative properties and practice-relevant implications. 
The image of IR as an un-discipline, facing demise and plagued by disagreement and 
fragmentation is only valid if we are to accept that it is necessary to have agreement 
on aims, objects and definitions in a discipline. As Wæver points out - ‘[] history of 
science is full of disciplines that didn’t agree at all on their self-definition, subject-
matter, or methodology, and continued nevertheless’ (2013, p. 309).  
 
Implications of the second Foundational Debate 
 
Ironically one such discipline with unresolved foundational issues is Philosophy of 
Science (PoS), which, as noted above, continues to have a profound impact on the 
“science debate” in International Relations. As was shown above, PoS provides 
vocabulary and analytical frameworks for foundational disputes in International 
Relations, with various theoretical paradigms seeking scientific validation and 
legitimacy through association with corresponding PoS positions. The fourth Great 
Debate was explicitly the Second “Foundational debate in IR, concerned with what the 
discipline should study and how (Kurki and Wight, 2013, p.16).  
 
However, Monteiro and Ruby are sceptical of PoS general influence on International 
Relations. They point out that each philosophical approach when applied as 
foundational basis for science in IR falters, because each demands “at least one leap 
of faith” (2009, p. 32). For example, instrumentalism limits knowledge to what can be 
observed, yet the notion of ‘observability’ itself is not scientifically knowable. In other 
words, there is no scientific basis for determining where the distinction between 
observable and unobservable lies, making the boundary fuzzy and arbitrary.  
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Social constructivist leap of faith is that “despite the social nature of knowledge, claims 
about social construction of knowledge are themselves not socially constructed” (Ibid 
p.34). But it is Scientific Realism that requires the deepest faith, according to Monteiro 
and Ruby. The correspondence theory of truth that underpins the approach is “plagued 
by a problem of logical circularity” (2009, p.34). The observation that science is 
successful and therefore must be ‘right’ or ‘correct’ is an example of inference to the 
best explanation and that in turn has no solid logical foundation, rather a great leap of 
faith.  
 
None of the foundational positions in PoS can fulfil the promise of philosophical 
foundations for International Relations and Monteiro and Ruby argue for “an attitude 
of foundational prudence in IR” (Ibid, p.35) – a move away from taking a foundational 
position, in favour of simply having an attitude towards the foundational debate – a 
kind of agnosticism that acknowledges philosophical diversity but does not seek to 
impose one or another foundation upon the discipline. They rightly point out that it is 
highly problematic when “...IR scholars deploy foundational arguments to show how 
their scholarship is ‘scientifically’ superior to that of others” (Ibid., p.36).  
 
Instead, they argue that IR pluralism, both theoretical and methodological, can be 
better served by rejecting a priori criteria and various forms of essentialism and instead 
determining theory and method choice on the basis of their contribution towards 
substantive   understanding of international politics. Hence, arguments in IR should be 
judged on their substantive merits, not foundational claims and, therefore, scientific 
standards should not come from outside the discipline. Monteiro and Ruby argue that 
standards generated outside the discipline, specifically foundational PoS standards, 
“allow for no gains compared to the standards generated by our own discipline – and 
make for important losses” (Ibid., p.37).  
 
Yet the authors do not extrapolate on what internal IR scientific standards are or could 
be. Their foundational prudence is agnostic on the questions of scientific progress and 
objectivity – it is defined more by its opposition to attempts to apply foundational 
commitments “as the basis for determining the scope of scientific IR” (Ibid. p.40). They 
conclude that the Great Debates should “be about substantive questions, not about 
inevitably shaky meta-theoretical positions” (Ibid. p.44).  
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As we have seen, however, attempts to bracket foundational commitments in any case 
are unlikely to succeed and foundational prudence advocated by Monteiro and Ruby 
is in the end yet another attempt to bracket metatheoretical issues in IR. And it is 
premised upon nothing less than a leap of faith of its own – that International Relations 
has empirical foundations as an independent academic discipline that require no 
metatheoretical philosophies to underpin them. Monteiro and Ruby actually call for 
scholars “to trust IR’s ability to stand on its own, without recourse to philosophical 
foundations” (Ibid., p. 37). For some critics of Monteiro and Ruby these problems with 
their notion of ‘foundational prudence’ stem from the authors’ unintended 
misunderstanding and mischaracterisations of PoS positions, leading towards a 
hyper-empiricist, neo-behaviouralist vision of IR (Jackson, 2009). 
 
But even on its own terms the notion of foundational prudence is problematic. What 
are the empirical standards inherent or internal to IR, for example, is never defined or 
elucidated – there is a quality of arbitrariness to the argument. Its stated purpose (“a 
truly pluralistic IR” (Monteiro and Ruby, 2009, p.41)) – is never developed or explained. 
It claims to be scientific but post-foundational, and that ‘bad science’ “can be debunked 
on theoretical, methodological or empirical bases” (Ibid. p.43).  
 
But what are the foundations of those theoretical, methodological and empirical 
bases? What should constitute as criteria for theory choice; for choosing one 
methodology over another? And how does one build an empirical body of scholarship 
when philosophical questions about what constitutes the ontology of International 
Relations are at the very heart of post-Fourth Debate disciplinary diversity? 
 
Philosophy of Science may itself be a contested field, divided on questions of 
epistemological and ontological commitments, and what constitutes “scientific” inquiry 
(Monteiro and Ruby, 2009, pp. 24-25).  But for PoS these are substantive issues which 
do not impede theory development and dialogue amongst scholars. There is no reason 
why they should do so in IR. Given the correspondence in the relationship between 
evolving PoS positions and foundational debates in IR, it is not difficult to view the rise 
of anti and post-positivist PoS schools of thought in parallel with the ending of 
rationalist dominance of IR. Cast in this light, “science debate” in International 
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Relations is not deadlocked. Instead, it should be seen as having re-founded 
International Relations as a massively expanded field of social inquiry.  
 
It can be argued furthermore, that the Fourth Debate was informed and shaped by 
growing awareness of philosophies of science which are more enabling of theoretical 
and methodological pluralism. Thus theoretical diversity in IR is a reflection of growing 
foundational confidence across the discipline and a more refined and nuanced 
understanding of epistemological dynamics. More importantly it potentially points to a 
(re)discovery of an expanded ontology of International Relations – a distinct social 
realm not studied by other, older disciplines.  
 
One outcome of the Second Foundational Debate could be that “[] IR has finally found 
its world” (Epstein, 2013, p.500). This is now potentially a meta-social science, 
constituting the study of the totality of human interactions across the globe and a 
normative intellectual enterprise animated by an ongoing emancipatory interest rooted 
in the foundation of the discipline in the aftermath of the horrors of WWI.  
 
And this may help explain a peculiar phenomenon in IR foundational debates – 
scholars’ IR-theoretical allegiances do not always (or even often) match or correspond 
to PoS-foundational positions either explicitly or implicitly endorsed by them. Thus, for 
example, some IR social constructivists and realists endorse Scientific Realism, which 
is a post-positivist philosophy of science (Wendt, 1999, p.67; Mearsheimer and Walt, 
2013, pp.432-434). Meanwhile other realists take Instrumentalism as their positivist 
PoS position of choice, including Kenneth Waltz (1979 pp. 1-13; p.124). 
Poststructuralists and critical theorists (mostly implicitly) embrace PoS Social 
Constructivism – expressly anti-positivist philosophy (Cox, 1981); those rejecting 
paradigmatic discourse and seeking to do practice-oriented International Relations 
often root their middle-range causal accounts in the Pragmatist PoS tradition (Sil and 
Katzenstein, 2010).  
 
This philosophical diversity, with sometimes counterintuitive matches between IR 
theories and PoS traditions underpinning them, suggests that IR scholars engage with 
foundational (“science”) questions through the prism of their own discipline and on its 
own terms. The fact that today post-positivist philosophies of science, such as 
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Pragmatism and Critical Realism are being increasingly accepted by IR scholars from 
across theoretical backgrounds and are then employed to facilitate IR theoretical 
pluralism, simply means that this is useful for contemporary, post-Fourth Debate 
International Relations.  
 
Problems of Pluralism in International Relations  
 
On foundational level, therefore, the discipline is characterised by philosophical 
pluralism, marking the end of positivism as the only science of International Relations, 
and (re)establishing and considerably expanding its ontological realm.  On theoretical 
and methodological levels, a picture of dynamic diversity emerges, as the discipline 
adapts to multiplicity of knowledge and ways of producing it.  
 
On one level, this is reflected in the changing structures of IR academia – renewed 
focus on university teaching and research, growth in the number of journals and 
periodicals, and in transformation in the way IR knowledge is presented in traditional 
text books (see, for example, Booth and Smith (Eds.), 1995 (1997); Reus-Smit and 
Snidal (Eds). 2008; Dunne et al (eds). 2013; Carlsnaes et al (Eds.), 2012; Edkins and 
Zehfuss (eds), 2009). 
 
But IR is also being opened up from below, with proliferation of online blogs and social 
media resources, which have not only provided platform to voices that would not 
ordinarily be heard, but also massively expanded the reach of the discipline, e.g. E-
International Relations blog has an average of 200,000 unique visitors a month (E-IR, 
2014; see also The Duck of Minerva). Unaffiliated to any academic institutions but 
often endorsed by the scholarly community (E-IR, 2015), ran not-for-profit by 
enthusiastic volunteers and hugely popular amongst students, academics, practioners 
and wider general public, these new IR platforms simultaneously shape and respond 
to disciplinary diversity and facilitate flows of interdisciplinary exchange.  
 
This is not to suggest that the discipline had reached some lofty peak of its 
development. But in his contribution to International Studies Quarterly symposium ‘The 
Third Debate’ 25 Years Later (Jackson (ed.) 20.03.2014) Yosef Lapid tellingly 
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references Randall Jarrell’s remarkable refrain that the “people who live in a golden 
age usually go around complaining how yellow everything looks” (1958, p.290). Lapid 
acknowledges the decentring of metatheoretical enterprise in IR but enthusiastically 
endorses its growing reflexivity and makes the following observation:  
 
“If the discipline is in reasonable theoretical health, why do we witness all this talk 
about “the end of theory” with or without a question mark? The answer to this question 
is, of course, very complex, but my hunch is that a secret urge to become a “normal” 
science is still deeply rooted in the disciplinary psyche... Strong and sustained therapy 
is needed to successfully address this insatiable urge” (2014). 
 
That is certainly a legitimate position to take but it does not address some of the 
fundamental questions facing IR. Diversity is established and normalised yet the 
extent to which it is being contested is equally undeniable. What may appear as a 
blooming if unruly garden to some, is “an ivory-tower effete debate about very little of 
consequence” to others (Ferguson and Mansbach, 2014). 
 
There is no agreement on what constitutes proper theory in IR and different 
conceptions or types of theory are utilised across disciplinary landscape. Pluralism 
appears to have also put an end to metatheoretical engagement as the primary focus 
of theoretical development. Moreover, different paradigms prioritise different 
ontologies of international relations – what should constitute a proper empirical focus 
or unit of study is also being robustly contested. In post-Fourth Debate IR pluralism is 
not limited to epistemological and ontological issues – methodology can be argued to 
be very much at the heart of the contested diversity.  
 
Pluralism raises a whole range of wider disciplinary issues – what is the relationship 
between IR scholarship and the practical world of international relations? What is the 
effect of the emergence of a growing set of autonomous subfields on the International 
Relations?  What impact pluralism is having on the academic and administrative 
structures of the discipline? But the issue of theoretical diversity is the one that 
animates debates around pluralism in IR, not least because reaffirmation of theory as 
its intellectual centre of gravity is the single most important outcome of the Fourth 
Debate.  
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Perhaps, it is anxiety over these kinds of questions, rather than some psychological 
urge for a “normal science” that provokes a profound angst about whether “IR theory 
is dead”. As Dunne, Hansen and Wight point out in the special issue of European 
Journal of International Relations nobody “is arguing against pluralism per se: in fact, 
everyone agrees that it is a desirable position (albeit under certain conditions, such as 
‘relevance’ or ‘science’). This leads us to consider the question: what kind of pluralism 
can, and should, IR embrace? (2013, p. 415).  
 
If pluralism to be welcomed unconditionally, it means envisaging IR as a social 
scientific enterprise animated by an ever expanding, critical and reflective theoretical 
diversity. It means embracing the fact that there is no possibility of ever settling 
theoretical disputes in International Relations and allowing for an open-ended and 
unrestricted proliferation of theoretical positions. Commitment to pluralism as an end 
in itself would characterise such an approach. After all, since there are no common 
epistemological standards by which to assess competing knowledge claims why not 
accept all perspectives and just get on with it?  
 
Yet, in reality post-Fourth Debate IR is characterised by a pluralism of a different kind 
– a “disengaged pluralism” (Ibid, p.416). If all claims are valid in their own right there 
is little incentive for theorists to engage with different viewpoints. Theory-development 
thus proceeds in separate, independent islands of knowledge-production, with “no 
attempt to specify the relationships between theories” (Ibid). Yet for proponents of 
theoretical diversity relativism is not a real constraint on inter-paradigmatic 
engagement. Some go as far as to dismiss the “incommensurability” problem 
altogether:  
 
“The notorious “specter” of relativism is rarely invoked and the once formidable 
obstacle to cross-paradigmatic communication known as Kuhnian 
“incommensurability” has been so utterly demolished that one finds herself secretly 
hoping for partial restoration” (Lapid, 2014). 
 
Whether or not this assessment is over-optimistic depends on what is meant by cross-
paradigmatic communication. Could it be taken as far as a genuine theoretical 
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synthesis? Such a synthesis would require combining of different elements, in this 
case abstract entities of International Relations theories, to form a new unified, 
coherent and complete theoretical whole. This, in turn, would require constituent 
theoretical components to shed their constitutive epistemological and ontological 
properties and then arrive at a new common set of core foundational assumptions to 
form a theoretical synthesis - another grand-theory, a supra-theory in fact.  
 
An alternative to such metatheoretical solutions to the challenges of disciplinary 
pluralism is increasingly sought amongst mid-level or eclectic theoretical approaches 
to global politics.  These broadly positivist approaches eschew paradigmatic 
pretensions and holistic accounts of international relations, focusing instead on various 
parts of the political process, rather than the whole; examining individual variables and 
how they determine policy choices and outcomes. Mid-level theorising is 
methodologically pluralist and places great emphasis on historical contingency, whilst 
also looking to broader patterns in world politics:  
 
“Bridging and in many cases simply violating boundaries between the levels of 
analysis, this strain of theorizing about international politics was self-consciously 
eclectic” (Lake, 2013, p. 571).   
 
The argument for such an approach is not necessarily a new one and it has been 
argued that many of the classical theoreticians of international relations have indeed 
been either proponents of eclectic endeavour in IR or at the very least recognised a 
need for multiplicity of approaches, especially when it came to practical issues in 
foreign affairs. As Kenneth Waltz argued:  
 
“The prescriptions directly derived from a single image [of international relations] are 
incomplete because they are based upon partial analyses. The partial quality of each 
image sets up a tension that drives one towards inclusion of the others... One is led to 
search for the inclusive nexus of causes” (1959, pp.229-230).  
 
Admittedly Waltz’s search ultimately led him to parsimonious structural vision of 
international relations. What is undeniable, however, is that eclecticism does have a 
strong historical foundation in IR, especially in the United States. It is no surprise, 
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therefore, that its most prominent and coherent articulation had emerged there with 
the publication of Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein’s influential “Beyond Paradigms. 
Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics” (2010).   
 
Sil and Katzenstein’s approach is based on a key argument that various features of 
theoretical analyses, which are initially embedded in separate paradigms or research 
traditions can be separated on foundational level, reinterpreted in a coherent way and 
then “recombined as part of an original permutation of concepts, methods, analytics, 
and empirics” (2008, p. 111).  
 
What sets analytic eclecticism apart is an explicit commitment to production of 
practically relevant knowledge. By integrating empirical observations and causal 
stories from different paradigmatic traditions it seeks to identify important substantive 
issues that have relevance to real world problems and have practical value beyond 
abstract academic debate. As an intellectual project it seeks first and foremost to 
address normative and policy debates in which real-life actors in international relations 
find themselves in real-time.  
 
This concern over practicality of theoretical endeavour is rooted in the Pragmatist 
Philosophy of Science. In fact, Katzenstein and Sil go to great length to provide strong 
foundational underpinnings to their approach, arguing that Pragmatism offers the most 
solid philosophical basis for analytic eclecticism because of its “aversion to excessively 
abstract ontologies and rigid analytic principles in favour of useful interpretations that 
can be deployed to cope with concrete problems” (Ibid., p.113). Analytic eclecticism is 
thus driven by an urge for relevant and practical knowledge about international politics, 
and therefore constitutes an explicit rejection of grand theoretical meta-projects in IR:  
“The making of practically relevant knowledge cannot wait for the emergence of a 
definitive consensus on methodological procedures or axiomatic principles that may 
reveal ‘final’ truths’” (Ibid). 
 
Sil and Katzenstein go to great length to promote a vision of pluralist International 
Relations rooted in the Pragmatist Philosophy of Science and committed to production 
of practical, useful knowledge about world politics. However, it will be shown in the 
next chapter that for all its ambition analytical eclecticism remains limited in its 
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pluralism - limited by its curtailed ontology and by its implicit, if unacknowledged, 
metatheoretical commitments. Both these limitations stem from a specific and highly 
delineated choice of pluralism – rooted as it is in dominant IR theoretical traditions and 
characterised by largely American disciplinary convention.  
 
Conclusion 
This Chapter offered an overview of theoretical and foundational debates in IR with 
the aim of setting the context for theory-synergetic approach proposed in this thesis. 
It is not clear whether the latest, fourth Great Debate and the second Foundational 
debate running alongside it are yet at an end. But it is beyond doubt that they have 
already profoundly impacted the study of international politics and greatly advanced 
and expanded the field.  
 
The end of the rationalist consensus and opening up of the IR to multiplicity of 
knowledge and ways of producing it, create both opportunities and problems for the 
development of the discipline. Whether International Relations can fulfil its potential as 
a multi-disciplinary, pluralistic social science, confident of its normative mission and 
foundational status, depends on whether intellectual output of the latest debates 
translates into further fragmentation of the field or results in fruitful cross-paradigmatic 
dialogue and scholarship.  
 
It is not enough to overcome incommensurability problems across a limited range of 
paradigmatic positions characterised by common foundational commitments. Nor is it 
sufficient to employ combinatorial techniques or offer open-ended multi-theoretical 
critiques of problems and puzzles in international politics. It is argued here that any 
multi-theoretical engagement in IR must proceed from foundational beginnings – how 
epistemological and ontological divergences between different paradigms are to be 
reconciled is a fundamental question. In the next chapter it will be shown that when 
assessed present efforts at theoretical synthesis and mid-range theorising are 
characterised by major shortcomings and flaws, severely limiting their potential as a 
way forward for a truly pluralistic IR research agenda. Theory-synergetic approach is 
then advanced as a means of achieving this and responding to foundational and 
theoretical challenges of the latest debates in International Relations. 
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II 
Theory-Synergetic Approach 
 
Introduction 
Foundational challenge posed by the Fourth Debate goes to the very heart of 
International Relations as a scientific enterprise. What constitutes science in the 
discipline is a philosophical question and at the core of the theory synergetic approach 
(TSA) is a clear recognition of this foundational and defining condition. The raison 
d'être for TSA is contained in the challenges thrown up by the latest theoretical and 
foundational debates in IR. Its scientific claims are necessarily foundational and there 
is no attempt made here to avoid meta-theoretical debates or the scientific ones.  
 
The overall aims of this chapter are to establish these foundational claims, to explain 
TSA, how it might work in practice, as well as to demonstrate how it differs and is 
superior to other contemporary multi-theoretical approaches. The chapter opens with 
an exploratory definition of TSA and introduces international energy politics as the 
proposed empirical field to serve as case study in this thesis to demonstrate how the 
approach is to be operationalised.  
 
Issues of epistemology and ontology are very much at the forefront of the analytical 
framework characterising theory-synergetic approach. The latter is not a proposal for 
a new paradigm or a specific methodology – it is a pitch for a wider, more general 
conception of a disciplinary method, a common way to do things or to approach 
substantive issues. TSA makes use of existing theoretical and methodological 
diversity. As such it makes no sense to attempt an escape from the discipline’s history 
and structure. TSA is an explicitly IR approach; it proposes no abandonments or new 
starts, merely restructuring and reformulation of existing thinking.  
 
TSA, therefore, is not an attempt at meta-theory, nor a paradigm, nor a research 
programme in a Lakostian sense. Neither is it a specific methodology. It is a technique 
or a systematic approach, which seeks to chart a roadmap for fully utilising the 
knowledge-producing potential of the post-Fourth Debate International Relations. It is 
posited that TSA is a method – a systematic way of thinking about substantive issues 
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in international politics and approaching empirical research tasks – which allows for 
full application of the discipline’s theoretical and methodological pluralism.  
 
Theory-synergetic approach is epistemologically pluralist in the widest sense and is 
called upon to address the challenges posed by the changed intellectual environment 
of IR - its deep ontology. TSA calls for a greater focus on real-world issues, normative 
commitments and reflective qualities in International Relations scholarship. But this 
self-conscious epistemological relativism is not arbitrary. TSA holds that IR theories 
can be viewed as research tools and proposes to study and reveal international 
political reality through a systematic application of these tools to specific substantive 
issues and empirical puzzles, such as the case studies in this thesis: international 
energy politics in general and specific oil and gas pipeline projects. 
 
Theoretical matrix of International Relations is held to be comparable to the periodic 
table in chemistry – the importance is attached not only to individual theories but to 
reactions and interplay between them, as they come into the empirical mix of TSA. It 
is a proposed framework for organising epistemological and ontological properties of 
contemporary IR and as such, it is founded and rooted in Critical Realist Philosophy 
of Science. This Chapter explores foundational claims that underpin the argument for 
theoretical synergy and demonstrates how applying Critical Realist concept of deep 
ontology helps unlock the inherent knowledge-maximising potential of multi-theoretical 
IR.  
 
This chapter will detail general principles, mechanisms and workings of TSA and 
demonstrate how they are to be operationalised through empirical modelling, using 
case-studies of energy politics. This will be achieved by showing that TSA represents 
a superior method of harnessing IR pluralism, especially compared to attempts at 
inter-paradigmatic synthesis. It will be argued that such efforts are unlikely to succeed 
at tackling incommensurability problems without highly abstracted disaggregation of 
epistemological and ontological elements and properties of various constituent 
theories. Instead of synthesis the concept of theoretical synergy is proposed as a 
means of engaging with epistemological and ontological divergences across the IR-
theory matrix.  
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Similarly, it will be demonstrated that mid-level theoretical approaches such as analytic 
eclecticism are characterised by distinct epistemological commitments that limit their 
theoretical pluralism. Attempting to avoid meta-theory and refocus IR as a practice-led 
project ends up arbitrarily constraining theory-choice and results in a highly delineated, 
curtailed ontological field. Theory-synergetic approach shares analytic eclecticism’s 
concern with real-world problems and its emphasis on ontology. However, it proposes 
to tackle substantive issues in IR without seeking to bracket theoretical diversity or by 
sacrificing normative concerns. TSA holds that theory-choice should be determined by 
specific problems of a given empirical puzzle, not be restricted by a priori assumptions 
about what constitutes valid knowledge or how the puzzle fits within parameters of an 
“acceptable” eclectic-theoretical combination.   
 
Theoretical synergy 
Theory-synergetic approach is called to realise the inherent meta-disciplinary power 
of IR and to reveal a deeper ontology of international relations. As such it is a proposed 
mechanism for systematic application of IR epistemological matrix to complex 
ontological problems, puzzles and challenges that encompass the widest possible 
range of global social incidence. That IR theories are lenses through which to view the 
reality is a common analogy (Smith, 2014). What TSA does is to translate that analogy 
into a practical and systematic approach. If the discipline of International Relations is 
to take seriously its commitment to a deeper (expanded) social ontology, then a 
common standard for a multi-paradigmatic approach is needed.  
 
That is not to suggest an attempt to impose uniformity or to “discipline the discipline”. 
Rather, TSA is an attempt at a minimal IR epistemological reconciliation. 
Epistemological relativism implicit in the synergetic approach may suggest that 
anything goes. Ultimately, however, there are always good reasons for choosing this 
or that particular lens through which to examine a particular puzzle – what Patomaki 
and Wight call epistemological opportunism (2000, p. 227).  
 
However, the rationale for judging which theories are most suitable for addressing a 
given puzzle should be grounded in the ontological priorities of that specific research, 
rather than grand theory dogmas. And, as will be shown, ontological problem field of 
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international politics of energy allows for a wide range of IR theoretical applications, 
with each epistemic lens revealing a particular set of questions and issues, which all 
overlap in a synergetic way upon the same empirical question or puzzle.   
 
Epistemological incommensurability thesis posits that since different theories have 
different epistemological criteria there is simply no way to compare them. TSA directs 
attention to the question of ontological overlap between theories. If incommensurability 
thesis declares that theories clash then there must be something to clash over: “Put 
simply, if there is no ontological overlap then there is little point in trying to compare 
theories, or bemoan the fact that we can’t” (Patomaki and Wight, 2000, p. 227).  Theory 
synergetic approach is essentially a technique for in depth theoretical analysis of such 
ontological overlaps.  
 
For example, a neo-realist analysis of oil pipeline politics in the Caspian-
Mediterranean region in the period following collapse of the USSR, might focus on the 
relationship between the Russian Federation and the United States, Turkey and Iran, 
and/or the implications of additional volumes of hydrocarbons on the balance of power 
in the region and beyond. Green Theory, by contrast, would seek to establish the 
additional amount of CO2 that would be produced when that additional volume of 
hydrocarbons is burnt, its implications for global warming and the politics which 
prioritise fossil fuels over renewable energy. Critical theory would seek to expose the 
interests driving the building of particular pipelines (and not others) and how these 
serve hegemonic tendencies, and so on.  
 
All levels of theoretical applications would have something valid and useful to reveal 
about the ontological problem at hand – international politics of energy. The picture 
that emerges at the end is far richer, textured, detailed and complete than if this given 
ontology was subjected to a single grand theoretical level of analysis. But the real 
value of the TSA is the synergy that emerges through such intensive multi-
paradigmatic application. This theoretical synergy pivots upon ontological overlaps.  
 
It is immediately clear, for example, that all theories when applied to international 
politics of energy will address to greater or lesser extent the issue of environment. But 
the angle at which the problem will be viewed will depend on the paradigmatic 
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properties of a given theory. The colouring of the lens will determine what aspect of 
reality is revealed.  It is in the way different lenses interact and interplay with each 
other within a single research framework – theoretical synergy as a kaleidoscope 
made up of multi-coloured lenses – that makes TSA what it is.  
 
Politics of oil (and gas) 
Politics of oil and gas provide for a particularly dynamic empirical field upon which TSA 
might be applied (see Chapter 3). This is partly down to an opportune overlap in the 
story of oil in the twentieth century and historical development of IR as a discipline in 
the Great Debates. Thus, emergence of petroleum as a key strategic resource in the 
aftermath of WWI overlapped with the timeline of the first Great Debate between 
Idealists and Realists. Prominence accorded by Realists to oil as a strategic factor in 
world politics is not accidental. Realists pointed to the value of oil in its material impact 
on relative and absolute power of states and as subject of international competition. 
As Wheeler and Whited put it in their seminal account of the oil industry: 
 
“The name of the game is power – power to mobilize transportation, industry, and 
mechanical hardware; power to heat and cool; power to influence foreign affairs and 
domestic policies; power to conduct the most expensive and uncertain gamble on 
earth; and power to win or lose world conflicts” (1971, p.1). 
 
Control and possession of natural resources generally and oil specifically are thus a 
central component of national power (Morgenthau, pp.131-135; Waltz, 1979, p.131). 
Hence the relative value of oil - its implications for power politics. E.H. Carr identified 
economic strength as instrument of political power through its relationship with military 
strength (Carr, 2002 (1981; 1939), p. 105). Pursuit of economic self-sufficiency or 
autarchy, especially in raw materials, is the first measure by which states utilise 
economic power in the service of national policy (Ibid. p.110). Carr viewed economic 
independence as “...primarily a form of preparedness for war” (Ibid, P.111). 
Morgenthau is even more emphatic about “the power of oil” (1985, p.133). He too 
recognised the historical relationship between raw materials, economic power and 
military strength (ibid, p.131).  
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These brief observations serve to underline how theoretical debates do not take place 
in a vacuum and have always been informed and structured by substantive issues and 
real-world concerns and contemporary questions in international affairs. Moving from 
realism onwards through Great Debates, IR theoretical matrix offers a unique prism 
through which to analyse evolution in international energy politics. The latter in turn 
provides for a particularly useful empirical problem-field for studying how different IR 
theories tackle real-life puzzles, from inter-state war to global climate change. As such 
it is precisely the type of ontological overlap referred to by Patomaki and Wight, over 
which theories clash and may be compared (2002, p. 227). TSA, however, goes further 
in arguing that they can be synergised.  
 
Specific case-studies of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the Southern Gas 
Corridor (SGC) pipeline project, will be used to demonstrate how this can be done in 
practice and to operationalise the workings and mechanisms of theory-synergetic 
approach. BTC is an international commercial oil pipeline, operated by BP, spanning 
three countries, from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean coast and has been in 
operation since 2005 (BP Operations and Projects 1, 2017). Southern Gas Corridor is 
a proposed EU-backed, multilateral international energy project, comprising a series 
of natural gas pipelines, running from Azerbaijan to Italy (BP Operations and Projects 
2, 2017; European Commission 1, 2017).  
 
These case-studies will be systematically examined throughout this thesis, as part of 
theoretical modelling and other TSA analytical tools (see below). However, it is argued 
that that the advantage of using synergetic, as opposed to single-paradigm or eclectic 
approaches, is that it unlocks a deeper ontological realm of any given problem field.  
Applying TSA to study international projects, such as BTC and SCG pipelines will 
necessitate understanding of the underlying material and ideational factors, social 
forces and historical processes that constitute those projects and determine their real 
location in the deeper ontological realm of energy politics.  
 
There are no a priori limitations or brackets on what constitutes that realm – the wider 
the epistemically-defined scope of applied theoretical synergy on a given problem, the 
more can be revealed about its material constitution, normative claims and debates 
surrounding it, historical contingencies and conditions that gave rise to it, in other 
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words -  its place in the “world out there”. Ontology, therefore, precedes epistemology 
- theory-synergetic approach begins with a recognition that the first purpose of IR here 
is to study politics of oil and gas by all means available; the choice of the means being 
determined by empirical concerns alone.  
 
Synthesis vs synergy 
There are, of course, other multi-theoretical, pluralistic approaches, briefly discussed 
in the previous chapter, that are animated by the same sense of ontological focus, 
drive to produce practically-relevant knowledge and by the same commitment to 
epistemological flexibility as TSA. At this stage. it is worth examining these analytical 
frameworks, not least because TSA proceeds from the same starting positions as 
synthesis and eclectic approaches in identifying the need for pluralist theoretical 
engagement as the necessary direction for IR to pursue in the aftermath of the Fourth 
Debate. There is agreement that complexity of modern international phenomena 
precludes mono-causal explanations and requires more comprehensive elucidation, 
even at the cost of diminished theoretical parsimony (Moravcsik, 2003, p.131). 
 
However, there are fundamental problems with synthesis and eclectic approaches 
which raise doubts over their potential to fulfil the task of building multi-theoretical IR. 
First, as previously stated, synergy is not synthesis. It is highly debateable that a truly 
cross-paradigmatic theoretical synthesis in International Relations is possible at all, 
whatever its proponents might claim. It is true that for them incommensurability is not 
considered an obstacle because, as Moravcsik argues:  
 
“... the elements of a synthesis, though necessarily coherent at some fundamental 
level, need not share a full range of basic ontological assumptions. Although the 
overarching assumptions embedded in a given model must be minimally coherent and 
justify the relative position of the elements within a multitheoretical synthesis, there is 
no need for each subtheory of the synthesis to make identical assumptions about 
fundamental ontological matters” (Ibid., p. 132).  
 
For Moravcsik IR theoretical synthesis can and should be theoretically diverse – its 
only test comes from the necessity for proposed syntheses to be empirically 
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established. Epistemological status of any given synthesis is thus no different to that 
of its component individual theories: “in both cases, our confidence is a function of 
plausibly objective empirical support” (Ibid). However, methodological problems 
associated with testing of complex theoretical syntheses are likely to be considerably 
more significant than those of a single theory. Moravcsik’s proposes to overcome or 
rather bypass this hurdle by disaggregating or breaking down elements of the 
synthesis and testing those separately using specific methods (Ibid, p.133).   
 
The main reason Moravcsik believes this is possible and that theoretical synthesis is 
easier than one might think is because he proceeds under a particular conception of 
synthesis: “Most syntheses comprise a set of discrete theories, linked by a set of 
overarching assumptions.” (Ibid, p.132). However, in reality genuine synthesis means 
that component elements are subsumed by a synthetic new entity and cease to 
function as independent variables. Their material or abstract integrity is deconstructed 
and then reconstructed as part of a new whole.  
 
Therefore, disaggregating component elements of theoretical synthesis and 
empirically testing each one and the assumptions underpinning them separately will 
not tell us anything about how they operate within synthetic theoretical model. Since 
they do not function as distinct entities within a synthesis their foundational properties 
and underpinning epistemological and ontological assumptions would by definition 
have been subsumed and incorporated into a new unified theoretical model. They 
would have effects within the synthesis but not of the causal kind that can be discerned 
through disaggregation – to be a genuine IR theoretical synthesis its causal claim must 
have intellectual integrity independent of its constituent parts.  
 
Moravcsik, by contrast sees synthesis as characterised by a set of overarching 
assumptions; his argument proceeds from there and his choice of examples to 
illustrate workable synthesis models is telling: “The overarching assumptions take 
various forms, each embedding subtly different formal and substantive assumptions: 
multivariate regression equations, game theoretical models, explicit models of 
interactions, decision trees, lexicographical orderings, narrative accounts, multistage 
sequences...” (Ibid). But is it really that simple? 
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We know that theoretical synthesis is possible in IR but only when its component 
elements are founded on common ontological and epistemological assumptions. 
Common subject matter is not sufficient to provide a basis for a credible synthesis. For 
example, a neo-realist, a Marxist, a social constructivist and a feminist might all study 
armed conflicts in South Caucasus but the conflicts they will see will differ markedly 
given different foundational claims underpinning their respective paradigms. 
Proponents of the synthesis approach have not yet provided a compelling illustration 
of how this degree of incommensurability might be overcome on substantive level.  
 
Setting the above aside and, for the sake of the argument, accepting disaggregation 
as a way around the problem of theoretical incommensurability would still not provide 
a workable synthesis model, because “different methods of theory testing are 
predicated on different epistemological assumptions...” (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010, 
p.17). Without a common and agreed unity of method the standards by which 
component theories would be empirically tested will be internal only to those theories 
and not the synthetic whole. Whilst a degree of synthesis may well be possible 
between theoretical positions which share common epistemologies, any wider inter-
paradigmatic synthesis is not therefore a credible model for IR theoretical pluralism.  
 
Analytic eclecticism vs synergetic analysis 
Turning now to analytic eclecticism it is important to first acknowledge that TSA shares 
some of its concerns with prioritisation of real-life problems experienced and its 
eschewal of excessive simplifications, often employed to fit within paradigmatic 
boundaries – what Sil and Katzenstein call the “no extrageneous factors” rule (2010, 
p.10). They set out their eclectic theoretical model as a means to explore “how diverse 
mechanisms posited in competing paradigm-bound theories might interact with each 
other, and how, under certain conditions, they can combine to affect outcomes” (Ibid).  
 
Yet there again is the spectre of incommensurability and Sil and Katzenstein do 
acknowledge difficulties it poses, especially when it comes to the old problem of 
establishing objective criteria for evaluating theoretical claims drawn from different 
paradigms (Ibid., p.15). However, unlike the disaggregation approach offered by 
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proponents of theoretical synthesis, analytic eclecticism posits the way out of 
incommensurability problem based expressly upon its substantive focus.  
 
Analytic eclecticism prioritises ontology over epistemology and therefore questions of 
theory-selection and testing are to be determined and operationalised by empirical 
referents, embedded within specific substantive matters and concepts. Analytic 
eclecticism overcomes the incommensurability thesis not through abstract theoretical 
evaluations but through systematic empirical analysis of research-specific substantive 
indicators: “It is possible to ensure that concepts and analytic principles are properly 
understood in their original conceptual frameworks, and to adjust or translate these 
terms by considering how they are operationalised in the relevant empirical contexts 
by proponents of various paradigms” (Ibid).  
 
Sil and Katzenstein go to great length to stress that analytic eclecticism is not a 
metatheoretical approach and nor is it an attempt “to hedge the bets to cope with 
uncertainty” (Ibid., p.16). They are explicit in their insistence that it is not theoretical 
synthesis and that does not imply that ‘anything goes’. What marks eclectic 
scholarship out are a set of key features (Ibid, p. 19): 
 
 open-needed, non-paradigm-bound problem formulation; 
 middle range causal accounts of international political phenomena drawn from 
more than one paradigm; 
 research outcomes which pragmatically engage both academic and practical 
dimensions and address the needs of policy makers and practioners.  
 
This combinational approach employing middle range theories is “specifically 
constructed to shed light on specific sets of empirical phenomena” but is not a 
juxtaposition or substitution for paradigm-based research (Ibid., p22-23). Analytic 
eclecticism is concerned with pragmatic engagement with social reality with the aim of 
identifying those knowledge clusters “that can enrich policy debates and normative 
discussions beyond the academe” (Ibid.): “Even when it is not offering explicit policy 
prescriptions, eclectic scholarship should have some clear implications for some set 
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of policy debates or salient normative concerns that enmesh leaders, public 
intellectuals, and other actors in a given political setting” (Ibid).  
 
A consistent commitment to production of practically-useful knowledge is informed in 
part by a sense that historic privileging of grand contests over epistemology has made 
International Relations less relevant to the world of practioners. As Ferguson and 
Mansbach argue contemporary IR should seek to use its pluralist theoretical 
framework in a “practical fashion” to address issues of importance in world politics. 
Analytic eclecticism certainly responds to their call to enhance the use of traditional 
paradigmatic perspectives in order “to bring more than one of them to bear on 
particular problems—different theories illuminate different aspects of “reality” (2014).  
 
Yet this systematic commitment to practical scholarship is not without problems of its 
own. Sil and Katzenstein briefly acknowledge the risk of loss of critical thinking “in 
relation to existing policy agendas” (2010, p.13). They also refer to Anne Norton’s 
paper “Political Science as a Vocation” warning, as she does, that “problem-orientated 
scholarship can end up enlisting scholars in the unreflective service of those exercising 
power” (2004, p.68). But they quickly move on to warn of the danger of over-
preoccupation with purely academic debates “that are hermetically blocked off from 
public discourse and policy debates about important issues of interest to both scholars 
and practioners” (2010, p.13). 
 
Yet, perhaps, it would have been useful to pay more attention to Norton’s warnings 
about the ethical implications of the relationship between knowledge and power. All 
science is a priori political and is conducted in languages which both constitute and 
reflect “contemporary preferences, prejudices, norms, standards, and assumptions” 
(2004, p. 74):  
 
“Science comprises institutions and discourses. We have studied institutions. We have 
learned that institutions call identities and interests into being. The presence of funding 
for particular projects, the absence of funding for others, will ensure that in some (if 
not in many) cases, individuals will undertake research projects not because they think 
these are the most important, but because these are the projects that can be 
accomplished, or even because these are the projects that bring the greatest rewards. 
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The power of the state is evident here but that of private funding is no less to be 
deprecated” (Ibid., p.73).  
 
The above is not a mere abstract warning. For example, Joseph Nye’s article 
“Scholars on the Sidelines” in The Washington Post (13.04.2009) is often cited 
(including by Sil and Katzenstein (2010, p.1)) to argue in favour of academics and 
researchers becoming directly involved in the world political practice.  But that is the 
world of power and politicians, some of whom are tyrants. Joseph Nye’s own 
experience with the regime of Colonel Gaddafi of Libya should serve as a cautionary 
tale (Silverstein, 2014, p.9).  
 
As Norton argues problem-orientated scholarship “is bad for politics and bad for 
science”: “It encourages arrogance; persuading the young and the uneducated (and 
occasionally the old and the erudite) that they can solve problems beyond their reach; 
that they can answer questions they do not fully understand... Quick conclusions are 
encouraged; study, consideration, refection, and debate are not. Science is not 
advanced in this economy. Politics is harmed by it” (2004, p.73). It is not necessary to 
subscribe to Norton’s view in its entirety. But it is important to acknowledge that 
practical, real-world problem-orientated scholarship must be rooted in a reflective and 
critical understanding of world politics. It is essential to spell out what is meant by 
useful knowledge and this is where the problem with Sil and Katzenstein’s approach 
stems from.  
 
Theirs is an unapologetically an empirical enterprise and its theoretical focus is 
circumscribed by clearly delineated material categories – structural factors, causal 
mechanisms, various social processes. These are drawn from existing mainstream 
paradigmatic traditions in IR. As Reus-Smit contends, this makes analytic eclecticism 
“epistemologically an empirical-theoretical project” (2013, p. 591). Normative reflection 
is absent from it with IR remaining an explanatory enterprise, interested in only 
empirical problems.  
 
And there is a reason for this. Sil and Katzenstein self-consciously seek to bracket 
metatheory and prioritise ontology by locating analytical eclecticism in the wider 
framework of the pragmatic turn in American social science. Geographic location 
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matters because Sil and Katzenstein refer to the TRIP surveys (Maliniak et al, 2007; 
Jordan et al, 2009) to argue that paradigmatic research continues to dominate the 
discipline (2010, p. 24). They then point out that almost two thirds of all IR scholarship 
comes from the triad of realism, liberalism and constructivism (Jordan et al, 2009, p. 
18).  
 
And it is on that basis that Sil and Katzenstein proceed to locate their eclectic vision 
of international relations scholarship in the context of realist/liberal/constructivist 
matrix – the Triad. They do concede that “other paradigms have acquired significance, 
at times for long periods, in various countries” (2010, p. 25). However, they refer to 
TRIP studies to indicate that the Triad remains the most viable contender for 
paradigmatic dominance in IR and argue that “it is in the context of debates between 
realists, liberals and constructivists that we find it most useful to elaborate on the 
significance of analytical eclecticism for the study of world politics” (Ibid).   The reason 
they find it “most useful” is because “these are the most prevalent approaches in the 
United States and worldwide” (Ibid, p.36). 
 
Limiting the approach to a three-dimensional paradigmatic framework provides both 
its distinct ontology and the epistemological foundation of analytical eclecticism.  The 
examples of eclectic scholarship Sil and Katzenstein presented in “Beyond 
Paradigms” (2010) are chosen specifically to highlight convergences and overlaps 
within the Realist/Liberal/Constructivist paradigms (which could be tagged as Neo-
Neo-Con). Interestingly, constructivism here appears as consequentially logical 
addition to a dominant paradigmatic pairing – its addition is useful, almost utilitarian, 
adding value to analytical eclecticism, which Sil and Katzenstein explicitly posit as a 
practical empirical-theoretical approach, aimed at providing useful knowledge for 
policy-makers. One is tempted to recall Walt’s prescription from two decades ago:  
 
“The "compleat diplomat" of the future should remain cognizant of realism's emphasis 
on the inescapable role of power, keep liberalism's awareness of domestic forces in 
mind, and occasionally reflect on constructivism's vision of change” (1998, p.35). 
 
Furthermore, as Reus-Smit argues, bracketing metatheory “does not free one’s work 
of metatheoretical constraints” (2013, p. 605). In Sil and Katzenstein’s analytical 
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eclecticism these constraints are structured by “a grund epistemological assumption 
that admits only empirical-theoretic forms of inquiry and knowledge” (Ibid). He 
examines the concept of practical knowledge from Aristotelian and Kantian 
perspectives, and revisits E.H.Carr’s supposed ultra-realism, concluding that for all 
these thinkers, “practical knowledge is the kind of knowledge that can address 
questions of how I, we, or they should act” (Ibid, p.602):  
 
“By not reflecting on the metatheoretical assumptions that constitute the 
epistemological boundaries and ontological contours of their conception of analytical 
eclecticism, Sil and Katzenstein fail to see how these assumptions impede the 
production of Aristotelian forms of practical knowledge, the kind of knowledge required 
to address key questions of political action in contemporary world politics. Such 
knowledge can only ever be the product of the integration of empirical and normative 
insights, yet the latter are epistemologically outside the scope of analytical eclecticism” 
(Ibid., 605-606). 
 
Even without committing to production of practical knowledge it is clear that these 
criticisms are valid - for all its pluralist claims analytic eclecticism remains bound by 
restrictive ontological and epistemological constraints. To demonstrate how theory-
synergetic approach can overcome these problems it is first necessary to explain 
fundamental philosophical differences between the two approaches. Unlike 
eclecticism, which is founded in the pragmatist tradition, TSA is rooted in critical realist 
philosophy of science.  
 
Critical Realism and TSA 
The rationale for placing theory-synergetic approach within the realist PoS springs 
from a starting foundational proposition, a thesis that holds that in the course of the 
Fourth Debate an ontological realm has been revealed and established, comprising 
an international reality – a global political subject matter, consisting of both material 
and ideational properties and qualities. This ontological realm is specific and particular 
to the discipline of International Relations and is not studied by other, older social 
sciences - IR has found the world of its own (Epstein, 2013, p.500). 
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Moreover, this international realm comprises deep ontology of International Relations 
– a complex reality consisting of multiple layers and dimensions. It exists as a historical 
fact and process in its material and ideational condition, regardless of whether it is 
observed or spoken of. In fact, its existence is a condition of possibility of it being 
observed or spoken about – it is a mind-independent reality. For example, as Wendt 
argued, in mainstream and critical IR scholarship states and states systems are 
treated as real structures and are referred to even if they are physically unobservable 
(1999, p.47). As such, theory-synergetic method is designed and called for to provide 
a model for studying and revealing the deep ontology of International Relations, one 
puzzle and one layer at a time.  
 
Yet to take this stance requires accepting a proposition that international realm exists 
independently of human beings and that it comprises a real, although often 
unobservable structure that can be revealed through science, in this case IR. Ontology 
precedes epistemology.  Although Wendt argues that “most IR scholars are at least 
tacit realists” (Ibid), these claims need to be further justified, as they are highly 
contested and disputed, both in PoS and in IR. For example, the correspondence 
theory of truth that underpins critical realism may be viewed as simply inference to 
best explanation – the idea that that something that has been proven to be true must 
have always been true because it has now been proven true – and, therefore, lacks 
solid logical foundation (Monteiro and Ruby, 2009, p. 33-35).  
Can ontology really be defined simultaneously as both a fallible interpretation of reality 
and as a definitive definition of a reality beyond our knowledge-claims? Critical realism 
is charged with confusing and conflating these meanings in attempt to justify the claim 
that critical realist ontology ought to supply the terms of reference for the scientific 
project (Cruickshank, 2004). Instead, critics argue, ontological theories in social 
sciences ought to be revised and replaced in the course of an on-going critical dialogue 
about reality (material and ideational) and should be defined in terms of fallible, 
empirically-testable interpretations of social reality (Ibid, p. 582).  
Social reality is just too complex to be assessed within one fixed ontology supplying 
universal terms of reference for the sciences. In fact, reality is such that “it is not 
possible to describe and explain it theoretically using the forms in which it immediate 
appears to us, without irresolvable problems and contradictions arising” (Magill, 1994, 
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p. 131). That means even if one acknowledges applicability of ideational, 
unobservable, illusionary concepts, it is not necessary to accept any overarching 
philosophical ontology in social science to apply them in research (Ibid, p.121). Critical 
realism is just too vague and general to provide any real guidance or clear implications 
for resolving specific ontological problems with social sciences, such as IR (Ibid). This 
echoes Monteiro and Ruby’s call for foundational prudence and abandonment of 
ontological philosophies (2009, p.35).  
The problem with these criticisms is that in challenging Critical Realism they offer no 
clear alternative criteria by which ontological claims could be evaluated and no 
roadmaps of their own for resolving foundational problems in the social sciences, save 
for a call for renewed empirical focus. Some critics drew on a contrast with ontological 
arguments in the natural sciences to claim that critical realist concept of deep ontology 
lacks legitimacy. In the natural sciences, ontological claims can be given some 
justification, but only when they are derived from research that is widely held to be 
empirically successful, whereas realist ontological claims in the social sciences do not 
have this basis and alternative critical realist mode of justification for these claims is 
simply unconvincing (Kemp, 2005).  
However, arguing that social scientific research should be conducted without 
philosophical legislation takes us back to narrow empiricist ontologies which posit that 
the fundamental characteristics of the social realm can only be established ex post 
facto to the production of empirically successful research in that realm. That, in turn 
takes us back to unresolved debates in IR. Drawing analogies with the natural 
sciences to borrow their ontological standards poses no special problems for 
materialists who hold there are no fundamental differences between natural and social 
realities but would not be acceptable for post-structuralists or social-constructivists 
(Wendt, 1999, p.49). TSA’s justification in seeking an epistemologically relativist, 
ontologically-centred foundational rooting is in seeking to resolve these problems and 
contradictions. Nevertheless, reliance on critical scientific analytical concepts, such as 
deep ontology, mind-independent reality, the no-miracles argument, requires further 
elaboration and validation.  
Critical realism holds that both positivist and anti-positivist philosophical approaches 
are inherently anti-realist. Empiricists do, in fact.  accept “the world out there” that 
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exists independently of scholars studying it, but posit that it can only be made real 
though observation and experience. Anti-positivists are categorical in denying the 
existence of “the world out there”, claiming that reality is socio-linguistically 
constructed. Thus positivists embrace anti-realism in their attempt to purge science of 
any traces of subjectivity, whilst anti-positivists become anti-realist through their 
emphasis on human agency in the process of creating or constructing reality (Wendt, 
1999, p.47).  
 
It is a common metaphysical structure – “anthropocentric reality” – a shared belief that 
reality can be real only if it is experienced (positivists) or spoken (anti-positivists) 
(Patomaki and Wight, 2000, p.216-217). Yet to exist must surely mean more than to 
be ‘experienced’ or ‘spoken’: there must be a reality that gives rise to that experience 
and language in the first place - “A world prior to the emergence of humanity is a 
condition of possibility for that emergence” (Ibid.). The workings and techniques of 
TSA are explored in this thesis using the case-study of international oil and gas 
pipelines. Yet the grund-ontology – the deep reality – of this case-study is neither 
“international politics”, nor “energy”, nor “production and transmission”, but 
hydrocarbons.  
 
Oil and gas are hydrogen combined with carbon (hydrocarbons), deposited 
underground in liquid and vapour forms respectively. Hydrocarbon deposits are the 
buried remnants of ancient algae, plankton and vegetation – they have a biogenic 
historical origin. Through various industrial processes, such as blending, distillation 
and refining, hydrocarbons can be transformed into a multitude of products for a whole 
range of uses, generation of power emerging as the most important since in the course 
of the 20th century. Before hydrocarbons can be burnt in internal combustion engines 
of our world they must be extracted and transported from the few locations on the 
planet where they are found. The geography of oil and its chemistry, the engineering 
and industrial processes that go into production of energy are all deeply ingrained and 
enmeshed in the social, economic, cultural and political fabric of the hydrocarbon 
reality of modern human civilisation.  
 
And yet oil has a much longer human history, having been used by generations since 
deep antiquity, for a variety of purposes, from medicine to illumination, from lubrication 
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to religious ceremonies. Most significantly, however, it predates the emergence of 
humanity and is of itself a state of metamorphosis of biological matter – an ongoing 
historical process. The few thousand years of human experience and discourse of oil 
are but a blip in the timeline of many millions of years. Oil, therefore, exists in a “world 
out there” – a mind-independent reality, which shapes the deep ontology of this TSA 
case-study.  
 
Thus, for example, Zoroastrian fire worshippers on the western coast of the Caspian 
Sea around 600BC had no conception of the origins and the chemical composition of 
the gases that fed the naturally occurring flames at their temples, or the complex 
geology that created the seemingly eternal fires breaking out of rocks. The social 
construction of oil began before its scientific discovery and empirical observation. But 
the prior existence of oil constitutes a condition of possibility for both.  
 
And the discovery of oil involved no miracles. Scientific advances over the course of 
centuries have revealed chemical composition of hydrocarbons and technologies were 
developed to apply oil and gas to multiple uses. The latter process itself was 
incremental. In the early stages of industrialisation oil was used almost exclusively for 
illumination because technology available for refining at the time allowed for creation 
of only one product – kerosene. As science progressed technologies were developed 
creating thousands of uses for oil products (Montgomery, 2010, pp.14-29).  
 
Perhaps, the “no miracles” argument for the success of science is not necessarily 
“better off” argument.  Science can be used for good and ill and technologies can have 
positive and negative consequences. The “no miracles” claim “is merely that because 
of science we can manipulate the environment in ways we could not before, even 
when we wanted to. By that limited criterion scientific knowledge is progressive” 
(Wendt. 1999, p.64). As Wendt argues the “no miracles” claim shows how science has 
been successful by gradually bringing our theoretical understanding of the world “into 
conformity with the deep structure of the world out there” (Ibid., p.64-65).   
 
The brief discussion above illuminates the fallacy, even arrogance, of anthropocentric 
philosophical approaches and anti-philosophical critiques of realism. Hydrocarbons do 
not stop ‘being’ if not measured or made subject of a discourse. Their existence is not 
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conditional upon human agency and given that humans are themselves a carbon-
based life form, a degree of humility would not be out of place. Critical realism is 
informed by this sense of humility on the wider scale of scientific endeavour. It holds 
there are no miracles in the process of knowledge discovery and is premised upon the 
argument that “the world is real and science is dependent upon the making of 
existential hypothesis” (Patomaki and Wight, 2000, p.218).  
 
There is, therefore, complexity to the critical realist conception of the world – it is not 
limited to discourses, impressions, experiences and so on, but is also of deeper 
underlying structures; there are different levels of reality, with the latter making the 
former possible. This is what is meant by deep ontology and the reason why critical 
realism is sometimes referred to as Depth Realism. Critical realism therefore is an 
ontological enterprise – a perpetual scientific enquiry: “Science is seen to proceed 
through a constant spiral of discovery and understanding, further discovery and 
revision, and hopefully ore adequate understanding” (Ibid, p.224).  
 
But there is also an implicit recognition that knowledge is not arbitrary – it is a social 
product which is dependent on antecedent social products and comes into being in 
non-spontaneous manner (Bhaskar, 2007, p.18). Not only different disciplines but 
different theories within a discipline can interpret the same ontological reality in 
radically different ways. This means that there are grounds for choosing one approach 
over another and justifiable reasons for preferring one theory to another (Patomaki 
and Wight, 2000, p.224). 
 
Theory-synergetic method pivots on the idea that Critical Realism, with its commitment 
to perpetual scientific enquiry, ontological foundationalism, epistemological relativism, 
and “judgemental rationalism” (grounds for choosing between theories (Ibid)), can be 
applied to the social world. And that is a major challenge - can “social kinds” exist 
independently of human mind? And can the “no miracles” argument really be applied 
in the case of social science, such as International Relations, where there is less 
compelling evidence of scientific success (Wendt, 1999, p.67-68)? 
 
Roy Bhaskar had set out three key differences between social and natural kinds 
((1979) 1998), p. 42). Firstly, the existence of social structures is dependent on the 
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activities that govern them. That is to say the social kinds are more space-time specific 
than natural kinds. Oil has been found at various times in various locations – it is a 
general natural phenomenon. Meanwhile the 18th century Scottish Enlightenment is 
defined and constituted by its spatial and temporal context. 
 
Secondly, the existence of social kinds is dependent on the conceptions, beliefs and 
theories held by actors or agents participating in the activities that make-up the social 
structures. For example, the emergence in the late 19th/early 20th century of a 
particular category of the oil trader created a certain set of shared ideas about that 
category, which are not reducible to the actual act of trading oil. Before the emergence 
of these shared ideas the category did not exist. Thirdly, social kinds are ultimately 
dependent on human practices and “may be only relatively enduring” (Bhaskar, 1998, 
p. 42). As Wendt argues, social kinds, are “a function of belief and action” (1999, p.71). 
Again, this raises question whether social kinds can be independent of the human 
agency and discourse.  
 
Critical realists have responded to these problems with various counterarguments.  
For starters, the social world may well depend on the concepts agents acting within it 
possess, “but it cannot be the case that any given social phenomenon requires the 
existence of a social scientist to conceptualise it before it comes into being” (Patomaki 
and Wight, 2000, p.225). Critical realism envisages a deep ontology of the social world 
that cannot be reduced to the simple fact of its experience or to its intersubjective 
elements. The sense that when it comes to social kinds intersubjective meanings have 
causal power may well obscure their deeper, previously hidden, essential relations. 
 
Furthermore, the role of material forces in forming and shaping the social kinds cannot 
be overstated. Ultimately human beings are natural kinds of themselves. As Wendt 
puts it: “In the last analysis a theory of social kinds must refer to natural kinds, including 
human bodies and their physical behaviour, which are amenable to a causal theory of 
reference. Constructivism without nature goes too far (1999, p.72). But for Wendt 
excessive materialism is unhelpful and he brings forward a further argument – the self-
organisation hypothesis. This is a claim that the social world is self-organising in the 
same way as the natural world.  
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For example, the human descriptions of animals in no way make the animals what 
they are. The self-organising quality of natural kinds determines our understandings 
and theories about them. Similarly, social kinds of various types can also be self-
organising. For example, Wendt focuses on the distinction between the empirical and 
the juridical sovereignty of states to argue that when it comes to states as self-
organising social kinds, the “process of boundary-drawing receives much of its 
impetus from forces “inside” the space around which the boundary will be drawn” (Ibid, 
p.74). 
 
It is not simply a question of whether social kinds can be self-organising, or whether 
they are underpinned by material foundations greater than the force of intersubjective 
meanings attached and brought to life by them. Neither is it enough to simply 
emphasize the role of material forces in constituting and forming social kinds. Critical 
realism as applied through theory-synergetic approach seeks to demonstrate that 
natural and social kinds can exist in a mutually referential relationship, as one and the 
same, simultaneously. 
 
The example here is again oil. Crude oil is a most natural kind – unrefined hydrocarbon 
straight from the pressure cooker of Nature where it has accumulated over millions of 
years. A barrel of oil contains 159 litres of crude. It is extracted in one place, sold in 
another and then physically transported to a power plant elsewhere to be burnt to 
produce electricity. Or it might be transported to a refinery where it can be turned into 
petroleum for cars, diesel or jet fuel. The various by-products of refining can then be 
utilised to produce anything from plastics to Vaseline. Whilst all these production and 
transportation processes, and arguably their outcomes, are social endeavours and 
structures their relation to oil (the natural kind) is ultimately determined and limited by 
material factors – its molecular structure that allows for an X number of uses and 
transformations.  
 
But a barrel of oil can also exist as a product of agents’ imagination and nothing else. 
A paper barrel exists in the virtual international realm of futures commodity trading 
even when the physical barrel does not. It can be bought and sold but will never 
change hands. It is not a source of energy or anything material at all but an investment 
opportunity for a hedge fund or a local government authority somewhere in the world. 
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Futures markets emerged in 19th Century America primarily for agricultural products – 
a way for farmers to manage long-term risks of expanding production. Basic human 
needs give rise to complex social structures. The role of oil futures markets, such as 
NYMEX (New York Mercantile Exchange, formerly Butter, Cheese and Egg 
Exchange), is discussed in Chapter VII. Here it suffices to say that what first emerged 
as a risk management tool for people who used and those who produced oil – 
“hedgers” – has now become something else entirely.  
 
It is a social structure of its own kind, where traders – “speculators” – who have no 
interest in taking delivery of the physical commodity, operate with a single purpose of 
making profit by anticipating and acting on constant changes in price. These 
“speculators” could be institutional investors representing, perhaps, a major European 
pension fund or independent traders in South East Asia in search of greater returns 
on their personal wealth funds. Most of them have never seen crude oil in their 
lifetimes. Millions of paper barrels can be sold and bought around the world without 
being extracted, delivered, burnt into energy or refined into other products. It does not 
mean they do not exist.  
 
A barrel of crude and a paper barrel of oil, a natural kind and a social kind, exist as 
one and the same but separately and simultaneously. The former has no causal 
relationship with the latter; the latter is underpinned by materialist assumptions but is 
entirely self-organising, possessing social qualities and properties which add specific 
value distinct and different from the former. It is possible, for example, to do with paper 
barrels what is physically impossible to do with actual crude oil barrels e.g. buy them 
two years in the future whilst someone else hedges their retirement pension to your 
purchase, in the future, and all of that takes place virtually on a computer screen.  
 
This suggests that trans-historical claims can be made about social kinds. Whilst the 
Scottish Enlightenment is specific to its temporal/spatial context, insofar as 
enlightenment refers to a broader social kind of outpouring of intellectual and cultural 
achievements, it is not limited by time and place. Similarly, futures trading in eggs in 
19th century United States is space/time specific, whilst general futures trading in 
commodities, be these paper barrels of oil or other goods, are trans-historical 
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phenomena and are not defined or limited by the spatial/temporal context in which 
these activities take place.      
 
Furthermore, as argued above, the emergence and existence of social kinds may be 
dependent on interlocking concepts, beliefs and theories held by agents as well as the 
human practices that carry them from location to location over time. A critical realist 
account of the world, however, identifies a deeper multi-layered ecological, biological 
and social reality and a more causally interactive relationship between social and 
natural kinds.  
 
A paper barrel – a social kind – may come into existence as a product of human 
imagination and agency, rooted in the material assumptions associated with the value 
of a natural kind (crude oil). However, once it is operational it acquires self-organising 
quality and real-life value of its own, independent of the intersubjective meanings 
attached to it by actors. And what can be said about mind-independent quality of social 
kinds when we consider that such activities as emissions trading in pollution or 
commodity futures trading in oil often take place virtually with almost no input from 
humans – complex risk assessment and price adjustment operations are carried out 
by computers, acting on advanced algorithms.  
 
Importantly these social kind/natural kind transactions and interactions have profound 
real-life economic, political and social impacts. For example, international 
financialisation of oil has been one of the driving factors in the rise of global oil prices 
from mid 2000s onwards. The rise in the price of oil and other commodity prices in turn 
led to new political dynamics in relations between energy producing and consuming 
states, and so on. Implicit and explicit historicism of critical realism unlocks analytical 
mechanisms for identification of trans-historical characteristics of international political 
phenomena. 
 
If, for example, we take systemic theories of IR such as structural realism and ask 
whether its insights can be generalised through time and space, a philosophical 
answer would be yes, “provided the essential features of the relevant kinds are 
preserved” (Wendt, 1999, p.70). States interacting under conditions of anarchy are the 
relevant kinds in this case and whilst the cultural characteristics of “states” and 
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“anarchy” are variable (“anarchy is what states make of it” (Ibid)), the formative 
defining characteristics that make them “social kinds” are not historically variable: “The 
culture of international politics in ancient Greece may have been different than the 
culture of international politics today, but this does not mean there are no 
commonalities between the two worlds which distinguish them jointly from bowling 
leagues” (Ibid).  
 
Theory synergetic approach seeks to adapt critical realist historicism with the aim of 
identifying these trans-historical commonalities within given pieces of research. This 
is possible to achieve without dismissing the complexity of culturally-contingent social 
phenomena. For example, strategic value of oil retains its essential features as a trans-
historical relevant social kind regardless of the time-specific analytical framework, e.g. 
WWI and the Russian Civil War, or the Battle of the Caucasus in WWII. It follows, 
therefore, that trans-historical claims can be made about, for example, pipeline politics 
as all pipeline projects share certain trans-historical commonalities. This trans-
historical-interplay between natural and social elements constitutes, defines and 
influences the multi-layered reality revealed by critical realist analysis – the multiplicity 
of global political, economic, social, cultural, demographic and other aspects of human 
condition.  
 
These can be studied separately within particular disciplinary sub-fields of social 
science designed to tackle particular sets of questions – economics, (international) 
finance, (international) law, political theory, demography, anthropology, history, 
sociology, strategic studies and so on. However, International Relations comes with a 
disciplinary superstructure that possesses the necessary intellectual toolkit (from 
theoretical diversity to methodological pluralism) that could allow for a holistic analysis 
of complex global phenomena, one that is multi-layered and is made up of the dynamic 
interplay between natural and social realities of human condition and experience. 
Through application of critical realist reasoning theory-synergetic approach is capable 
of demonstrating complex trans-historical dynamics between the material and the 
ideational in international relations. Critical realism is a sound philosophical grounding 
for TSA, an ontology-centred, epistemologically-relativist theoretical IR approach. 
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Operationalising theoretical synergy  
In summary, theory-synergetic approach is primarily an ontological enterprise that 
envisages international realm to be a real entity, comprising material and ideational 
structures and processes, and the discipline of IR is the science dedicated to studying 
it. TSA is an epistemologically-relativist multi-theoretical method of enquiry that rests 
on a hypothesis that IR paradigms are analytical tools that shed light on specific 
aspects of international political phenomena and that applying them systematically in 
a synergetic fashion can considerably enhance and amplify holistic understanding of 
a given empirical problem (Table 3 sets out broad outlines of TSA).   
 
Table 3. Theory Synergetic Approach and International Relations 
 
 TSA holds that there is a deeper ontology of International Relations and that 
it exists “out there”, independently of the scholars who study it; 
 TSA is epistemologically and methodologically relativist and committed to the 
widest possible multi-theoretical enterprise;  
 TSA is judgementally rationalist, holding to the view that theory selection 
should be determined in terms of ontological relevance in a given empirical 
problem and not upon a priori theoretical bracketing; 
 TSA seeks to reveal a deeper social reality and answer important substantive 
questions about international politics by generating theoretical synergy 
through a systematic application of IR multi-theoretical matrix to substantive 
empirical puzzles. 
 
To avoid the disaggregation problem identified with the synthesis multi-theoretical 
model, it is proposed instead to use the principle of paradigmatic dynamism. Broadly, 
it could mean an idea that scholars should internalise disciplinary-theoretical discourse 
as an integral language of International Relations, permeating all aspects of research. 
Multi-theoretical matrix of IR should be viewed as a kind of a periodic table, with each 
theory representing elements with corresponding epistemic and ontological properties 
and methodological characteristics, capable of producing specific types of knowledge 
about the international realm.  
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Paradigmatic dynamism requires engaging with IR research outputs, regardless of 
methodology, in the context of a roadmap. Data sets, secondary sources, historical 
accounts, questionnaires, interviews etc. can all be analysed and assessed in a 
paradigm-dynamic fashion, even if produced within confines of specific single-
paradigm models. In effect, theoretical matrix of IR is a sieve through which 
substantive issues can be passed through to produce multidimensional vision of 
international reality. Each theory, as mentioned, is a potential research tool. There is 
always more than one way of reading a particular set of results and the real interesting 
and revealing quality of any piece of research is identifying the ways in which these 
different dimensions of the same ontological framework interact and clash with each 
other.  
 
This relates to the second element of the theory synergetic method. Once the logic of 
paradigmatic dynamism permeates research and is applied to concrete substantive 
puzzles and problems the prospect of theoretical modelling arises. The different 
visions of international reality that emerge can be systematically sorted into specific 
theoretical models. Over the next chapters this approach is systematically applied to 
the case-studies of international energy pipelines and politics of oil and gas production, 
transmission and consumption. 
 
Briefly, it is being argued here that substantive subject matter of the case studies, set 
in a deeper ontology of global energy politics, can be modelled in accordance to 
epistemic values associated with various paradigmatic traditions of IR theoretical 
matrix. For example, a classical realist model of energy politics might centre on the 
role of great powers, drawing on the historical ebb and flow of strategic interests; a 
Marxist one might examine the dynamics of oil politics through analysis of class 
interests; a neo-realist model might in turn focus on how variables such as production 
and transmission of oil impact on distribution of power amongst states under 
conditions of anarchy; and so on.  
 
The principal idea here is that multi-theoretical analysis of the same ontological 
problem can produce widely different accounts and that these accounts can be 
systematically organised into epistemologically integral models. This is not an attempt 
to merely avoid the incommensurability problem. In fact, much of the 
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incommensurability arises from methodological differences and significant divergence 
in the data (research outputs) produced by these different methods. For example, a 
liberal institutionalist analysis of politics of Caspian oil is likely to focus on the activities 
of multi-national energy corporations, with emphasis on trade volumes, business 
geography, technologies, the role of financial institutions and banks, and a plethora of 
other commercial factors. Meanwhile, a critical model will inevitably seek to expose 
underlying power relations of Caspian energy politics and identify how the choices 
informing them came to be configured at specific points in time.  
 
It is unlikely that a synthesis of these two models can be produced in an 
epistemologically integral format and disaggregation on empirical level negates the 
very purpose and aims of a multi-theoretical research approach. Instead, theory 
synergetic method insists on preserving epistemological integrity of individual 
theoretical models built around the same subject matter, puzzle, or substantive 
problem. Theoretical synergy is built through such dynamic interactions between these 
epistemologically integral theoretical models, overlapping around specific ontological 
core. This is possible because it quickly becomes apparent that rather than 
unbridgeable incommensurability ontologically-focused multi-theoretical modelling is 
in fact characterised by a multitude of conceptual overlaps and thematic 
commonalities.  
 
These stem from directions of substantive research which cut across paradigmatic 
divides because their essence is not epistemological. Different theories may be 
addressing different aspects of international reality but because the substantive 
problem is the same it is inevitable that these different narratives will produce specific 
convergences, to greater or lesser extent. Thus, for example, as will be shown, all 
theoretical models of international politics of oil and gas address the issues of 
environment and climate change. The diversity of theoretical knowledge addressing 
this complex issue produces a kaleidoscopic panorama, ranging from neo-liberal 
preoccupation with environmental transaction costs and resulting regulatory regimes 
to environmentalist critique of increased CO2 emissions and the politics leading to 
them. Such thematic commonalities, conceptual overlaps and various substantive 
convergences is the stuff that synergies are made of.  
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They are, however, messy and do not fit neat patterns – instead they cut across 
paradigmatic lines. Different research sources and pieces of analysis (even, for 
example, the way quantitative data is created and read) can produce widely different 
conclusions and may contain elements of more than one paradigmatic analytical 
framework. The challenge for a theory-synergetic IR scholar, therefore, is to be able 
to identify thematic commonalities and other convergences by consistently retaining 
ontological focus whilst exercising and applying the wealth of the discipline’s 
theoretical knowledge.  
 
Systematic identification of substantive convergences (thematic commonalities and 
conceptual overlaps) between different theoretical models of the same ontological 
puzzle or problem is a crucial part of the theory synergetic method. However, the key 
objective of TSA research is to build a holistic theory-synergetic model of a given 
subject matter. That requires bringing theoretical synergies into operation within a 
single analytical framework. There needs to be a format for organising synergetic 
knowledge in a coherent and credible way.  
 
The active part of theoretical synergy arises when substantive convergences between 
different theoretical models are operationalised within a holistic narrative – the way 
they interact in a particular analytical framework and the mechanism by which they do 
so are referred to in TSA as inter-paradigmatic pivots. These are the pins or shafts 
upon which the whole analysis rotates. The task is to establish how different 
paradigmatic analytic frameworks of the same ontological phenomena interact with 
each other. Specific points of that interaction within wider areas of theoretical 
convergence constitute inter-paradigmatic pivots upon which the whole synergetic 
narrative revolves. The purpose of TSA is that theoretical pluralism is brought to life, 
activated within a specific substantive problem-field and is animated in an intensive 
and live-action, continuously expanding body of analysis of that problem-field. The 
more inter-paradigmatic pivots in a research the richer, more diverse and amplified 
theoretical synergy will be.  
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Constructing inter-paradigmatic pivots 
The process of engaging paradigmatic dynamism, developing theoretical models, 
identifying ontological convergences, overlaps and commonalities between single-
paradigm models and constructing inter-paradigmatic pivots to generate synergetic 
analytical insights is explored systematically over the next chapters using empirical 
case-studies of BTC and SGC oil and gas pipeline systems. At this stage it is 
necessary to introduce this process out sequentially to illustrate operations of TSA 
mechanisms in principle upon a substantive issue, for example the Southern Gas 
Corridor project (SGC) (BP Magazine, 12.10.2017).  
 
Theory-synergetic approach proceeds by first recognising that the empirical depth of 
SGC as a subject of investigation cannot be predetermined. One way to proceed is to 
envisage SGC as a substantive issue or puzzle, set within wider empirical field of oil 
and gas politics, which in turn is established within the grund-ontology of international 
politics of energy. That is to say that that whilst the subject matter is SGC, a project 
comprised of series of existing and proposed gas pipelines, the ontology of this study 
is not bracketed by a priori assumptions about what constitutes the reality of the project 
- complex material/ideational structure that might be revealed through synergetic 
theorising.  
 
The latter similarly begins with broad assumption that all IR paradigms will reveal 
something important about some aspects of SGC, even if each theory might be more 
useful at explaining or exposing certain elements, features, facets and characteristics 
of the project than others. No a priori assumptions are made on theory selection and 
the logic of paradigmatic dynamism dictates that such judgements should be made 
after empirical test is applied to theoretical assumptions about SGC. Single-paradigm 
models of SGC serve as the building blocks of multi-theoretical construction, as well 
as the basis for judging whether a particular theory is an appropriate analytical tool in 
a given research. 
 
Rationalist models of SGC focus on the role of states, international financial 
institutions, multilateral lenders, regulatory bodies and regimes, strategic issues of 
energy security, cooperation and competition (see Chapter IV). Meanwhile, reflectivist 
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models constitute both intellectual and praxeological critique of the project, aiming not 
only to expose its normative implications but to prevent the project from happening at 
all (see Chapter V). Synthesis of rationalist approaches is centred on the strategic and 
institutional dimensions of the project (see Chapter 4). Neo-realist modes of analysis 
of Southern Gas Corridor might address such issues as EU/Russia energy 
cooperation/rivalry (Shiriyev, 19.07.2017), EU energy strategy of gas supply 
diversification and relations with countries-suppliers (Karagöl and Kaya, 2014). Neo-
liberal institutionalist model might focus on the role of EU bodies, such as the 
Commission (Van Aartsen, 2009) and actions of multilateral financial institutions 
(Gurbanov, 09.03.2017).  
 
Analytic-eclecticism approach builds on the rationalist synthesis by drawing on social 
constructivist insights to explore how politics of SGC are shaped by competing 
normative-regulatory frameworks and policy agendas of various participants, state and 
non-state (Siddi, 2017; Verda, 2016). Meanwhile, critical post-structuralist theories 
submit SGC to sustained normative and political critique, seeking to expose its 
negative consequences for the environment (Counter Balance, Platform and 
Re:Common, 08.03.2016), and to demonstrate how the project contributes to human 
rights abuses (ARTICLE 19, Banktrack & Others, 12.09.2017). 
 
Reflectivist critique of SGC is coupled with a praxeological element - an international 
political campaign by counter-hegemonic agents (NGOS, activists, civil society 
groups) aimed at stopping the SGC project (see Chapter 5). Critical-poststructuralist 
alternative to the rationalist consensus around the politics of Southern Gas Corridor 
involves plethora of activity, from direct action on local grassroots level in countries 
traversed by SGC pipelines to empirical-normative research, aimed at challenging 
dominant narratives about SGC (Gotev, 29.03.2017; Stone, 30.11.2017; Bacheva-
McGrath, 2015).  
 
Construction of these single-paradigm models of SGC (as well as stories of BTC and 
wider Baku oil), as set out in the next chapters, requires IR scholar to employ different 
epistemologies and ontologies of the subject matter, engaging with different theories 
on their own terms and paying attention to multiplicity of understandings and claims 
about the project. In essence, this is IR experimentation – the same subject is 
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consistently submitted to the same empirical test but with different variables. The 
outcomes will differ and result will illuminate a particular property of the subject matter. 
It is clear that for all this epistemological diversity, SGC project comprises a common 
ontological intersection on which different single-paradigm models pivot. All theories 
will address common themes and issues, e.g. the role of EU and its member-states, 
and all theories will overlap over concepts such as, for example, environmental and 
social impacts of the pipelines, especially when the focus of analysis is centred on 
narrow empirical problems, such as international public institutional funding of Trans-
Adriatic pipeline (see Chapter VI).  
 
Constructing synergetic inter-paradigmatic pivots means more than simply extricating 
theoretical concepts, logics, mechanisms from these single-paradigm or synthesis 
models of SGC and then attempting to translate and selectively integrate them into a 
new holistic analytic framework. Synergetic theorising must go further and requires 
looking at causal dynamics and reactive relationships between these analytic 
elements in real time and identifying how these are manifested in real world situations 
and in political outcomes. Theory-synergetic approach engages with specific empirical 
puzzles but enables operationalisation of complex multi-causal questions which shed 
light on the deeper ontology of international relations. For example, operationalising 
the issue of SGC financing as an inter-paradigmatic pivot can help illuminate co-
constitutive relationship between socio-normative change and political decision-
making of major states and institutions (see Chapter VI).  
 
For example, how do post-modernist critiques and civic-popular opposition to SGC 
stimulate state behaviour and institutional responses of international actors involved 
in the project? Do normative changes in state and institutional environmental identities 
and socio-economic interests influence multilateral financial organisations when it 
comes to funding decisions on SGC, BTC and other fossil-fuels projects? How do 
counter-hegemonic networks – coalitions of environmentalist NGOs, climate change 
campaigners, civil society groups, marginalised communities, human rights activists 
and others – employ international regulatory systems and institutional normative 
standards, to challenge prevailing social order in global energy politics and to set out 
possible alternatives?   How do competing national identities and strategic interests of 
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energy-producing and consuming states determine political outcomes in the wider 
global energy order and are we at a point of fundamental transition in this order? 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter TSA is grounded in the Critical Realist philosophy of science. It is 
argued that international relations constitute a distinct ontological sphere, which exists 
independently of attempts to study it but one that can be revealed through a systematic 
scientific enterprise. This science is the discipline of International Relations and its 
language and intellectual properties are contained in its theoretical diversity and 
methodological pluralism. It is a mega if not a meta-social science.  
 
If we are to accept that unity of science consists alone in its method then what 
International Relations requires is a common language – a cross-disciplinary 
discourse and a general technique to utilise, apply and coherently communicate IR 
disciplinary diversity.  This approach, with all its normative priorities and theoretical 
pluralism, should aim towards resolution of concrete substantive puzzles and 
problems in international politics. Theory synergetic approach is proposed as this 
common ontology-prioritising technology for maximising the value potential of 
intellectual properties and vigour of IR theoretical pluralism.  
 
It is worth repeating that TSA is not a methodology in itself and is not an attempt to 
impose any universalising conditions on the multi-theoretical progress. It is, however, 
an argument for a more self-confident disciplinary approach and one that recognises 
the full empirical potential inherent in IR’s multi-disciplinary and theoretically 
heterogeneous knowledge pool. It is also a proposal for a disciplinary way of thinking 
– the method in TSA consists of internalising theoretical diversity, until it becomes part 
of IR architecture and is treated as a matter of fact. No theory or combination thereof 
should be accorded a higher status in any given research, until and unless ontological 
conditions demand prioritisation of particular set of explanations. Anything goes as 
long and as much as it is practically useful. 
 
TSA can therefore be seen as a proposal for an applied science of International 
Relations. Theoretical models are to be utilised as tools for experimentation. The latter 
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is posited to consist of specially constructed synergies – a mechanism for pivoting into 
motion IR theoretical pluralism and bringing it to bear upon concrete empirical 
questions. The reward for mobilising synergetic thinking is a deeper, multidimensional 
and hyper-active real-time panorama of the subject manner, not limited by any a-priory 
paradigmatic assumptions, and unshackled from any dogmatic grand-theory 
commitments. The king of IR is the subject matter of international relations and 
theories are the interactive tools of the synergetic method, called to reveal them.  
 
In disciplinary terms, therefore, TSA may be said to be responding to the challenges 
of the Fourth Debate and addressing its many implications. It is intended as a way to 
reconcile IR’s disciplinary diversity; to bridge cross-paradigmatic divide; to find a 
solution to the incommensurability problem; to develop a common discourse; to make 
IR more practical and relevant to real-life challenges of international politics; to 
effectively integrate the normative/ideational content into an accentuated empirical 
enterprise; to provide a degree of ontological cohesion to a highly diverse and eclectic 
theoretical field. In the following chapters theory-synergetic approach is demonstrated 
through its application to the study of international politics of oil. 
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III  
IR and Politics of Oil (and Gas) 
Introduction 
Oil. Power. World. Security. Glory. Quest. Scramble. Earth. Struggle. Prize. Blood. These are 
the words most commonly featured in the titles of some of the most famous and prominent 
histories, textbooks and critiques of oil politics.  There are few topics that capture imagination 
the way oil does. It is a subject that crosses disciplinary boundaries and concerns the broadest 
spectrum of human activity. Directly and indirectly oil shapes the modern world, impacting on 
everything from physical condition to popular culture. There is drama, romance and adventure 
in the story of oil, which underline its essential quality.   
 
Our relationship with oil and the world it created, our fascination and ambivalence towards it, 
and all the paradoxes therein are borne out by that very essentialism – we live in the 
hydrocarbon age.  Over one hundred and fifty years since Edwin ‘Colonel’ Drake first struck oil 
at Titusville, Pennsylvania we still have “oil on the brain”10. That is not to say that the 
ontology of oil begins at the point of its modern ‘discovery’ and industrial application. 
Indeed, the question of what is oil in terms of its ideational (social) and material 
(physical) kinds, lies at heart of its own subject matter. It is so expansive a subject that 
few have attempted to provide a universal account of oil (although Daniel Yergin 
(1991) is often credited as having done just that – see below).  
 
                                                          
10 “Oil on the brain” refers to the title of a popular Joseph Eastburn song (1865, Lee & 
Walker, Philadelphia, USA), which captured the frenzy of the first ever oil boom that 
hit Western Pennsylvania in the aftermath of ‘Colonel’ Drake’s discovery and 
successful commercial drilling of oil at Titusville in 1859:   
 
“The Yankees boast that they make clocks  
    Which "just beat all creation:"  
They never made one could keep time  
    With our great speculation.  
Our stocks, like clocks, go with a spring,  
    Wind up, run down again;  
But all our strikes are sure to cause  
    "Oil on the brain." 
Stock's par, stock's up, Then on the wane;  
Ev'rybody's trouble with "Oil on the brain." 
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Therefore, the choice of oil and natural gas projects as case-studies for TSA is by no 
means arbitrary. Oil provides a broad empirical field upon which theories of 
International Relations can be systematically applied and tested in a synergetic 
method. The task is not to determine which theory gets it ‘right’ about the deeper reality 
of oil; it is to find out which aspects of that reality, or rather what different realities 
different theories of IR reveal. What should emerge at the end of this enterprise is an 
expanded and complex ontologies of these substantive puzzles, which will remain 
subject to further challenge and open to greater clarification and explanation. There 
are no legitimate a priori limits or brackets that can be placed upon what can be 
potentially known about the material and social realities of oil and gas projects studied 
here.  
 
This chapter explores this wider empirical field of international oil and gas politics, and 
sets out the case-studies of BTC and SGC pipelines that are examined in this thesis. 
It opens with a historical review of IR engagement with oil politics and examines how 
different theoretical traditions shaped contemporary political and academic 
discourses. The overall aim of this chapter is to set out a theoretical rationale for 
choosing energy politics and the case-studies of oil and gas pipelines as the empirical 
testing ground for applied theory-synergetic approach. 
 
Theories of international oil and gas politics 
Oil emerges as a distinct international political theme in the second decade of the 20th 
century, and studies of oil often begin with examination of the role it played in imperial 
politics of the late 19th century, leading up to and through WWI. Indeed, Yergin opens 
“The Prize” (1991), his much lauded history of oil, with Winston Churchill’s fateful 
decision to convert the Royal Navy from coal to oil in the aftermath of the 1911 Agadir 
crisis and the ratcheting up of the Anglo-German arms race: “He decided that Britain 
would have to base its ‘naval supremacy upon oil’ and, thereupon, committed himself, 
with all his driving energy and enthusiasm, to achieving that objective [] There was no 
choice – in Churchill’s words, ‘Mastery itself was the prize of the venture’” (1991, xiv). 
 
Churchill’s use of the term ‘mastery’ goes to the heart of the political subject of oil and 
introduces its most potent theme. It is no surprise therefore that the classical Realists 
80 
 
of the interwar and post-WWII period focused their attention on the role of oil as both 
constitutive of state power and as its instrument. Classical Realist assumptions about 
strategic value of oil are evident in this excerpt from Edmond J. W. Slade’s lecture 
entitled “The Influence of Oil on International Politics”, delivered at Chatham House, 
in 1923: “The lack of money has never stopped a nation from fighting, but the lack of 
the means of producing mechanical power brings everything to a standstill… It is 
therefore evident that since, under existing conditions, petroleum is indispensable, the 
country which can control the supply of petroleum to the rest of the world is in a position 
to enforce its will so long as its sources of supply are not open to attack” (p. 254).  
 
E.H. Carr clearly identified this central relationship between economic and military 
power in “The Twenty Years’ Crisis”, published in 1939. In his examination of autarchy 
as political instrument Carr argued that pursuit of economic self-sufficiency and 
independence are issues of military significance and are “primarily a form of 
preparedness for war” (Carr, 2001 (1981), p.111). A clear relationship between oil and 
power, especially military power is for the first time located as a causal factor in policy 
making. This theme is echoed, then defined and expanded upon, by H.J. Morgenthau 
in “Politics Amongst Nations”, first published in 1946: “The absolute and relative 
importance of natural resources in the form of raw materials have for the power of a 
nation depends necessarily upon the technology of the warfare practiced in a particular 
period of history (1985, p. 131). 
 
Referring to ‘the power of oil’ Morgenthau is first to identify its critical quality – in the 
post-WWII world oil was no longer one of many natural resources that go into making 
up the power of a nation-state but “a material factor whose very possession threatens 
to overturn centuries-old patterns of international politics” (Ibid, p.133). Thereafter 
realist analysis of oil focuses almost exclusively on its function in power relations 
between states, in particular its role in war and military affairs.   
 
This approach was further reinforced and refined by neo-realists, who showed little 
interest in the workings of the global oil industry or wider issues, dismissing such 
concerns as reductionist and posing their questions about oil solely within the 
framework of a parsimonious structural theory of international relations. Oil was 
interesting only in so far as it could help explain differentials in power capabilities of 
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states. The 1973 oil crisis (‘the first oil shock’) served to further consolidate this 
structural approach and to bring centre stage issues of resource dependency and 
national strategies for withstanding embargoes. Kenneth Waltz, writing in his “Theory 
of International Politics” (1979) (published at the time of the ‘second oil shock’ caused 
by the Islamic revolution in Iran), discussed the impact of the OPEC embargo in 
precisely in those terms, asking whether the crisis showed “that the unequal 
capabilities of states continue to explain their fates and to shape international political 
outcomes” (p.152).  
 
For Waltz and other neo-realists oil was not ‘special’ and did not constitute a factor in 
its own right. States are not ranked on the basis of excelling in one or another sphere, 
and their economic, military and other capabilities cannot be disaggregated and 
assessed separately. The status of nations depends on how they score across a broad 
spectrum of items, resource endowment being just one of these (Ibid., p.131). What 
interested neo-realists is how possession of oil or lack thereof impacted on behaviour 
of states in a self-help, anarchic system. As Waltz argued: “Countries that are highly 
dependent, countries that get much of what they badly need from a few possibly 
unreliable suppliers, must do all they can to increase the chances that they will keep 
getting it” (1979, p. 153). 
 
Yet ideas about politics of oil then continued to develop broadly in parallel with the 
evolving themes of IR theory and debates about oil continued to correspond roughly 
with the intellectual schisms of the Great Debates in IR. So much so that by 1991, as 
the Soviet Union collapsed and the world was shaken by the first Gulf War, Daniel 
Yergin identified three great themes which underlie the story of oil: the rise of 
capitalism and modern business; oil as a strategic commodity central to global politics, 
national strategies and power; and what he called the ‘anthropological argument’ – the 
rise of the ‘hydrocarbon society’ and the ‘Hydrocarbon Man’ (“The Prize”, pp.13-15).  
It is not surprising that Yergin chose to rank the business of oil above its politics. Whilst 
realists were preoccupied with the power-maximising capability of oil as a strategic 
resource, the impact and consequences of the 1973 and 1979 oil crises prompted a 
growing attention to the oil industry itself - “the world’s biggest and most pervasive 
business” (Ibid., p. 13). From the late 19th century onwards the scale of the energy 
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enterprise began to draw together the worlds of engineering, commodities trading, 
banking, international financial institutions, commercial and property law, marketing, 
to name but a few.  
Driven by the global geography and geology of oil and by the constant need to discover 
new sources the industry rapidly expanded across the world, and the force behind this 
expansion was the power and the capital of the oil companies – the first truly 
multinational corporations11. Writing about these giants of industry in his seminal 1975 
study “The Seven Sisters”, Anthony Sampson observed: “For decades the Companies 
(with a capital C) seemed possessed of a special mystique, both to the producing and 
the consuming countries. Their supranational expertise was beyond the ability of 
national governments. Their incomes were greater than those of most countries where 
they operated, their fleets of tankers had more tonnage than any navy, they owned 
and administered whole cities in the desert.” (p. 24).  
For Yergin the business of oil is full of the drama and the adventure reminiscent of the 
golden age of exploration: “No other business so starkly and extremely defines the 
meaning of risk and reward – and the profound impact of chance and fate” (1991, p. 
13).  Yet the story of corporate oil is one of continuous transformation, shrinkage and 
growth again. As governments, independent producers, global, national and local 
regulators sought to curb the growth and power of the oil companies and to develop a 
rules-based system to keep “Big Oil” in check, there developed complex relationships, 
bodies and organisations, all possessing their own institutional dynamics and cultures, 
which became a focus of a new, neo-liberal turn in energy studies. The role of markets 
and institutions came to the fore of the field.  
The politics and the business of oil, two of Yergin’s themes in combination constitute 
the mainstream core of oil studies. It can also be argued that the epistemology of this 
combination corresponds roughly to the ‘neo-neo synthesis’ in International Relations. 
For neo-realists, oil was a strategic commodity that goes into making up national state 
power. Therefore, states, acting in a self-help system, will behave in ways designed 
to maximise access to reliable supplies of this precious commodity whilst seeking to 
lessen their dependence on other countries.  
                                                          
11 Sampson remarks that Exxon 1973 Annual report referred to the company as having been a 
multinational corporation “at least fifty years before the term was commonly used” (1975, p.24).  
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For neo-liberal institutionalists, who built upon the insights of earlier, classical liberals, 
oil was first and foremost a major enterprise of complex legal and institutional design, 
involving trans-national actors and processes and driven primarily by market forces 
and regulatory pressures. For example, some economists at the time of the 1973 crisis 
argued that the rapid rise in prices was caused exclusively by market forces (Gilpin, 
2001, p. 59). Focusing on the power of international oil corporations and their ability 
to mobilise technology, capital and human resources on monumental scale some 
neoliberals point to the fact that these forces are often more powerful than nation-
states. Additionally, neoliberals are more likely to pay attention to the role of 
personalities and individuals (leaders and innovators) as active actors in shaping 
outcomes.  
The synthesis of these two approaches provides the framework of much of the 
discussions around oil today. Yet Yergin (1991, pp. 14-15) identifies a further theme – 
what he terms as the anthropological argument - that oil forms the basis of modern 
civilisation, fuelling both its late industrial and the post-industrial phases. The invention 
of kerosene and later of the internal combustion engine marked the end of the 
dominance of coal, which came to be displaced by oil as the fuel of modernity. An 
entire culture had arisen as the result –  the ‘Hydrocarbon Society’: “Today, we are so 
dependent on oil, and oil is so embedded in our daily doings, that we hardly stop to 
comprehend its pervasive significance” (Ibid., p.15).   
Meanwhile, what started out in the 1960s and 70s as a set of broad concerns over 
ecological implications of industrial society, was by early 1990s a fully-fledged 
movement, led by international civic organisations and campaigning groups such as 
Greenpeace. It was informed by a growing awareness of the risks of pollution, wider 
environmental impact of the use of fossil fuels and the emerging debate about human-
made climate change. Ethical concerns were not limited to this newly political 
environmentalism. The latter was further reinforced by a growing distrust and criticism 
of the oil industry and of the very politics of oil. Decolonisation and anti-imperialism of 
the post-war period saw nationalisation of oil assets around the world, cancellation of 
concessions and often violent resistance to exploitation of natural resources from 
indigenous groups (see for example, Betancourt, 1978).  
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The wider post-structuralist, critical turn in social science was beginning to influence 
debates around oil. Yergin, whose epistemological and normative commitments fall 
within the broad ‘neo-neo synthesis’ framework, is forced to acknowledge that the oil 
industry was being “increasingly scrutinized, criticized and opposed” and that the 
growth of ethical concerns “challenges the basic tenets of industrial society” (1991, 
p.15). But he goes on to argue that the appetite for oil remains unabated, the demand 
is growing, driven by the developing world and population growth, as more and more 
countries join the ranks of industrialised countries and exercise their “right to consume” 
(Ibid). Looking ahead, Yergin then identifies the terms of the key normative debate at 
heart of “The Prize”:  
“In the meantime, the stage has been set for one of the great and intractable clashes 
of the 1990s between, on the one hand, the powerful and increasing support for 
greater environmental protection and, on the other, a commitment to economic growth 
and the benefits of the Hydrocarbon Society, and apprehensions about energy 
security” (Ibid). The very nature of industrial modernity is at stake.  
At this stage it is important to acknowledge the full significance of “The Prize” - Yergin’s 
encyclopaedic work in the field of oil and wider energy studies. Daniel Yergin is a figure 
not only of considerable academic but also political authority, serving in senior 
advisory roles to US government and the private sector; he is a founder of IHS 
Cambridge Energy Research Associates – a major political and business consultancy 
firm (Yergin, 2016).  
Few texts have had as much impact, across such a wide disciplinary spectrum, as 
Yergin’s “The Prize”, which won the Pulitzer Prize for General Nonfiction (1992). As 
the result Daniel Yergin had established what Dwight Garner described in The New 
York Times as “a virtual monopoly on the subject of energy and geopolitics. Such is 
his influence that one half expects his competitors to file antitrust litigation against him” 
(20.09.2011); for a contemporary review see Vietor, 1991). However, it can also be 
argued that “The Prize” represents an apogee of mainstream rationalist approaches 
to oil politics. At its core is a solidly positivist analytical framework that prioritises 
modernist interpretation of social phenomena and does not seek to question, let alone 
to critique, prevailing orthodoxies.  
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All of this has interesting implications for this study, part of which is concerned with 
charting the ways in which theoretical debates are translated on empirical level, and 
how such scholarship relates to political practice. For that purpose, “The Prize” takes 
a central position in the bibliography of this study, not only as a source of empirical 
data but also as an example of a possibly hegemonic academic discourse, which in 
itself should be a subject to critical challenge. 
In the decades that followed publication of “The Prize” the world of oil had undergone 
further dramatic transformations and cataclysmic crises, developing into one of the 
most fiercely contested fields in public policy and wider debates. Environmental 
concerns have been elevated from isolated direct action campaigns of eco-groups of 
the 1970s to the top of the international political agenda. By the time of the historic 
2015 UN Climate Change Conference in Paris the link between fossil fuels and rising 
global temperatures has been widely accepted and the task of cutting human-made 
CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions has been identified as the key challenge 
facing the world (The Paris Agreement, 12 December 2015).   
The impact of the post-structuralist turn on the development of oil studies and 
associated debates around the issue can hardly be overstated. If oil is the fuel of 
modernity, then by definition any post-modern critique of social reality is, at least 
implicitly if not explicitly, about oil. For much of the history the world of oil was 
dominated by politicians and lawyers, engineers, oil company executives, bankers, 
traders and speculators. Therefore, discussions around oil were bracketed by clearly 
defined parameters of what can arguably called a “problem-solving” conceptual 
framework (Cox, 1983).  
Questions about oil were confined solely to issues of supply and demand, distribution 
of political power and competition between oil-producing and consuming states, 
strategic control over prices and production, transportation and refinement and so on. 
Oil remained a dominant topic, whose “doings and controversies are to be found 
regularly not only on the business page but also on the front page” (Yergin, 1991, 
p.13).   
But by early 1990s a critique began to emerge seeking to expose power relations in 
the world of oil and to illuminate the social and material costs of a civilisation built upon 
consumption of fossil fuels. This critique was strong enough so that mainstream 
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positivist scholars, such as Daniel Yergin, were forced to acknowledge its impact. In 
initial stages it sought to raise awareness of environmental concerns, to challenge the 
power of international energy companies and the conduct of governments engaging 
in oil politics, with the Middle East in particular focus. A whole range of issues, from 
post-colonialism to human rights, began to bear upon the debates about oil.  
But the post-modern critique went further and with the new century it came to question 
the very foundations of the ‘Hydrocarbon Society’, the basis of modernity. It asks 
whether there is really no alternative to the reality of industrial and economic growth, 
consumerism and global free trade fuelled by the burning of oil and other fossil fuels. 
Technological, economic and cultural change in the decades that followed the end of 
the Cold War, sped up and amplified by rapid advances in computing and the 
exponential growth of the Internet, reinforced the intellectual and social impact of post-
modernism on discussions about oil.  
Thus, the rise of renewable sources of energy came to represent not merely a 
replacement for oil but a force for a total transformation of society, heralding possibility 
of a different kind of living (see, for example, Armaroli & Balzani, 2010). Oil is no longer 
seen as a monolithic, perennial and inescapable reality. Post-structuralist insights 
brought not only a renewed historicism to the critique of the modern oil industry, but 
brought a critical edge to mainstream thinking about energy, reconceptualising the 
terms in which it is understood. Climate change, for example, is no longer an 
“environmentalist” issue but a major economic challenge (Stern, 2007) and potentially 
catastrophic security threat (Schwartz and Randall, 2003).   
Therefore, given the fact that humanity had been using sustainable energy sources 
for its entire history up to the industrial age, might it not mean that, as Aitken argues, 
‘the world will necessarily again have to turn to sustainable resources before the 
present century is over?”: “The fossil fuel period is therefore an “era”, not an age, and 
highly limited in time in comparison with the evolution, past and future, of civilizations 
and societies. Accordingly, it is critical for governments to view what remains of the 
fossil fuel era as a transition” (2003, p.3).  
For positivists, such as Yergin, this may only be possible if the problems associated 
with renewable energy are solved (by government policies and market forces). The 
question for him is: “What kind of energy mix will meet the world’s energy needs 
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without crisis and confrontation?” (2012, p. 5). But the fact that “The Quest. Energy. 
Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World” (2012), Yergin’s follow up to “The 
Prize” (1991), is not about oil per se but is about energy, is indicative of the extent of 
the transformation in the thinking about the subject. 
Synergetic readings of oil and gas politics 
The brief overview of the evolution of debates around oil and energy issues is 
presented here, in broad brush-strokes, in conjunction with the corresponding set of 
developments in the epistemological and ontological evolution of International 
Relations theory, as told through the history of the Great Debates, culminating with the 
reflectivist turn of the Fourth Debate. The two strands intertwine continuously, 
presenting a broad common timeline from WWI to present day; the implications of the 
post-structuralist challenge may mean that the timeline should be in fact moved back 
to earlier human interaction with oil and forward – towards possible alternatives to 
fossil-fuel dominated energy order. A scientific realist might well argue from a 
philosophical standpoint that there should not be any arbitrary limits placed on the 
ontological space-time framework at all.  
Ontological turn in IR provides the rationale for the theory synergetic approach. It is 
no longer feasible, in the aftermath of the Fourth Debate, to bracket the greatly 
expanded ontology of International Relations in either exclusively positivist or anti-
positivist frameworks. To take ontology seriously is to posit that the discipline of 
International Relations encompasses the study of the totality of organised human 
relations across the globe -  from affairs of states to institutions and processes; the 
normative expanse - international ethics, justice and law, the interests of marginalised 
groups; the ‘problem-solving’ agenda and the ‘emancipatory project’ – the entirety of 
IR knowledge capital – ‘all that we’ve learnt’.  
This does not mean an end to paradigm-driven research, but rather a 
reconceptualization of what paradigms represent in International Relations. Prioritising 
ontology does not mean dismissal of theoretical questions or blind adherence to 
epistemological relativism. It means, for example, that if the empirical task at hand is 
an investigation into politics of oil, then issues of epistemology are to be subordinated 
to the demands of that task. The questions are not what is the right way to study politics 
of oil or what should be studied and how. The question here is which part of the 
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empirical puzzle of oil is revealed by what theory and how these different elements 
come together in the grand ontology of oil politics?  
Therefore, to apply theory-synergetic approach to a specific empirical case-study 
requires first to adopt a particular way of thinking about the discipline of International 
Relations. The latter is a meta-disciplinary grand-ontological social-scientific 
enterprise, built around a highly complex theoretical super-structure, which developed 
over a hundred years of Great Debates. This pan-disciplinary identity holds 
irrespective of any paradigmatic commitments, or rather theoretical specialisations, 
scholars might have. Indeed, pursuit of theory-synergetic scholarship does not 
preclude paradigmatic research agenda, and helps to enrich and sharpen its analytical 
edge.  
Within the empirical framework of theory synergetic research individual theories and 
schools of thought are valuable tools for revealing different aspects or layers of reality 
(if not altogether different realities) of and about the same phenomena. Taking such 
view may suggest that in terms of the IR disciplinary structure, paradigmatic research 
constitutes specialisation – scholars focusing on particular set of questions, requiring 
different methodologies and research skills, but all striving towards the same goal of 
“getting at the way things really are”. 
But the disadvantage of paradigmatic research is that it can only reveal a partial, 
epistemologically-specific and ontologically-bounded element of the grander reality 
under study. This in turn will have normative implications. There is ever only so much 
that can be discovered through theoretically limited research. Synergetic research, by 
contrast, offers a way for harnessing specific paradigmatic insights in a holistic 
analytical framework systematically applied to grand-ontology of a given problem field. 
This grand-ontological approach applies equally to issue-specific, mid-range empirical 
puzzles and to wider, more comprehensive investigations of various socio-political 
phenomena. 
For example, a theory-synergetic study of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-
India Pipeline (TAPI) (Asian Development Bank, 2016) would aim to reveal the grand 
ontology of its subject matter, comprising a diverse and complex mix of social, 
economic, cultural and political forces, actors and processes, all operating across a 
wide historical span. The scope of such an enquiry could include but not be limited to 
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issues and themes, such as inter-state relations in Central Asia; 9/11 and the US 
power in the region; the heritage and local dynamics of political Islam; Pakistani and 
Afghan Taliban; the interests of ethnic minorities in the regions traversed by the 
proposed pipeline; the impact of the TAPI project on women, tribal and clan groups 
and other marginalised communities in the affected territories traversed by the 
pipeline; the role of China in the regional energy market; the role of Russia in Central 
Asia; religious demography of the regions traversed by the proposed pipeline; the role 
of international energy corporations; the role of international financial institutions, such 
as the Asian Development Bank; environmental impact assessments of the TAPI 
project, locally and globally; energy market implications of the project; comparative 
historical analysis of the Great Silk Route and the TAPI pipeline;  political and civic 
opposition movements and domestic politics of states participating in the TAPI project; 
wider legal and normative debates about the project.  
This is by no means an exhaustive list and may in fact underestimate the complexity 
of the empirical challenge posed by this hypothetical international-political problem-
field. The starting point is recognition of the material foundation of the social discourse 
of the proposed pipeline. The TAPI pipeline project is an engineering challenge of 
considerable magnitude – a 1,420 millimetres (56 in) in diameter pipeline, of over 1800 
kilometres in length, running from Galkynysh gas field in southern Turkmenistan, 
traversing complex topography of Afghanistan and Pakistan through Herat to Multan, 
and culminating at the city of Fazilka, in north-western India.  
When operational (from 2019) it will carry 33 billion cubic metres of natural gas per 
year, supplying 5 billion cubic metres to Afghanistan and 14 billion cubic metres to 
Pakistan and India respectively. Six compressor stations would be constructed along 
the pipeline, which will run alongside Kandahar-Herat Highway in western 
Afghanistan. The cost of the project, being led by the Turkmenistan’s state energy 
giant Turkmengaz, is expected to rise to $12 billion (Alexander’s Gas & Oil 
Connections, 21.11.06; Graeber. D.J., 03.12.14; Abdurasulov, A. 16.07.15; Tanchum. 
M. 3.12.15; Gurt & Auvezov, 13.12.15).  
The immense scale of the physical reality of the TAPI pipeline endows it with a 
historical and imaginational history, before it is even constructed. This history goes 
back beyond the mid-1990s when the project was first envisaged, all the way back to 
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the ancient Silk Route, the geographical route of which is relatively closely matched 
by the proposed pipeline. The sheer range of stories, narratives, ideas – the full 
spectrum of imaginative potential - is implicit in such an analytical framework. This 
material, physical reality, therefore, exists as a condition of possibility of any kind of 
social discourse around the TAPI pipeline project.  
As such there is no reasonable justification for a priori assumptions about what 
constitutes legitimate scholarship about the TAPI project, or for limiting or 
circumscribing the ontological scope of the study. The set of hypothetical questions 
listed above, modest as it is, indicates the breadth of knowledge that is possible about 
this subject matter and might be revealed through scholarship. Any attempt to exclude 
one or other question would necessarily be a product of political decision, and not of 
some arbitrary standard of scientific or scholarly objectivity or judgement. For it would 
determine which parts of the grand-ontology of the TAPI pipeline project are to remain 
obscured, unrevealed and unexamined, and this would inevitably have normative 
implications. The same is true for the case-studies examined in this thesis – BTC and 
SGC pipelines represent a complex social-material reality not subject to reduction.  
By contrast, theory-synergetic analysis seeks to systematically expand the scope of 
scholarship, striving for an ever growing, open-ended epistemological engagement 
with various ontological challenges presented by a given empirical problem-field. The 
key here is not simply identifying specific paradigmatic insights but determining how 
these different theoretical models of the same subject matter interact with and relate 
to each other within a single, holistic research framework.  
Therefore, a theory-synergetic analysis of a major pipeline project would include a 
model of inter-state relations, a normative enquiry, a critical examination of its social 
order, a study of institutions, processes and identities from global market forces to 
local tribal traditions and so on, set within an expansive timeline and exploring complex 
ideas and concepts about changing relations between East and West,  emergence of 
the Eurasian sphere,  modernity and tradition, religion and nationalism and more. The 
resulting theory-synergetic multidimensional map of a vibrant, epistemologically 
pluralist, deep(-er) grand-ontology of a given project contrasts markedly with what 
appears from a theory-specific, single paradigm research perspective as a 
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straightforward, clearly-defined and reducible empirical puzzle, e.g. a regional gas 
pipeline.  
The same approach can be taken to a more expansive subject matter of global politics 
of energy by envisaging a greatly enhanced social and material ontology of “oil 
international”. A synergetic study of international oil and gas politics would comprise a 
holistic examination of the totality of paradigmatic models. Thus,  methodological 
individualism of rational choice and game theory approaches, balance of power 
calculations and examination of institutional and processual characteristics of inter-
state energy competition and conflict, market dynamics, trade and other constituent 
features and characteristics of a positivist analysis are operationalised within the same 
empirical framework as normative critiques of oil politics, with a particular attention 
paid to revealing and identifying underlying power structures and distribution of gains, 
and marginalisation of disempowered groups; and a social constructivist exploration 
of oil/energy as identity-forming factor, both domestically and internationally within 
states (e.g. the social dynamics of energy-producing and energy-consuming states); 
and a general post-modernist critique of the hydrocarbon society; and so on.     
Thus, for example, a positivist analysis, what Robert Cox (1986) termed “problem 
solving theory”, might take “the prevailing social and power relationships and the 
institutions in which they are organized, as the given framework for action” (p. 208) 
when it comes to oil politics e.g. what to do to stabilise oil prices? how a merger 
between two international energy corporations affects the oil market? what might a 
state do to reduce its dependency for oil on another country? what impact will the 
development of alternative energy sources, both fossil fuels and renewables, have on 
energy markets of tomorrow and on relations between energy-producing and 
consuming states? etc.  
A reflectivist critique, by contrast, “does not take institutions and social and power 
relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins 
and how and whether they might be in the process of changing”. In doing so it “allows 
for a normative choice in favour of a social and political order different from the 
prevailing order” (Ibid.) e.g. who and how sets the oil prices? who benefits and who 
loses out from the operations of international energy corporations? how sustainable is 
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the existing energy order? what alternative energy sources might be used and who 
benefits from maintaining the fossil fuel status quo? etc.  
What is interesting from theory-synergetic perspective is how these two levels of 
analysis interplay as they converge on specific empirical questions. If, for example, 
the empirical puzzle under investigation relates to political regulation of a major 
international oil project (an off shore deep-water development or exploration in an 
environmentally and socially  sensitive area) it is important to ascertain the role of 
international financial institutions and their environmental and social impact 
assessment apparatus and mechanisms, the role of states and how they compete and 
cooperate on these projects and for what purpose (how do they seek to maximise their 
power and interests by promoting this or that option?); as well as to investigate whether 
there is an alternative to the world envisaged by these projects and to expose existing 
power relations, underlying the dynamics driving these projects to completion.  
To continue with this hypothetical empirical example - what is ultimately of interest 
here for an International Relations scholar is the international relations of a major 
international oil project, and not the debate about what constitutes legitimate 
scholarship about a major international oil project and so on indefinitely and without 
final determination. In order to gain as full an understanding of how things really are – 
complex knowledge – it is essential to pursue explanatory and prescriptive research 
agendas, systematically applying and deploying the full spectrum of epistemological 
and methodological tools available in the IR toolkit.  
All approaches are taken as potentially valid models of a same given empirical 
problem, coexisting simultaneously but independently. This does require taking each 
paradigmatic model on its own terms. The synergetic value is generated through 
construction of inter-paradigmatic models of the same subject matter. It is in these 
substantive intersections of various autonomous paradigmatic models that theoretical 
synergy can be operationalised.  
One reason why this may be possible is because theory-synergetic method is located 
and grounded within the disciplinary pluralism of International Relations. As noted 
above, IR is the only social science with the necessary structures and properties - a 
sufficiently extensive international ontology, encompassing both material and 
ideational/social kinds; an epistemological heritage of considerable diversity, making 
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it an ideal platform for complex, multidisciplinary social-scientific enterprise.  But this 
is only possible if we engage with IR as a discipline that prioritises and expands our 
conception of what constitutes ontology and allows for true epistemological pluralism.   
The social and the material in oil and gas  
Alexander Wendt is right to argue that, ‘Epistemology generally will take care of itself 
in the hurly-burly of scientific debate” (2010 [1999], p.373). But theory-synergetic 
approach departs from Wendt in two important ways – it differs considerably to his 
conception of an exclusively “social” and “constructionist” ontology of international life 
and employs a more nuanced understanding of epistemological relativism. It is worth 
briefly commenting on this. 
Wendt prioritises ideational factors over material, taking distribution of ideas and 
culture as the starting point of theorising about international politics, with material 
forces coming in later (Ibid, p.371). He draws upon realist philosophy of science to 
support his view of a constructivist ontology of international relations (Ibid., p. 372). 
Finally, Wendt argues that, “it is through ideas that states ultimately relate to one 
another” and these ideas “help define who and what states are” (Ibid).  
Positivists remain sceptical about constructivist emphasis on ideational factors as key 
units of analysis. Robert Gilpin (2001) argues that any international theory must “seek 
to integrate both ideas and material forces”, because ideas are important but, “the 
world is composed of many economic, technological, and other powerful constraints 
that limit the wisdom and practicality of certain ideas and social constructions” (p.20). 
What echoes in Gilpin’s observations is a positivist notion of ontology of international 
relations that is on final account a materialist one. And this materialism is ultimately 
defined in terms of power: “While I agree that ideas are very important, they are 
important politically only insofar as they are supported by the interests and power of 
important actors such as states or domestic political coalitions” (Ibid., p.86n).  
Wendt’s critique of materialist ontology in IR (and hence his justification for replacing 
it with a socially constructed one) is limited to this narrow conception of material forces 
“defined as power and interest” (2010 [1999], p. 371). However, the theory-synergetic 
approach is premised on a deeper conception of international ontology. As discussed 
above, theory-synergetic approach employs scientific realist philosophy of science to 
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posit an unlimited international ontology, composed of material and ideational forces. 
This ontology is “unlimited” in the sense that there are no a priori limits on what 
constitutes legitimate ways of generating knowledge about it.  
For it exists independently of the mind, as a condition of possibility of it being 
discovered and have ideas formed about it. As, for example, mentioned before, the 
ontology of oil predates human agency i.e. just because humans were not capable of 
refining kerosene until late 19th Century does not mean that oil did not have the 
potential of being refined until then. The process of scientific discovery suggests a 
complex relationship between material and social forces which should not, therefore, 
be viewed exclusively through the prism of causality and agent/structure modes of 
analysis. The symbiotic interactions between the two present a far more interesting 
focus for scholarship. The fact that material forces can give rise to ideas that then 
shape identities and determine types of political behaviour is evidenced by the 
historical experience of oil producing societies and states. Therefore, when it comes 
to ontology, scientific inquiry should seek to pose causal and constitutive questions. 
It is difficult, therefore, to agree with Wendt’s argument that “relatively little of 
international life is a function of material forces as such” without us ascribing implicit 
ideational content to power and interest explanations (Ibid.). Geography, environment, 
topography, natural resource endowment, even terrain type can have a determining 
impact on both material and social development of states, societies and community 
identities. Natural catastrophes and climate change can have as material an impact 
on international relations as war or genocide, whilst simultaneously giving rise to ideas 
and social constructions capable of generating social change. 
Therefore, a theory-synergetic conception of the materialist component of its ontology 
of international life is not bracketed but is defined in broadest terms, from planetary 
conditions and physical and environmental forces to power and interest of powerful 
actors, and not only between states but all international human communities (for 
example, from multinational corporations to global digital social movements). Implicit 
here is a recognition that material (physical) kinds can give rise to construction of social 
(ideational, imaginational) forms. And in turn ideas and culture often constitute the 
content and meaning of material forces, as Wendt argues (Ibid, p.371).  
95 
 
The social component of theory-synergetic international ontology is taken to be 
similarly expanded, possessing causal and identity-constitutive potential in 
international politics. Social kinds do not form in vacuum and are shaped by interplay 
with material kinds. Certain ideas may give rise to particular identities, which in turn 
provide impetus for social change; or they may in turn be products of material forces 
impacting on imaginational, social constructionist dynamic of international life.  
In sum, theory-synergetic ontology of international politics of oil and gas is social-
materialist, in the sense that it is through a continuous, flowing and mutually-
constitutive interplay between ideas and material forces (defined in broadest possible 
terms) that international life occurs and proceeds.  It therefore makes more sense to 
begin our theorising about international politics with the dynamic interplay between 
ideas (identities, culture and so on) and material forces (physical environment, power, 
wealth and so on).  
Coupled with this enhanced and fluid ontology is a nuanced understanding of 
epistemological relativism. Wendt draws on a realist philosophy of science to argue 
that there is “nothing in the intellectual activity required to explain processes of social 
construction that is epistemologically different than the intellectual activity engaged in 
by natural scientists” (Ibid., p. 372). He acknowledges that different social and material 
kinds of objects of study may require different methodologies of scientific inquiry, but 
“methods are not epistemologies” (p.373). Wendt then asserts that what constitutes 
“epistemic authority of any scientific study” is the applicability of the falsifiability criteria 
on empirical level – something that post-positivists acknowledge (Ibid.).  
It is worth, however, to take epistemological diversity more seriously. There is nothing 
incompatible between commitment to epistemological relativism and recognising 
significant differences where they exist. Methods of inquiry are not epistemologies but 
they do differ in significant ways between sciences and amongst paradigmatic 
traditions on intra-disciplinary level. Different objects of scientific enquiry requiring 
different methodologies involve different disciplinary structures, contents, cultures and 
ultimately different procedural standards for applying falsifiability criteria.  
It is therefore important to recognise in different paradigmatic traditions their specific 
natures as forms of various specialisations in International Relations, requiring their 
own specific standards of epistemic authority. Retaining epistemological integrity of 
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individual paradigmatic models of the empirical puzzle under research is an essential 
part of TSA. These models can then be examined and falsified by those specialising 
in those particular theoretical traditions. Epistemic authority of theory-synergetic 
research as a whole, however, is determined not by deconstruction of its synergetic 
parts but on its holistic merit, i.e. that on empirical level it constitutes a unit of publicly 
available evidence and its results (the synergetic model of a research subject matter) 
can be falsified.  
Epistemological relativism does not require us to abandon all sense of theoretical 
integrity, which could lead to what is likely to be fruitless attempt at theoretical 
synthesising.  The intellectual value of paradigm-bound research within a synergetic 
empirical programme stems from a unique set of knowledge-generating properties 
specific to that particular paradigm. It is therefore counterproductive to seek to gloss 
over these real differences because to do so would be to undermine the very purpose 
of the synergetic intellectual enterprise.  
Because, as noted above, synergy is a simultaneous operation of different, fully 
autonomous, self-contained parts. Through this operation a new whole emerges which 
is necessarily greater than the sum of its constituent parts. Therefore, an IR theory-
synergetic method relies upon a systematic application of different, epistemologically-
integral modes of paradigm-bound analysis upon the same empirical puzzle. The 
synergetic model of that puzzle that emerges through this process constitutes 
something more than simply agglomeration of theoretical perspectives. Thus, it will be 
shown that the synergetic model of international oil politics (Chapter 6) is necessarily 
greater, deeper and more substantial than the sum of its individual constituent parts - 
realist, critical, liberal, social constructivist, Marxist, post-structuralist and other 
paradigmatic analytical models (see chapters 4 and 5).  
This relates to an earlier statement that TSA first and foremost aspires to serve as a 
pan-disciplinary culture – a formalised acknowledgement and acceptance of 
multiplicity of knowledge in International Relations and a way for IR scholars to 
communicate across theoretical boundaries, and collaborate on empirical level in 
meaningful and potentially more fruitful ways. Turning to the empirical question at hand 
–  theory-synergetic analysis of international politics of oil and gas – the task is to 
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demonstrate how such a professional cross-theoretical discourse can be established 
and operationalised in practice.     
Case-studies: BTC and SGC projects 
Over the past ten years Baku-Tbilisi Ceyhan pipeline proved central to unlocking 
Caspian hydrocarbon reserves. It provided Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan 
- oil and gas producing states in the region - with a critical infrastructure link to global 
energy markets (Frederick-Starr, 2005, pp. 8-9). The pipeline runs from the Azeri-
Chirag-Gunashli (ACG) off-shore field across Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, and 
links Sangachal terminal on the shores of the Caspian Sea to Ceyhan deep-water 
marine terminal on the Turkish Mediterranean coast (see Map 1). The 1,768km 
pipeline became operational in 2006 and has since carried around about 2.8 billion 
barrels of crude oil to world markets (BP 3, BTC co. Shareholders, 2017).  
Yet, the BTC pipeline represents far more than an energy conduit. It is a multifaceted 
international project, involving a wide range of actors and comprising a complex mix 
of multi-level politics. Multinational corporations (MNCs), international financial 
institutions (IFIs), global advocacy groups and NGOs participated in the project 
alongside states, in a drawn out process that was marked by much friction and 
controversy (Carroll, 2010, p.2). As such, it was characterised by “the close 
correspondence that existed at all stages of the pipeline’s development between 
politicians, businessmen, and economists who defined the project’s ends and the 
engineers and builders who devised the means by which those ends could be 
achieved” (Frederick-Starr, 2005, p.8).  
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Map 1. BTC pipeline (Source: Oxford Engineering Alumni, 2008) 
Furthermore, BTC and related projects are underpinned by an impressive legal 
architecture made up of national constitutions, international agreements and 
commercial contracts between MNCs, host governments and IFIs, and an array of 
additional legal instruments. In total it comprises a hierarchal legal structure that 
governs the operation of the project and determines relations between its participants. 
Provisions of this international legal framework supersede domestic laws of the 
countries hosting the pipeline (Blatchford, 2005, p.120).   
BTC project had also had considerable normative implications, with concerns raised 
over human, social and environmental impact of the pipeline. These concerns are at 
the heart of the debate around BTC, both within participating states and internationally. 
This is reflected in the sustained criticism of the project before and since its operation 
commenced (Muttitt and Marriott, 2002; Carroll, 2010). It is also reflected in the 
widespread integration of social, environmental, human rights and developmental 
considerations in the workings of the project (Frederick-Starr, 2005, pp. 11-13). 
Therefore, BTC project and political debates around it in the late 1990s and early 
2000s should be understood in their wider historical context, as part of an evolving 
story of energy exploration and development in the region. 
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Running alongside BTC for much of its route is its natural gas sibling the South-
Caucasus Pipeline (SCP). The 700km pipeline transports gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah 
Deniz off-shore gas field, running across Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, where it is 
currently connected to the local distribution network, although it has been considerably 
expanded over the past few years (BP, SCP, 2017). It is intended as the first link in an 
interlocking chain of pipelines which, when completed, will form the Southern Gas 
Corridor (SGC) – SCP, Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and Trans-Adriatic Pipeline 
(TAP) (BP Magazine, 12.10.2017). Just as BTC proved central to unlocking Caspian 
oil reserves, SGC is seen as a major energy project of global significance: 
“Seven countries, 11 companies, as many gas sales agreements, more than $40 
billion of investment and upwards of 30,000 people employed during its busiest phase 
of activity: the Southern Gas Corridor is one of the global oil and gas industry’s most 
significant – and ambitious – undertakings yet. It is also one of the largest projects in 
BP’s portfolio – and of strategic importance in the business’s shift towards gas” (BP 
Magazine, 12.10.2017). 
 
Map 2. BP Visual Guide to SGC (Source: BP Magazine, 12.10.2017) 
 
It is clear, therefore, that whilst SGC and BTC represent different points in evolution 
of energy politics they form part of a common empirical framework when it comes to 
adopting the theory-synergetic approach. Like BTC, Southern Gas Corridor is a 
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multifaceted international project, characterised by a set of complex multi-agency 
interactions and informed by highly polarised normative debates. The project is of 
crucial importance for states, companies and institutions involved in its development 
but for environmentalists and others who oppose it, SGC is “an emblematic project 
likely to lock in a fossil fuel model instead of promoting a de-carbonised future” 
(CounterBalance, Platform and Re:Common, 08.03.2016). BTC and SGC projects are 
not merely pieces of industrial infrastructure for energy transmission – they symbolise 
normative choices about energy, environment, and the kinds of possible social orders 
these choices determine.   
In this chapter international politics of oil and gas is introduced as the broad ontological 
field of this study and is placed within historical framework of IR theoretical debates. 
The next two chapters set out rationalist and reflectivist/post-positivist models of BTC 
and SGC case-studies. Perhaps the most important observation to be drawn at this 
point is that oil serves as a single, common but complex empirical field, upon which 
different theoretical models (from Classical Liberalism, Realism and Marxism, through 
to the “neo-neo synthesis”, to the reflectivist critique and then on to positivist response 
and so on), operate independently but simultaneously, in synergy. Again, the objective 
is not to ascertain which theory gets it right about oil but to accurately determine which 
part of the deep ontology of oil is being revealed by the insights of a specific theoretical 
model or paradigm, and how that particular framework relates to others in forming the 
empirical problem-field of international oil and gas politics.  
Thus feminism may not be useful in explaining the crude oil prices collapse of 2015, 
but it is invaluable in identifying the effects of the Niger Delta oil crisis on marginalised 
groups (Ihayere et al, 2014). Marxism may not be the best theoretical tool to address 
the question of the environmental impact of Chinese state energy policy in Africa in 
2000s, but it does, for example, provide a sharp analytical framework for 
understanding the rise of anti-imperialist and socialist movements in oil producing 
regions of Russian Caucasus in 1900s (Suny, 1972). Positivist approaches might 
focus on the power of oil (physical, material and political) (e.g. Montgomery, 2010), 
critical theories - on exposing the costs and vagaries of its industry (and who benefits 
from it globally) (e.g. Silverstein, 2014), post-modernist analysis - on deconstructing 
the narrative of oil consumption (e.g. Margonelli, 2008), constructivist paradigm - on 
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the development and outcomes of social processes in the business and politics of oil 
(e.g. Bower, 2010) and so on.  
These different paradigmatic approaches are telling the same story, or rather different 
threads of the same story, occurring simultaneously or at different times in history but 
cumulatively constituting an epic, Tolkienesque tapestry of knowledge about oil, into 
which a new element has come in: the resultant picture is greater than, and not 
explained by, the sum of the component threads. It is explained and animated by the 
knowledge-maximising effect of theoretical synergy.  
It can be argued, based on discussion above, that any decision to arbitrarily set limits 
upon or to bracket the scope, breadth and depth of a given ontological and 
epistemological framework (in this case - oil) is not only fundamentally subjective but 
is antithetical to the goals and purpose of any knowledge-producing intellectual 
enterprise. Theory choice then should be determined not by a narrow set of a priori 
epistemological and ontological commitments but by the specifics and circumstances 
of the empirical question or puzzle under study and with a firm commitment to 
knowledge-inclusivity in the widest sense. Generally, the broader a particular empirical 
problem-field is, the greater theoretical synergy that can be produced.  
This should not, however, mean that where the empirical set is narrower particular 
forms of knowledge-production should be dismissed on grounds of 
incommensurability. A commitment to synergetic analysis, with its implicit historicism, 
requires constant recognition of a deeper ontology of any given subject matter or 
empirical puzzle – a mystified, obscured reality which can be revealed through an 
open-ended scientific engagement.  
This commitment is not an ideological standpoint or an arbitrary aspiration. It is beyond 
debate that the grand, deep ontology of oil suggested in this cursory analysis is 
expansive, multi-layered, complex, multidimensional, and one that encompasses a 
wide array of concepts, actors and processes of both social and material kind. As a 
complex ontological field its geographical scope is truly global in terms of the physical, 
geological occurrence of oil in different locales around the world, and international in 
terms of the historical process of its distribution and movement across the planet. As 
Francisco Parra observes: “Most of the oil consumed in the world today has moved 
from one country to another” (2013, p.1).  
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Conclusion 
As an empirical research problem hydrocarbons pose an implicitly interdisciplinary 
challenge. The natural science of oil and gas comprises a multidisciplinary 
combination, bringing together geology, chemistry, seismology, engineering; it is 
highly-technology dependent and is driven by a continuous process of innovation and 
discovery. As will be shown technology emerges as one of the key factors determining 
the course and nature of relations between oil producing and consuming states, 
societies and multinational energy companies.  
As a social scientific enterprise oil studies represents an even broader range of 
disciplinary approaches, ranging from history and sociology to game theory modelling 
and international finance and economics, domestic and international law, 
anthropology, business management and administration. This is before wider arts and 
humanities are considered – the drama, even romance of oil has a potential to capture 
imagination few other phenomena possess. It has had a profound cultural and social 
impact, inspiring works of art, literature and cinema.  
This ontological complexity has profound empirical implications, for it transmits and 
permeates the entire subject matter, on macro and micro-levels, on grand- and mid-
range theoretical scale. For example, a pipeline carrying 700,000 barrels of oil per day 
is not merely a product of an intergovernmental agreement, cannot be reduced to the 
terms of the corporate contract underpinning it and does not represent a purely 
technological enterprise. It encompasses all three and many other elements, social, 
political, cultural, even imaginational.  
An oil pipeline can be a symbol, representing simultaneously a triumph of corporate 
endeavour, a standard of great technological achievement, a threat to national 
security, a solution to the problem of regional energy diversification, an environmental 
threat to local natural habitat, a hope for national progress and prosperity, additional 
CO2 in the atmosphere, a reminder of past historical accomplishment, challenge to 
national pride e.g. as a reminder of loss of territorial or imperial control, and many 
other different things to different actors.  
Therefore, any attempt at construction of a parsimonious model of oil politics is bound 
to be unsuccessful. Seeking to ascribe systemic, structural qualities to a complex, 
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multidimensional ontological field (one that is constantly evolving and changing in 
response to external stimuli and internal dynamics, and is hyper-sensitive to ideational 
and material shifts) is a futile enterprise. Similarly, the belief that this ontology can be 
reduced solely to the sum of its social construction, e.g. forms of linguistic expressions 
through which it is constituted or its underlying, hidden power-structures, is unfounded.  
Ontological complexity is universal and remains true at all levels of analysis and for 
this reason no forms of knowledge can be excluded on a priori grounds.  
Given the task of tackling such a challenge a social scientific project of meta-
disciplinary proportions is required. The extent of theoretical, methodological and 
wider analytical properties of this meta-discipline must match the challenges 
presented in empirical problems, on all levels of analysis. It needs to possess a 
particular disciplinary culture and a common language to effectively communicate 
across disciplinary and epistemological boundaries. As has been argued already 
International Relations has the potential to fulfil this function. Post-Fourth Debate IR is 
a discipline bursting with epistemological diversity. It is increasingly interdisciplinary, 
reflective, intellectually responsive to real world developments. And the wealth of its 
intellectual capital, accumulated through nearly a century of Great Debates, provides 
for the right analytical toolkit with which to tackle the ontological complexity of oil.   
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IV 
Rationalist Models 
Introduction 
This chapter explores rationalist approaches to oil and gas politics and sets out rationalist 
models of the BTC and SGC pipelines. Positivism forms the core of mainstream international 
energy studies and constituted the dominant discourse of the field for over a century. Classical 
liberal and realist theoretical traditions establish key themes in petroleum politics – economic 
and political power of hydrocarbons. Neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalist paradigms 
develop these themes, advancing more attenuated and complex forms of rationalist analysis 
of oil and gas production, transportation and trade.   
 
Therefore, BTC and SGC pipeline systems take their place in a structure of oil politics that is 
set in an expansive timeline, spanning over a century of history from Industrialisation to present 
day.  Yet key themes and issues that characterise rationalist paradigms as shaped by the 
realist/liberal and the ‘neo-neo’ discourses, recur continuously throughout these debates. This 
chapter aims to provide an introduction to these debates about petroleum politics in general, as 
well as to set BTC and SGC case-studies within the rationalist paradigmatic analytical 
framework. The chapter opens with an overview of classical liberal and realist accounts of Baku 
petroleum and the origins of the global oil industry, before proceeding to set out neo-realist neo-
liberal institutionalist accounts of energy politics and the BTC and SGC case studies.    
 
Classical rationalist approaches and the story of Baku oil 
Liberalism 
A classical liberal analysis of international oil politics begins with an explicit recognition 
that “virtually from the very beginning, petroleum was an international business” 
(Yergin, 1991, p.56). For classical liberals, or idealists, the focus of enquiry is not 
limited to aspects of state power but is directed towards identifying opportunities for 
international cooperation. Liberal internationalism, underpinned by Kantian ethics, 
holds “democratic government, economic interdependence, and international law and 
organizations as means to overcome the security dilemma of the international system” 
(Russett, 2013, p.95). Unlike realists, classical liberals, such as Alfred Zimmern, treat 
economic forces as independent factors, separate from military and political power, 
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and more important: “It is enough to emphasise the fact that the economic weapon is 
the most powerful in the varied armoury of the Allies” (Ibid. p.20).  
This theme runs consistently through idealist accounts of international politics (Angell, 
1913). In the liberal account the dynamics of international oil politics are driven by the 
economic and technological forces, by free trade and international finance, and by the 
global reach of international oil companies, which exercise considerable influence over 
national policy. For example, the decision by the British government to lift the 
prohibition on tanker traffic through the Suez Canal in 1890 was dictated in large part 
by Shell’s expansion into cross-ocean oil trade and the need to give a British-owned 
private company a competitive edge against the dominance of the American Standard 
Oil (Yergin, 1991, p. 67).  
The story of oil, therefore, begins with the establishment and growth of the global oil 
industry in the second half of the 19th Century (Yergin, 1991). Particular attention is, 
therefore, paid to the prominent role of international oil companies, banks, various 
regulatory frameworks under international law, especially international commercial 
law, and the relationships between various actors participating in global oil trade. By 
liberal account, this is first and foremost the story of international oil companies and 
their leaders, whose names have become synonymous with the very idea of capitalism 
– John, D. Rockefeller and his Standard Oil empire, the Nobels, the Rothschilds, 
Marcus Samuels and the rise of Shell/Royal Dutch, amongst others. This is the story 
of free trade and enterprise, of global banking and financial forces, of international 
organisations and firms, led by irrepressible characters, committed to promoting the 
causes of commercial industrialism and scientific and technological advancement.  
This is also a story of how the interests of states and governments are subsumed and 
shaped by the interests of private commercial enterprise. By late nineteenth century 
oil was already a valuable commodity, traded around the world in the form of finished 
products, namely kerosene (Yergin, 1991, p.56). The business of oil preceded the 
politics of it. By 1900 oil was already a global industry, dominated by the Standard Oil 
Company in the United States and the Nobels, the Rothschilds and Marcus Samuels’ 
Shell Transport and Trading Company in the Russian Transcaucasia (Azerbaijan and 
Georgia) (Hiro, 2007, pp.10-12).  
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The origins of BTC and later SGC projects are to be found here. The region of present 
day Republic of Azerbaijan has been renowned for its hydrocarbon reserves since 
antiquity (Yergin, 1991, p.57; Adams, 2002, p.5; Sebag Montefiore, 2008, p.195; 
Gŏkay, 1999, pp. 2-20). The Arab conquest marked the beginnings of Caspian oil 
exploration and its rise as a commercial resource (Ashurbeili, 1992, p.64). By mid-19th 
century all of present-day Azerbaijan and the whole South Caucasus had been 
annexed by the Russian Empire. And from a classical liberal perspective it was the 
introduction of a new contractual system by Tsarist authorities in 1870s that marked 
the beginning of the oil industry in Baku (Adams, 2002, p, 8-9; LeVine, 2007, p.7).   
The new system replaced state monopoly on oil and the lease back system (LeVine, 
2007, p. 7). Instead a new legal regime of publicly tendered long-term oil concessions 
was introduced, establishing clear legal relationship between oil producers and the 
state and ensuring multitude of incentives for private investment and technological 
innovation. The scene was set for rapid industrialisation of Azerbaijan, with Baku 
emerging as one of the birthplaces of modern oil industry (Adams, 2002, pp.8-9; Muttitt 
and Marriott, 2002, p.20; LeVine, 2007, pp.4-27; Yergin, 1991, pp.57-63). 
It was in Baku that the first drilled (as opposed to hand-dug) oil well was constructed 
in 1844, ten years prior to the method being used in Pennsylvania. By 1878 there were 
over three hundred such drilled wells (Adams, 2002, p.8). New uses for oil were also 
being developed with dozens of kerosene refineries opening in Baku by 1870s.This 
was the as yet underdeveloped but pregnant with possibilities environment that 
greeted the Swedish Nobel family upon their arrival in Baku in 1873 (Sebag 
Montefiore, 2008, p.195). The story of the first Baku Oil Boom is to a large extent the 
story of the Nobels (see Asbrink, 2002; Tolf, 1976). 
In 1875 Robert Nobel Refinery was established in the city’s industrial Black Town 
district. Having pioneered new refining techniques Nobels dominated the Russian 
kerosene market (Adams, 2002, p.12). They developed local pipeline network to 
connect their wells to transport infrastructure and in 1876 Ludwig Nobel began work 
on a cistern ship, essentially the world’s first oil tanker (Yergin, 1991, p.59). In 1878 
tankers “Zoroaster” and in 1880 “Moses” were launched from Baku, delivering 
kerosene and fuel oil to Russia through Caspian Sea and by river Volga. By 1885 the 
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Nobels had 11 tankers in the Caspian and two in the Baltic (Adams, 2002, p.15; Yergin, 
1991, p. 59).  
Similarly, the Nobels’ involvement in Baku oil opened “a further universal theme in 
global oil - the competitive search for international capital to finance oil development” 
(Adams, 2002, p. 19). Concerned with overexpansion of their operations in the 
Caspian, the Nobels sought to mitigate their risks by forming a publicly owned Nobel 
Brothers Petroleum Company, in order to attract additional private capital. Eventually 
this resulted in cooperation between the Nobels and another legendary 19th Century 
business family - the Rothschild banking empire (see Lottman, 1995; Fursenko & 
Freeze, 1990). As Yergin contends, Nobels’ borrowing arrangements with the 
Rothschilds’ Credit Lyonnais “set a significant precedent in that it may have been the 
first loan for which future petroleum production was used as collateral” (1991, p. 60). 
One of the end products of this cooperation was a railway between Baku and the 
Georgian port of Batumi on the Black Sea – a strategic alternative route for Caspian 
oil to the world markets; its launch in 1883, “opened a door to the West for Russian 
oil, it also initiated a fierce, thirty-year struggle for the oil markets of the world” (Yergin, 
1991, p. 61). The rail-line was complimented by a 900km pipeline that traversed 
Azerbaijan and Georgia parallel to the rail line. It was not completed until 1906 when 
it was the world’s longest oil pipeline (Yergin, 1991, p.69; LeVine, p.24). Terry Adams, 
one of the architects of what came to be the BTC pipeline, points out: “Ninety-two 
years later the pipeline route again became the preferred strategic option for 
evacuating South Caspian oil from Baku to the Black Sea” (Adams, 2002, p.22) (see 
below).  
 
The Rothschilds capitalised on their investment in the Baku-Batumi railway and 
pipelines, setting up the Caspian and Black Sea Petroleum Company in 1886, with 
headquarters and refineries in Batumi (Yergin, 1991, p.60). By 1900 Baku was 
supplying 50% of the world’s oil (Ibid. p. 24; Shaffer, 2002, p. 27; LeVine, p. 26). In the 
United States the industry was dominated by J.D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil cartel; 
but in Russian Azerbaijan a new level of complexity emerged – local small-holders, 
Nobels and Rothschilds all operated in an intricate web of financial and technological 
relations heralding the advent of modern oil industry – capital and technology were all 
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brought to bear upon the task of bringing Caspian petroleum reserves from Baku to 
world markets.  
 
There were also many other smaller, independent producers and traders around the 
world, and along with the oil giants, they were brought together in a complex web of 
commercial competition, technological innovation, financial expansion, geographical 
race for new sources and an evolving regulatory legal framework to govern it all. It is 
inconceivable from an idealist perspective to reduce this complexity to mere power 
politics and inter-state military competition (Zimmern,1918, p.2).   
Realism 
Classical realists, and E.H. Carr in particular, were scathing of such liberal 
assessments of world politics. Their analysis of international politics of oil begins with 
examination of power, and in particular military power. There is a strong association, 
therefore, between economic and political power (Carr, 1939 (1981), pp.104-106). 
This point is emphasised by H.J. Morgenthau: “Control over [oil deposits] has been an 
important factor in the distribution of power, in the sense that whoever is able to add 
them to his other sources of raw materials adds that much strength to his own 
resources and deprives his competitors proportionately” (1985, p. 133). 
What distinguishes classical realist analysis of oil politics is this central role it accords 
to power. Instrumentality of oil as a source and conduit of economic, military and 
political strength of states is prioritised. Normative framework of such analysis is far 
from absent but it is bracketed by the terms of core power relations amongst national 
states. This is well illustrated by E.H. Carr’s treatment of economic factors in 
international politics. Having characterised economic power as an instrument of policy, 
he sets out two means by which it is deployed – the export of capital and control of 
foreign markets (1981 [1939], p. 113).  
In the former case, British government’s aforementioned direct purchase of shares in 
the Suez Canal and Anglo Iranian (formerly Anglo Persian) Oil Company are amongst 
examples of direct government ownership as means of projecting and accumulating 
state power (Ibid., p.114). The role of private companies and individual entrepreneurs, 
celebrated by idealists, is downplayed as subordinate to the priorities of states: “More 
often, government used their power to stimulate investments by banks and private 
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individuals in the interests of national policy. [] Political interests were furthered by 
private investors enjoying, like the chartered companies of the nineteenth century, 
government patronage or, more commonly, diplomatic support” (Ibid.).  
By this account, international oil companies in the first decades of the twentieth century 
were extensions of state policy, rather than autonomous economic actors, pursuing 
independent objectives. The liberal narrative of progressive advance of industrial 
capitalism and international systems of legal governance is rejected in favour of 
analysis of inter-state competition in an anarchic system. Therefore, processes such 
as the internationalisation of trade, commerce and industry are seen as a product of 
the struggle between states for control of foreign markets.  
And, to paraphrase Carr, it is not clear whether political power is being used to acquire 
control over oil resources in far flung corners of the world for the sake of their economic 
value or whether oil resources are being sought in order to establish and strengthen 
political power: “…powerful countries found their “natural” markets in areas where their 
political interests lay and where their political interests could be most readily asserted” 
(Ibid., p. 116). For example, Carr brings up the example of Britain’s Export Credit 
Guarantee Department, set up by the government to apply its purchasing power as an 
international political asset, by issuing guarantees for overseas private projects 
considered to be “in the national interest” (Ibid, p. 116).  
Carr is dismissive of classical economists’ insistence on theoretical separation of the 
economic from the political, symbolised by the laissez-faire approach of the 19th 
century. He criticises what he calls “the illusion of a divorce between politics and 
economics” (Carr, 1939 (1981), p.107). From a realist standpoint economic forces do 
not constitute an independent factor in international relations and, along with military 
strength of nations, are integral to the political dynamics of inter-state competition and 
balance of power (Ibid., p. 120).  
Not surprisingly, access to and control of natural resources, such as oil, are prioritised 
as fundamental functions of economic and therefore political military power. 
Possession of natural resources such as oil is instrumental to a state’s ability to 
exercise military force and is therefore essential. As Carr wryly observes: “Where 
home supplies were not available, the unfettered control of overseas supplies became 
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a primary objective. The desire to control adequate supplies of oil inspire an active 
British policy in more than one oil-producing country” (Ibid., p. 113).  
Morgenthau paid particular attention to this relationship between military strength and 
economic power in the form of raw materials. He considered that their relative and 
absolute importance for the power of a state depended “necessarily upon technology 
of the warfare practiced in a particular period of history” (1985, p. 131). Hence, from a 
realist standpoint the importance of oil in international politics over the past century 
and a half is determined chiefly by the central role it plays in the efficacy of various 
dominant military technologies. 
Military technology/strength – power: this schematic symbolises the crude material 
value of oil as translated into power politics. It also provides for a starting point in the 
classical realist analysis of international oil politics, with oil emerging as the 
instrumental raw material of war in the early 20th century. Growth of German power in 
late 19th century was stimulated in large part by its consistent pursuit of a decisive 
technological advantage over its rivals to give itself a critical military edge (see, for 
example, Bernhard von Bülow, 1932; Kelly, 2011; Sondhaus, 1997).  
Ultimately, as Yergin observes, this aggressive arms build-up, especially construction 
of oil-powered ocean-going gunboats was to have a decisive consequence (1991, 
p.152). In line with Morgenthau’s dictum, Britain’s decision to switch the Royal Navy 
to oil “was driven by the technological imperatives of the Anglo-German naval race”: 
“Oil for the first time, but certainly not the last, had become an instrument of national 
policy, a strategic commodity second to none” (Yergin, 1991, p. 163). 
In the first decade of the 20th century there were two oil companies representing private 
British interest – the Royal Dutch/Shell and smaller Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
(APOC), operating a concession in Iran. It became clear from the outset that the British 
government was particularly concerned about APOC12, fearing its concession might 
pass under control of a foreign syndicate (Ibid., p. 159). For their part, APOC’s 
management consistently emphasised “that Anglo-Persian was a natural adjunct to 
British strategy and policy and was a significant national asset – and that all the 
company’s directors saw it just that way” (Ibid.). By May 1914 the British Government 
                                                          
12 Anglo Persian Oil Company was renamed Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1935 and British 
Petroleum Company in 1954. It is one of antecedents of the modern BP.  
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acquired 51% stake of APOC and a 25-year contract with the Admiralty to supply Royal 
Navy with cheap fuel oil (Ibid, p.160). 
Thus, in line with Carr’s observations, Britain lacking domestic supplies of oil, sought 
unfettered control of overseas supplies, which in turn inspired an active British policy 
in Iran and wider Gulf region. In fact, in “The Twenty Years’ Crisis” Carr mentions 
British government’s purchase of Anglo-Persian Oil Company as an example of 
political objectives being attained by direct government economic investment (1939 
(1981), p. 114).  And many in Whitehall wondered about the purpose of Anglo-Persian 
– was it to merely supply the Royal Navy with fuel or was it “to help create an 
integrated, state-owned oil company, a national champion, and then to assist that 
company in expanding its commercial interests worldwide?” (Yergin, 1991, p.175).  
In other words, governments often use political power to stimulate private investment 
in furtherance of political objectives – they provide banks and private capital with 
patronage, diplomatic support and access (Carr, 1981, pp.114-115). Historical record 
suggests that this was the case with BP-led BTC project, as US, Turkish and British 
governments intervened repeatedly in support of the pipeline and companies behind 
them, and provided political legitimacy and security through funding of the project by 
international public institutions such as the World Bank (Adams, 2009, p. 249; Carroll, 
2010, p.  10).  
 
Control of markets overseas is another direction of government policy and powerful 
countries often found their “natural markets” close to where their political interest lay. 
Purchasing power of rich states is an international asset that allows them and not the 
producer, “to call the tune” (Carr, 1981, pp.116-117). Carr brings up the example of 
Britain’s Export Credit Guarantee Department, which was established by the Board of 
Trade in 1939 to provide UK state financial guarantees for British firms investing 
abroad or engaged in transactions “...in connection with which it appears to them (ed. 
– the Board of Trade) expedient in the national interest that guarantees should be 
given” (Ibid, p.116).  
 
For Carr ECGD represents a substitution of the military weapon by the economic. Sixty 
years later, the very same ECGD served as the institutional framework for British 
public funding of the BTC project. Providing a $150 million of taxpayers’ money in 
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credit for the construction of Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, ECGD argued that the project 
“contributes to the development of further energy supply routes in accordance with the 
Government’s policy of ensuring a range of secure energy sources to Western 
markets” (ECGD, 2003, p.2). The point here is that classical realism can offer a useful 
historical-analytical prism through which to understand contemporary international 
energy projects such as BTC. And not surprisingly, therefore, on realist account, Baku 
oil first attains strategic significance in the aftermath of WWI.   
 
By the terms of the October 1918 armistice between Britain and Ottoman Empire, 
Britain took control over Baku and the entire Trans-Caucasus region - “The British Oil 
Administration had come into effect” (Adams, 2002, p.44-45). Azerbaijan and Georgia 
declared independence earlier that year and the British Oil Administration was in 
reality a reluctant intervention – Britain was economically and militarily overstretched. 
Still, some five thousand troops under command of General WM Thompson arrived in 
Baku from Iran by autumn 1918 (Altstadt, 1992, p.92).  One notable reason for British 
involvement was emerging American isolationism – it was clear that President Wilson 
would not commit US troops to the region. Possibility that France or another European 
power would play that role in the oil-rich Baku was equally unacceptable to Britain 
(Adams, 2002, p. 46). 
 
Azerbaijani government made repeated appeals for international recognition, 
particularly that of the US. Basing its claims on President Wilson’s “Fourteen Points”, 
Azerbaijani leadership was also keen to utilise what Adams calls oil diplomacy; for 
example, by offering preferential treatment in award of oil contracts for American 
companies as incentive for US establishing full diplomatic relations with Baku (2002, 
pp. 47; 54; 57). The Paris Peace Conference in January 1919 opened with Azerbaijan 
at the top of its agenda.  No recognition, however, was forthcoming.  
 
From a classical realist perspective, the abandonment of Baku oil and the Caucasus 
to the Russian Red Army in 1920 was down to recalibration of strategic interests by 
great powers, especially Britain – discovery of oil in Iran and acquisition of concession 
rights by Anglo-Persian significantly reduced strategic value of Baku reserves (Adams, 
2002, pp.56-58). Despite Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” it was clear that neither Britain, 
nor anyone else will come to the aid of Azerbaijan or Georgia: “Churchill, reflecting the 
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imperial school of thought, argued that it was all right to support self-determination in 
the abstract but that no vital interests were at stake in the Caucasus; owing to their 
weakness, these states would be reabsorbed into Russia eventually” (Altstadt, 1992, 
p.106).  
 
The British quickly recognised that Azerbaijani and Georgian independence could only 
be maintained by an outside force, not just for external but for internal reasons too, 
and were not keen to play that role (Adams, 2002, p.54). The cost of British presence 
in the Caucasus was rising and political support for it quickly disappeared. Winston 
Churchill in particular saw no competitive advantage for Britain’s continued 
involvement in the region and believed the future of Britain’s energy security to be in 
Iran. The Americans too refused to become involved. By early 1919 plans were being 
made for British withdrawal from the region. As Adams contends: “For reasons of 
expediency and affordability, Curzon and the British abandoned the newly democratic 
independent states of the Caucasus to their Bolshevik fate” (2002, p.56). The British 
withdrew by end of August 1919. The Red Army entered Baku in April 1920. 
 
Neorealist and Neo-Liberal Institutionalist Approaches 
Azerbaijan’s incorporation into Soviet Union put an end to international involvement in 
Baku oil until the collapse of USSR and restoration of Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s 
independence in 1991 (Le-Vine, 2007, pp.144-173; Adams, 2009). By that stage, 
however, international petroleum order has been completely transformed. World War 
II was a turning point in the history of global energy. It marked the pivotal shift from 
coal to oil as the primary fuel of industrial and economic growth, ushering in a new 
world petroleum order. Oil production and consumption in the West and in the USSR 
increased rapidly, fuelling the reconstruction effort and the post-war economic boom 
(Yergin, 1991, p. 409-410).  
Oil proved to be the strategic commodity in war – powering tanks, ships and planes, 
but also trucks and other internal combustion engine vehicles. And the post-war period 
heralded a golden age of the automobile – by 1950 there were forty million cars in 
operation in the United States alone, leading to an explosion in demand for petroleum 
(Ibid.). By 1960 worldwide consumption of oil rose to 21 million barrels per day (from 
just 6 million barrels in 1945) (Roberts, 2005, p.40). What began as a cottage industry 
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in the nineteenth century now was the life-force of the Modern Age. Oil was now a 
colossal international enterprise comprising a myriad political, economic, social and 
technological processes and interactions on a truly global scale, bringing together 
geologists and engineers, lawyers, traders and corporate executives, politicians and 
civil servants, in pursuit and competition for the world’s critical commodity: “to be a 
world power a nation needed either oil or the money to buy it” (Ibid.).  
Moreover, the post-war scientific turn in the oil industry was complemented by 
development of increasingly specialised theories about the economics of oil. The 
sheer volumes now being traded on the open markets and the growing complexity of 
the international political economy of oil and energy more generally, required holistic 
understanding of a wide array of issues, from supply and demand dynamics, to prices 
and corporate governance, to marketing and trade, to international contract and 
commercial law (for a definitive rationalist overview of oil politics in WWII and the post-
war petroleum order see Yergin, 1991, pp. 289-431)  
Neo-realism 
These themes were all playing out against a backdrop of escalating Cold War 
tensions. Indeed, one of the first crises in the conflict was the Soviet occupation of 
northern Iran. Soviet troops were ordered out of the country in May 1946 but this did 
little to assuage Western fears over possible Soviet advance in the Gulf (Yergin 1991, 
p. 403). US policy makers were worried about the security of oil supplies and the threat 
of Soviet expansionism in the region; this being at least partly the motivation behind 
the launch of the Truman Doctrine in 1947: “Ostensibly aimed at Greece, Iran and 
Turkey, its true target was the oil-rich area of Western Asia” (Hiro, 2007, p. 90). As 
Daniel Yergin summarised: “Oil provided the point at which foreign policy, international 
economic considerations, national security, and corporate interests would all 
converge. The Middle East would be the focus” (1991, p. 410).  
On empirical level, these developments contributed to the development of a more 
attenuated forms of realist thinking on oil politics. Access to stable and secure supplies 
of petroleum emerged as a key issue. Heavily influenced by economics, scholars 
working in the field of oil and energy politics produced complex quantitative studies 
focusing on issues of available oil reserves, security of supplies and the behaviour of 
actors in the global energy market in the context of evolving dynamics of the Cold War 
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(Stocking and Watkins, 1948; Schwartz, 1950). Such scholarship was not limited to 
raw data analysis, but also involved systematic examination of key topics and themes 
in oil studies – strategic value of oil, interplay between government and business, the 
impact of various regulatory frameworks, interstate competition for control of supplies, 
the role and increasing power of oil-producing states, and the influence of international 
institutions and legal frameworks (Shwardon, 1974 [1955]; Stocking,1970; 
Shwardon,1977). 
It can be argued that this was a formative stage in the development of the mainstream, 
rationalist approach to energy studies. The key themes of the neo-realist, structural 
model (security of supply being the paramount one) were set out in the scholarly and 
political debates of the post-war period, not least by the policy-makers themselves (US 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1946). The Cold War structured international oil politics in the late 
1940s and through the 1950s with Middle East, and Saudi Arabia in particular, 
emerging as new centre of gravity in the post-war world (Yergin, 1991, p.393). 
These themes and modes of analysis dominated both scholarly and policy debates 
throughout the 1950s.  It can be argued that the Second Debate had the effect of 
transforming the study of international oil politics from a historical-sociological 
intellectual enterprise into a highly specialised, data-focused subfield of strategic 
studies. With the rise of OPEC, academic (and public) attention shifted to relations 
between producing and consuming countries, but the core characteristics of the 
rationalist oil paradigm remained in place – quantitative methodologies, game-theory 
applications, states and national oil companies as key units of analysis. The Middle 
East crises and wars of 1960s and 1970s only served to bring oil to the very top of 
political, academic agenda and, importantly, to the attention of general public. The 
issue of Western dependence on Middle Eastern oil came to the fore in the debates 
about energy and petroleum.   
Kenneth Waltz’s seminal “Theory of International Politics” was published just months 
before the second major oil shock, brought about by the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 
1979. Applying his economics model to set out a structural theory of international 
politics, Waltz argued that, like a market, the international system “is made by the 
actions and interactions of its units, and the theory is based on assumptions about 
their behaviour (Waltz, 1979, p. 118). His discussion of oil politics therefore, proceeds 
116 
 
within the framework of this parsimonious structural theory, where states competing in 
a self-help system, do all they can to ensure secure supply of strategic resources: 
“Countries that are highly dependent, countries that get much of what they badly need 
from a few possibly unreliable suppliers, must do all they can to increase the chances 
that they will keep getting it” (Ibid., p. 153).  
The OPEC embargo of 1973, the fall of Shah’s regime in Iran in 1979 and the 
consequent spikes in oil prices (and shortages) shook Western confidence and raised 
fears of permanent dependence on the Middle Eastern oil. Writing in later editions of 
“Politics Amongst Nations”, Henry Morgenthau observed that in the past consumers 
controlled prices “through colonial and semi colonial arrangements”, but now it is the 
producers who were organised to raise prices considerably by means of their 
independent, collective control of oil production (1985, p. 135).  Morgenthau advocated 
energy conservation, stockpiling of reserves, developing alternative energy sources 
and interestingly, limiting and curtailing importation of oil – classical realist strategy of 
self-sufficiency and autarky (Ibid.).  
By contrast Waltz advocated increasing imports in the short to medium term and 
conserving domestic resources: “Having imposed quotas on foreign oil for decades to 
make sure, in the name of resource development, that we would use our own oil first, 
it makes sense now to rely more on imports” (1979, p. 155). Perhaps on this issue 
there emerge early distinctions between offensive and defensive realisms, but in other 
respects Waltz’s policy prescriptions on oil matched that of Morgenthau, other experts 
and indeed the US Government – energy conservation and building up of reserves to 
withstand embargos. Establishment of the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve in 1975 
echoes Waltz’s suggestion of a “petroleum stockpile sufficient for riding through, say, 
a six-month embargo” (Ibid., p.156).  
Neo-realism did not completely subsume more traditional forms of realist thinking on 
oil – many scholars continued to produce historical comparative analysis, emphasising 
themes of change in the international energy system and inter-state oil politics, as well 
as the role of non-state actors (see, for example, Stoff, 1982). Yet given the overall 
impact of neo-realism on International Relations it is not surprising that international 
oil politics, as an academic sub-field (as well as wider policy community), came to be 
heavily influenced by neo-realist thinking. Analysis of oil politics now took place in the 
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context of a structural international political theory. Natural resources such as oil did 
not constitute independent units of analysis and were not especially important by 
themselves; their significance was tied to their contribution to the composition of 
national power, resource endowment being one of the key elements that determines 
a nation’s power-ranking (Watz, 1979, p. 131).  
Yet there was another emerging theme that began to impinge on the mainstream neo-
realist thinking about oil politics – environmentalism. Daniel Yergin’s “The Prize”, as 
mentioned, remains perhaps the most important and influential book on oil within the 
mainstream rationalist framework. What Yergin calls the “anthropological argument” 
forms the third key theme of this monumental study (business and politics of oil being 
the other two) (Ibid., p.14). This is the argument that oil is the basis of modernity, 
underpinning the very foundations of daily life – the rise of “Hydrocarbon Society” 
(Ibid.).  
Whilst Yergin hardly addresses substantive environmental issues in any real detail (in 
the first editions of the book), it is notable that “The Prize” opens with questions about 
environment that are pertinent to neorealist understanding of the problem: “In the 
meantime, the stage has been set for one of the great and intractable clashes of the 
1990s between, on the one hand, the powerful and increasing support for greater 
environmental protection and, on the other, a commitment to economic growth and the 
benefits of Hydrocarbon Society, and apprehensions about energy security” (Ibid., p. 
15). And the book concludes with Yergin envisaging possibility of “the almost 
incomprehensible costs and disruption… that could result if there’s a major climate 
change” (Ibid., p. 779).   
There are, therefore, two strands of thought emerging here: 1) that environmental 
issues represent a policy problem to be managed on balance with other strategic 
considerations or as Yergin describes it: “a competition of two great themes – energy 
and security, and energy and the environment” (Ibid, p. 779); and 2) that the climate 
change is a foundational threat to the very notion of modernity (Ibid., p. 780). These 
two approaches were to increasingly dominate mainstream rationalist debates around 
politics of oil in the 1990s and beyond (see, for example, Brown et al, 2007; Raleigh 
and Urdal, 2007; Broder, 2009).  
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Elevation of environmental concerns from empirical fringes to mainstream scholarship 
and their integration into mainstream paradigm of international oil politics took place 
in the context of evolving public debates, in politics and media. Nevertheless, 
mainstream positivist approaches to energy and environment retain their essential 
problem-solving normative focus. To illustrate this point, it is worth considering Daniel 
Yergin’s “The Quest: Energy, Security and the Remaking of the Modern World” (2011) 
– his follow up to “The Prize” (1991).  
If environment and climate change were barely mentioned in the latter publication, in 
“The Quest” Yergin accords them a central place in the narrative. Yergin opens “The 
Quest” with three key questions about energy, which in sum constitute the ontology of 
the contemporary positivist research programme and, at the same time, reflect the 
changes and transformations in neorealist thinking about energy over the past twenty 
years and especially, the role of oil: “Will enough energy be available to meet the 
needs of a growing world and at what cost and with what technologies? How can 
security of the energy system on which the world depends be protected? What will be 
the impact of environmental concerns, especially climate change, on the future of 
energy?” (2012 [2011], p.3).  
In a neorealist research programme, the central important question on climate change 
is not how to stop it in principle but on how it might affect the global energy regime e.g. 
in terms of balance of power amongst states. This is not because the human cost of 
climate change is unimportant but simply because such considerations do not fall 
within the ontological sphere of the rationalist model of energy politics. The story is no 
longer just about oil but its underlying ontological, epistemological and normative 
foundations remain unchanged, connecting various intellectual strands of “The Prize” 
(1991) and “The Quest” (2011).  
Neo-liberal Institutionalism 
Yet such an approach undoubtedly obscured the complexity of international oil politics. 
Specifically, neo-realist accounts failed to incorporate within their analytical framework 
the growing role of trans-national, intergovernmental and non-governmental actors 
and economic and social processes, whose dynamic interactions had direct and often 
decisive impact on political outcomes. This shortcoming was clearly demonstrated by 
the oil crises of the 1970s – the market, the companies, the oil traders and speculators, 
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even domestic consumers had all played critical parts in the unfolding drama of rising 
prices, petroleum shortages and economic recession.  
As the oil crisis of the early 1970s unfolded some scholars, notably Robert Keohane 
and Joseph Nye, were already tentatively beginning to seek to “to establish the political 
significance of international organizations in certain issue areas – as arenas and 
members of transgovernmental coalitions, and as potential points of intervention in 
transnational systems” (1974a, p. 61; see also, Ibid., 1972). Keohane and Nye (1974b) 
focused on the role of non-state actors, such as multinational corporations pursuing 
profit in a global marketplace, and emphasised significance of trans-national 
processes in world politics and their implications for national states (1973, p. 158).  
Major differences between neo-realist and neoliberal institutionalists began to emerge  
around disagreements over a possibility and the degree of international cooperation 
(Nye, 1980), which offered ample opportunities for applying various game-theory 
scenarios to international oil politics; and b) the extent to which transnational factors 
can be said to impinge on the primacy of states as key units in the international system 
(Bucknell III, 1981; Ebinger, 1982; Hoffman and Johnson,1981; Krapels 1980; Ross 
and Williams, 1981).  
Another important component of the institutionalist research programme of 
international oil politics centred on the study of non-state corporate institutions that 
dominated production and trade in oil – the international oil companies (IOCs). Ever 
since publication of Anthony Sampson’s definitive “The Seven Sisters” (1975), which 
to this day remains the benchmark text on corporate history of oil, academic scholars 
consistently sought to incorporate international oil companies as units, or at the very 
least sub-units, in the architecture of international political oil regimes.  
The dynamics of relations between producing and consuming states on one hand, and 
international oil companies on the other, represents another level of complexity. In 
1945 US Navy Secretary James Forrestal stated that he did not “care which American 
company or companies developed the Arabian resources, as long as they were 
American” (quoted in Yergin, 1991, p. 412). IOCs are certainly trans-national in their 
operations, which are determined by the facts of geology above all, but their 
headquarters and shareholder base remains in their countries of origins. Meanwhile, 
the 1960s and 1970s saw proliferation of publicly-owned national oil companies 
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(NOCs) emerging to take their place alongside the majors – a process driven by 
decolonisation and independence movements across the developing world, as oil 
producing nations increasingly assumed control over their own resources, leading to 
the decline of the old concessionary system. 
Therein lies the paradox  -  Western oil majors have historically been viewed as 
national champions, promoting state interests, often with direct state involvement (for 
example Anglo-Iranian/BP (Sampson, 1973, pp. 70-74)); yet they also had had a 
complicated, often fractious relationship with national governments in Europe and 
especially in the United States, beginning with the dissolution of Standard Oil in 1911 
and the ongoing anti-trust battles between oil companies and the federal government 
(for an example of contemporary ‘trust-busting’ in academic literature, see Blair, 1978).  
These debates were not taking place in a vacuum – the 1980s was a decade of 
growing global, especially financial, markets and, in the West, government 
deregulation and privatisation of public enterprises. Oil was first introduced in the 
futures markets at the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) in 1983. And in 1985 
Margaret Thatcher abolished British National Oil Company (BNOC) and then, two 
years later, “reversed Winston Churchill’s historic decision of 1914” and sold off the 
government’s 51% stake in British Petroleum (BP) (Yergin, 1991, pp. 746, 767). Such 
developments were seen as victories for the market – could it be that oil was becoming 
just another commodity (Ibid., pp-743-744)? 
Furthermore, towards the end of the decade there emerged a consistent strand of 
scientific argument that the use of fossil fuels is having an impact on global climate, 
coupled with a growing public awareness of the issue (Yergin, 2012, p. 463). 
Establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988 
marked the beginning of the political evolution of international environmental and 
climate change agenda – from the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992 to the 
Paris Agreement (to cut carbon emissions) in December 2015 (UNFCC, 12.12.15). 
Environmental security agenda was subsequently picked up by international 
institutions, such as the World Bank (Mearns and Norton (eds.), 2010) and 
increasingly governments (Schwartz and Randall, 2003). 
Climate change and global warming were increasingly being taken seriously by 
governments and policy-makers and formed an arena for growing international 
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cooperation. Evolution of the IPCC process and the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change centred the issue at the heart of global political agenda. The signing 
of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 served to underline this shift. Kyoto also introduced 
markets in emissions trading and established several other foundational principles in 
the process that eventually led to the Paris Agreement of 2015 (UNFCC, 12.12.15; 
see also Yergin, 2012, pp.487-492). 
These themes – the declining role of the state in the oil industry, growing power of 
international oil companies, gradual marketization of oil pricing mechanisms, growth 
in global commodities and financial markets, the weakening of OPEC and of other 
producers (including Soviet Union), gradual decrease in oil prices, growing regulatory 
authority of international organisations and evolving international cooperation in 
tackling environmental crises, all provided the backdrop to neoliberal discussions 
about oil in the 1980s/1990s and beyond.  
This brief overview of neo-realist and neo-liberal accounts of post-war international 
energy politics sets out broad topical themes -  supply of energy, security of this supply, 
how the environment (climate change) might affect it in the long run, and international 
financing of energy projects are some of the central analytical planks of an expanded 
neo-neo rationalist model of global energy politics. The next task is to locate BTC and 
SGC projects within these single-paradigm rationalist models and the wider rationalist 
synthesis they comprise.  
Neo-realist account of BTC  
Soviet collapse in 1991 heralded what some described as “the new great game” and 
others, more sensibly, “pipeline politics”: “…the fact that the decisive clash was not 
that of weapons but of the routes by which oil and natural gas from the landlocked 
Caspian would get to the world’s markets” (Yergin, 2012, p.4-46). Newly-independent 
Azerbaijan did not possess necessary technology to develop its off-shore oil wealth 
independently and needed foreign companies’ expertise and capital (Omarova,1998, 
p.187). Russia, Britain, the United States, Turkey, Iran, the European Union and major 
multinational energy companies were all to become players in what Yergin described 
as the “Caspian Derby” (2012, pp.46-50).  
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For Georgia and, in particular, Azerbaijan, newly independent but weak, unstable and 
riven by conflicts, this was seen as an opportunity to avoid the repetition of 1918-1920 
and to secure independence through “oil diplomacy” (Adams, 2009, p.229). In the 
wake of the Gulf War, the U.S. and Europe were seeking ways of diversifying their 
energy supplies away from Middle East and OPEC-controlled resources and were 
particularly enthusiastic about the potential of the region’s hydrocarbon future (Carroll, 
2010, p.4). Turkey’s attempt to position the country as a major transit route for Middle 
Eastern oil and gas was stumped - specially-constructed deep-water Ceyhan port 
facility was designed primarily to process Iraqi oil being exported to Europe. But the 
sanctions against Saddam Hussein’s regime effectively shut down the Kirkuk-
Yumurtalik (Ceyhan) pipeline, resulting in serious underuse and additional financial 
costs for Turkey (Baran, 2005, p.104).  
The United States government immediately recognised independence of all Caspian 
states and became actively engaged with them in a policy that effectively remains in 
place to this day. As one of its architects, former U.S. Ambassador to the European 
Union, Richard Morningstar argued (2006): “The principal component of U.S. policy 
was to help these new states develop as stable independent countries that would 
ultimately become market democracies in an uncertain part of the World... In addition, 
the United States believed and still believes that the development of natural resources 
in the region should provide an alternative source of oil and gas at a time when South 
Asia and the Middle East are becoming increasingly unstable and demand is soaring 
from India and China”.  
Yet it was the British who were first to return to Baku, some seventy years after they 
were expelled by the Bolsheviks (LeVine, 2007, p. 144). And it was BP, of Anglo-
Persian fame, that was to win the prize when on 20th September 1994 the “Contract 
of the Century” was signed in a ceremony in Baku – a comprehensive agreement 
between Azerbaijan and a consortium of ten oil majors, including BP, Amoco, 
Norwegian STATOIL, as well as Russian Lukoil and Turkish TPAO, to explore Baku’s 
Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli offshore oilfield and Shah Deniz offshore gas-field – Azerbaijan 
International Operating Company (AIOC) was formed (Adams, 2009, p.228). 
The Contract was signed, yet the perennial question of how to transport Baku oil to 
global markets remained (DeLay, 1999, p.47). The Early Oil Project (EOP), which 
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emerged as the solution to the problem, involved production of relatively small 
quantities of oil for export via existing or new pipeline infrastructure (DeLay, 1999, 
p.51-54; Yergin, 2012, pp-57-59). Two potential pipeline routes emerged– Northern 
Export Route (NER) from Baku to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk and 
Western Export Route (WER) from Baku to the Georgian port of Supsa. The first option 
would involve re-activation of the existing Baku-Novorossiysk Pipeline, whilst WER 
would require considerable construction work in Georgia (see LeVine, 2007, pp.217-
235; Yergin, 2012, p.59). The issue of routing became immediately highly politicised. 
The United States and Turkey were both initially strongly opposed to NER, whilst some 
investors in AIOC were quite happy to proceed without WER.  
 
In Russia two policies seemed to have emerged in the Yeltsin period – one, embracing 
a zero-sum approach, aimed at frustrating any Azerbaijani attempt to develop its oil 
with Western help and the other one followed a more realistic aim of improving Russian 
position in relative terms (Fincher, 2005). Given that no agreement on sub-division of 
the Caspian Sea (the seabed and the territorial waters) existed between the newly 
independent Caspian states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) and Russia 
and Iran, it was claimed by the latter two that Azerbaijan’s negotiations with oil 
companies were in fact illegal and any contract for off-shore exploration unenforceable 
(Adams, 2009, p.234). This was a major challenge to Azerbaijani sovereignty and one 
that Baku dealt with by placing Russian interests at the top of the agenda in the Early 
Oil Project and mobilising major international political pressure on Moscow – Yergin 
described this policy as “offend no one” (2012, p.56).  
 
Thus, from early on, NER became the main option for transportation of Baku oil. In 
addition, Lukoil, the Russian energy giant, was given a 10% share in the Contract, 
becoming a shareholder-member of AIOC. By 1999 (the outbreak of the Second 
Chechen War which temporarily shut down Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline) WER was 
also commissioned – a new pipeline from Baku through Tbilisi to the Black Sea port 
of Supsa, built at a cost of $640 million (Adams, 2009, p. 251). Political strategic 
considerations prevailed. 
 
By 1998 scores of additional production sharing agreements were signed with 
companies representing commercial interests of the United States, Iran, Saudi Arabia, 
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Belgium, France and Italy. EOP was a resounding success, paving the way for 
wholesale exploration of Baku’s off-shore reserves. For Azerbaijan this meant 
diversification of its political interests, binding the country closer to the West, whilst 
placing it once again at a centre of the global energy industry in the early 21st Century. 
As Adams concludes in his discussion of the Contract of the Century: “Regional 
powers [Moscow, Ankara, and Tehran] were well served as well as Washington and 
London. Most of the capitals in Europe together with Tehran, Tokyo and Riyadh had 
embassies in Baku” (Ibid. p.252). 
  
Yet the question of the main export pipeline (MEP) remained unanswered (Carroll, 
2010, p.5). Whilst successful, NER and WER were relatively small projects with limited 
operational capacity and beset by technical and operational difficulties.  A major new 
pipeline, capable of carrying up to and above a million barrels of crude per year was 
needed – Baku-Tbilisi Ceyhan was to become that main export pipeline and to reshape 
politics of energy transportation in the Caspian region.  
 
The issue of MEP and its routing has been a subject of much debate and speculation 
amongst journalists, industry experts and political commentators right from the start – 
“good media fodder”, as Hill describes it (2004, p.20). Yet it is clear now that BTC was 
always going to emerge as the primary choice in the selection of export routes for 
Caspian oil – “... the question for BTC as an MEP had always been ‘when’ and ‘how’, 
not ‘if’ or ‘where’...” (Adams, 2009, p. 246; Yergin, 2012, p. 60).  There were several 
initial proposals for potential route of the MEP. These included expansion of the 
existing Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline (NER), developing WER pipeline and a new port 
facility in Georgia, a new route through Iran to Turkey (Ceyhan) or an Iranian port, a 
route to Ceyhan through Armenia, a route to Ceyhan through Georgia. 
 
Adams argues: “Any Russian option for an MEP was to be destroyed by security 
problems in Chechnya. Likewise, an MEP export from Georgia would have required 
Black Sea constricted and competitive oil transits through the Bosporus that created 
an unacceptable long term environmental risk for AIOC investors. The American 
investors in AIOC, constrained by the US Iran Libyan Sanctions Act, could never 
accept Iranian transit to Turkey. A similar transit through Armenia was equally 
125 
 
unacceptable for Baku, with its unsettled war in Nagorno-Karabakh” (2009, pp.245-
246). 
 
This brief examination requires further discussion. It is true that any Russian option 
would be constantly threatened by security challenges in North Caucasus. The 
outbreak of the Second Chechen War in 1999 briefly shut down Baku-Novorossiysk 
pipeline and necessitated a by-pass through Dagestan in 2000 to avoid areas where 
fighting was taking place (Carroll, 2010, p. 5). Yet, there is a more important 
explanation why the Russian option was unacceptable and it is to do with the U.S. 
policy objectives, which are not confined to commercial interests of American 
companies.   
 
As Svante Cornell et al argue, BTC represents “the most important pillar” of a major 
transportation network known as the New Silk Route or the Eurasian Transport 
Corridor – a planned, fully integrated infrastructure network of pipelines, highways, 
telecommunication facilities to connect Central Asia/Caspian region to Europe and the 
Far East, thus facilitating global trade and commerce (2005, p.21). BTC should 
therefore be seen in the context of a wider pipeline system in the region (planned and 
operational). 
 
The United States, chief architect of this vision, pursued a double aim of diversifying 
energy supplies through support for multiple pipelines system and ensuring that the 
dynamics of global trade and energy transportation flowed East to West, rather than 
North to South (Joseph, 1999, p.12). Preventing monopolisation of pipeline routes (by 
Russia or Iran) was thus seen as a fundamental facet of American policy in the region 
and Washington’s intense support and promotion of BTC fits neatly into this paradigm 
LeVine, 2007, p. 347). It is “... the biggest project anywhere in the former Soviet Union 
that the United States has backed, promoted and carried out strategically over three 
differing administrations” (Svante Cornell et al, 2005, p. 30). US sanctions against 
Tehran, introduced in 1996 Iran Libya Sanctions Act by the US Congress, imposed 
severe penalties on businesses investing in the Iranian energy sector, thus precluding 
possibility of MEP being routed through Iran, despite this being the most economically 
attractive option (Hill, 2004, p.19; Carroll, 2010, p. 5; Yergin, 2012, p.60).  
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Turkey represents another major facet of the BTC story. With a collapse of Soviet 
Union this NATO member found itself at a strategic location – crossroads of Europe, 
Russia, the Caucasus and Middle East. With significant mineral resources, vibrant 
young population and growing economy Turkey was an attractive option for newly 
independent Turkic states of the Caspian, particularly Azerbaijan (Yergin, 2012, p. 49). 
Yet the Turkish Republic was severely energy dependent with some 75% of all energy 
expected to be imported by 2025 (Baran, 2005, p.103). Realising the full potential of 
the Caspian oil and gas reserves, Turkey immediately saw an opportunity in land-
based pipeline connecting Baku oilfields to Ceyhan export terminals on the 
Mediterranean Sea. This pipeline would help bind the former Soviet states in the 
Caspian region to Turkey and strengthened Turkey’s importance for Europe and the 
US (Ibid, p.104).  
 
As Adams points out: “Guaranteed access to Turkish military infrastructure was 
fundamental to the US political policy and practical containment of Iran and Iraq. This 
would be directly linked to US reciprocal support for BTC. At the same time increased 
American influence in the Russian near abroad was seen to correspondingly decrease 
Russian political influence in the same areas, bringing with it direct access to 
considerable non-OPEC oil and gas reserves in which BTC would play a lead function” 
(2009, p.246-247). 
 
In addition, there was the issue of the Straits of Bosporus in Istanbul (Yergin, 2012, 
p.60). Extensively used for tanker shipment from the states of the Black Sea region, 
the Straits experienced a massive increase in use in the 1990s due to the additional 
oil traffic from the Caspian, leading to congestion and a high environmental risk 
(Baran, 2005, p.106). Turkey argued vociferously against any additional shipments 
through the Bosporus and sought to restrict these (Carroll, 2010, p.6). Ankara’s 
position was supported even by oil companies who faced “an unacceptable long term 
environmental risk” (Adams, 2009, p. 246; Hill, 2004, p.22).  
 
BTC option would avoid the Bosporus by delivering crude oil directly to southern 
Mediterranean and generating higher revenues in tariffs for the Turkish state (Elkind, 
2005, p.5). The Bosporus dilemma severely undermined the case for any MEP routing 
through Russia and Georgia. Turkey, therefore, pursued BTC from the outset (Carroll, 
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2010, p.6). Turkish state oil company TPAO was a minor shareholder but nevertheless 
a founding investor of AIOC. Ankara also offered to provide public-funds as guarantee 
to meet any construction cost overruns for BTC (Carroll, 2010, p. 6; Baran, 2005, 
p.107). This strengthened the Ceyhan option for the MEP. Any possibility of the 
pipeline being built to Turkey through Armenia was unacceptable to Azerbaijan. 
Azerbaijani strategy was to use oil development in general and pipeline routing in 
particular to strengthen its position in the ongoing conflict with Armenia over Nagorno 
Karabakh (Cornell and Ismailzade, 2005, pp.81-83).  
 
The route from Sangachal oil terminal in Baku through Tbilisi, capital of Georgia, and 
onto the export terminals at the Yumurtalik deep-water Turkish Mediterranean Sea 
port of Ceyhan, was the only acceptable option for the main export pipeline (Yergin, 
2012, p.61). The U.S. government made it clear by 1999 that the AIOC consortium 
“could build any pipeline they desired, so long as it ran from Baku to Ceyhan without 
touching either Iran or Russia” (LeVine, 2007, p.351).  
 
Ten years of negotiations, debates, conflicts and disputes ended on 18th November 
1999, when, during an OSCE summit, US, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia and 
Kazakhstan signed the Istanbul Declaration on main export pipeline from Baku to 
Ceyhan – the Intergovernmental Agreement, obliging all parties to provide all possible 
assistance in financing and building BTC pipeline (LeVine, 2007, p.356). At the same 
time, an agreement was made to fully explore large Azerbaijani Shah-Deniz gas fields 
and build a natural gas pipeline parallel to BTC but only up to the Turkish city of 
Erzurum (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum or South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP)) – Azerbaijani gas 
was to supply Georgian and Turkish consumers, greatly alleviating the countries’ 
energy shortages (Hill, 2004, p.23) (see Map 1). The gas pipeline amplified BTC’s 
regional impact and laid the foundation for future expansion – what came to be the 
Southern Gas Corridor (SGC).  
 
Financing and construction were now the focus of international effort behind BTC 
(LeVine, 2007, p. 356; Yergin, 2012, p. 62). The issue of funding, which faced the 
Nobels over a century before, was of critical importance. Any project of such size 
would require support from public financial institutions, such as the World Bank 
(International Finance Corporation (IFC)) and the European Bank for Reconstruction 
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and Development (EBRD), as well as private capital. Over the years that followed BP 
and its partners embarked upon a long drawn research consultation and development 
process. But in the end, it was U.S. government backing and political support that 
ensured public funding of BTC and SCP pipelines: “Washington’s was the most 
influential voice with the banks that counted – with its own Export-Import Bank and 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation as well as with the World Bank and EBRD. 
All could be relied on to put up money and make it safe for commercial banks to 
participate” (LeVine, 2007, p. 357).  
 
 
Map 1. Caspian/Black Sea pipeline network (http://eurodialogue.org/Caspian-Pipelines-Map) 
With public financing from EBRD and IFC approved in 2002-2003, BP and its partners 
in the Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan Pipeline Company (BTC Co), an 11-member joint venture 
led by BP, acquired powerful backers for their investment in BTC, which in turn 
attracted additional private capital from Citibank, ABN Amro and other institutions 
(Carroll, 2010, pp. 7-11). In total, the project cost in excess of $3.9 billion with some 
70% of the cost met by loans from public financial institutions (Upstream Online, 2006; 
Carroll, 2010, p.9).  
 
It took two years to complete construction of the 1760 km pipeline and it was officially 
launched on 24th May 2005, at a ceremony at Sangachal, Baku (Yergin, 2012, p. 63). 
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Some ten million barrels of oil was needed to fill the pipeline and it took over a year to 
arrive at Ceyhan and by 2017 “it carried a total of about 2.8 billion barrels (more than 
374 million tonnes) of crude oil loaded on 3,674 tankers and sent to world markets” 
(BTC co., 2017). State power is what made BTC possible. 
 
As Wheeler and Whited put it in their seminal account of the oil industry: “The name 
of the game is power” (1971, p.1). Morgenthau is even more emphatic about “the 
power of oil” (1985, p.133). He too recognised historical relationship between raw 
materials, economic power and military strength (ibid, p.131).  For Morgenthau 
competition for oil has important implications in terms of distribution of power – as 
states seek to control energy reserves they do not merely aim to add to their own 
resources but to deprive their competitors proportionately (Ibid, p. 133). Contract of 
the Century and its attendant pipeline system should be seen in the context.  
 
Morgenthau goes on to argue that since oil “...has become the lifeblood of industrially 
advanced nations...”, it represents a revolutionary value in international politics (1985, 
p.134). States which do not necessarily possess all or any elements of national power 
(large territory, population etc.) suddenly become very powerful factors in international 
politics if they have the strategic asset of oil. Historically low oil prices in the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries were product of colonial and semi-colonial relations which 
existed between powerful imperial consumer states and weaker producer-colonies. 
Possession of oil in the 20th century reinforced independence of these former colonies 
and enabled them to raise prices by controlling production (e.g. through formation of 
OPEC).  
 
At the same time demand for energy grew exponentially and many industrial societies 
are totally or in considerable measure dependent on supplies from abroad (Ibid, 
p.134). This helps explain why Azerbaijan failed to secure independence in 1918-
1920. Having extracted itself from a colonial relationship with imperial Russia, Baku 
was plunged into a semi-colonial relationship with Britain, before being re-captured by 
Bolshevik Russia. With Britain acquiring sovereign control over the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company (later BP) and thus Iran’s oil reserves, prices for oil plunged to record lows. 
Under such conditions Azerbaijani “oil diplomacy” was bound to fail. By contrast, BTC 
in the early 21st century represents success of Azerbaijan and Georgia, their 
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independence underpinned by hydrocarbon reserves and transportation 
infrastructure, far more valuable now that at the turn of last century. Operating in this 
new “sellers’ market”, two small Caucasian states, with tiny populations, beset by 
separatist conflicts and territorial disputes with neighbours were nevertheless able to 
transform their petroleum wealth into political power (Yergin, 2012, pp. 63-64).  
 
Neo-liberal institutionalist account of BTC 
Neo-liberal institutionalist model of BTC holds the project to be a product of the post-
Cold War liberal settlement – “end of history” in action. For Fukuyama Soviet collapse 
signalled a final victory of world democratic capitalism (Fukuyama, 1992 in Burchill, 
1996b, p. 30). Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s independence from the USSR and their 
adoption of western democratic model and free trade, symbolised by the Contract of 
the Century and BTC, represent a natural culmination of the countries’ historical 
evolution to liberal democracy and integration with the West (Fredrick-Starr, 2005, 
p.14).  
 
Neo-liberal institutionalists stress the importance of transnational institutions of 
governance and global economic forces in development of world politics (Keohane 
and Nye, 1977).  In this context, BTC is first and foremost an economic project, devised 
and implemented by multinational energy corporations, supported by global financial 
institutions. The single, most repeated statement about BTC is that economics still had 
to make sense before the project could be implemented (Adams, 2009, p. 247; Carroll, 
2010, p. 6; Frederick-Starr, 2005, p. 9, Yergin, 2012, p. 62). It was primarily a 
commercial venture that only went ahead when business conditions were right and it 
was profitable to build the pipeline. 
 
A “continuous alignment of common interests between the host government and 
foreign investors” was required to ensure the success of the Contract of the Century 
(Adams, 2009, p.233). Azerbaijan required participation of oil majors with necessary 
technology and expertise in development of its oil reserves, representing a broad 
range of international sovereign interests (especially US, UK and Turkey) and who, 
most importantly, would be prepared to self-finance the early part of the development 
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project. Political and economic considerations went hand in hand in the Azeri 
government’s considerations (Ibid; Yergin, 2012, p.55; LeVine, 2007, pp.174-200).  
As Adams contends, the oil companies, on the other hand, had to ensure that the 
commercial terms within the Contract would realistically reflect the risk environment 
involved (Ibid). The companies also needed guarantees that the contract would be 
enforceable under both Azerbaijani and British law, with mechanisms for international 
arbitration. Thirdly, the oil companies insisted on unanimity clause in all management 
and operation decisions involved in the contract, effectively slapping the right of veto 
and placing themselves on par with government of Azerbaijan, a sovereign state. The 
contract is an extremely detailed document, spelling out all the particulars to leave no 
room for future disagreements (Adams, Ibid, p.235).  
Oil majors involved in the development of Caspian oil pursued interests of their global 
shareholders and not those of individual nation states (Adams, 2009). The idea behind 
the Contract of the Century was ambitious from the start – in the long-term it envisaged 
creation of a main export pipeline (MEP) to carry some one million barrels per year. In 
1994, however, at the time such ambition must have seemed extremely premature 
and risky (Yergin, 2012, p.56). A pilot project was needed that would demonstrate 
credibility of the Contract and of the parties involved, and instil confidence to attract 
additional investment. It was necessary to show that export of land-locked Baku oil to 
the energy markets was feasible (Adams, 2009, p. 235).  
Despite heavy political pressure from the US, UK and Turkey in support of BTC, 
members of AIOC insisted on the Early Oil pilot project, built two preliminary pipelines 
to diversify their risks and acquired extensive financial support from the public and 
private funders before proceeding with the BTC project. It took over a decade after the 
Contract of the Century before BTC was built and as Adams categorically argues: 
Despite so many later claims to the contrary, when BTC was finally built, it was on the 
basis of commercial not political decisions. Investment had always been dependent 
on AIOC first proving bankable oil reserves at ACG, that were required to finance this 
international mega project. Claims of a geopolitical “win” by Washington and Ankara 
over Russian regional interests could not have been further from the truth. Commercial 
reality had prevailed (2009, p.247). 
132 
 
Some liberals go further and challenge the underlying logic of strategic competition 
underpinning the politics of energy development in South Caucasus. For them BTC is 
a manifestation of unnecessary geo-political confrontation brought about by state 
conflict and detrimental to the goals of free trade and individual prosperity (de Waal, 
2010, p.4). The great powers should desist from disruptive competition and accept 
mutual interests in the region. On top of that South Caucasus should be developed as 
“...a free trade zone and communications hub, radiating out to five points of a star: to 
Russia, the Caspian Sea, Iran, Turkey and the Black Sea. The day the railway line is 
reopened through Russia, Abkhazia, Georgia, Armenia, the Azerbaijani exclave of 
Nakhichevan to Iran -- with a sideways connection to the Black Sea, Turkey and 
Europe -- is the day the South Caucasus regains its role as a region with real prospects 
for the future” (Ibid.) 
Market forces is what made BTC possible in the end. As oil prices began to rise (from 
£13 in 1994 to $30 per barrel by 2000) AIOC investors’ scepticism about an MEP 
began to wane (Adams, 2009, p. 247). With existing pipelines (NER and WER) 
hampered by limited capacity and other challenges, BP and other companies were 
keen to take the project to its logical conclusion (Ibid). BP/AMOCO merger in 1998 
had a significant impact on BTC process – BP emerged by 2002 with a massive joint 
31% stake in AIOC – western Caspian now constituting a major part of the company’s 
global oil portfolio (Hill, 2004, p.24; LeVine, 2007, p. 352).  
If anything, BTC represents diminution of state powers. Host Government Agreements 
signed by Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey with energy corporations can be viewed as 
challenging state sovereignty, by taking precedence over national legislation. As 
Blatchford argues, local social, environmental, safety and emergency laws apply only 
in so far as they do not conflict with provisions of the HGAs (2005, p.120). For 
mainstream neo-liberals, however, BTC is a transformative project, delivering 
normative outcomes as well – local economic development, strengthening of domestic 
liberal-democratic regimes and tying Azerbaijan and Georgia to the West (Frederick-
Starr, 2005; Yergin, 2012, p.64). BTC is part of a highly interdependent international 
economic system (Ibid.). 
In addition to this, liberal institutionalists will point to international legal architecture 
and formalised ethical and political standards that govern the BTC project. Legal and 
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compliance policy regime of the BTC project are designed to have binding authority 
on international level and provides not only for commercial and technical issues, but 
for enforceable social, environmental and human rights standards (Blatchford, 2005). 
MNCs operate within a regulated global environment, where international standards 
are set by international financial institutions - provision of funding for BTC was based 
on normative and commercial conditions. Decision to route the pipeline to bypass 
congested straits of Bosporus was dictated by issues of cost to participating 
companies and environmental concerns over risks posed by additional tanker traffic 
(Elkind, 2005, p.39). 
On top of comprehensive technical, feasibility research, due diligence and planning, 
topographic and seismic studies, BP (embracing its new motto of corporate social 
responsibility) carried out major environmental and social impact assessments, 
publishing all findings and making all documents publicly available (BP, BTC ESIAs, 
2017). A massive consultation process, involving NGOs, interviews with members of 
affected communities, compensation schemes and other remedial actions were 
undertaken (Carroll, 2010, pp. 9, 11; Blatchford, 2005, pp.121-122). BP also publicly 
committed itself to the UK government’s Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI) requiring the company to “publish what it pays” to host (Azerbaijani) government 
in revenues and bonuses under both the Early Oil and BTC project – major act of 
information disclosure (Carroll, 2010, p.9). 
 
From neo-liberal institutionalist perspective, therefore, BTC represents far more than 
a piece of geo-political infrastructure – it operates in a normative framework, reflecting 
social and political concerns, bringing together a wide variety of actors into a rule-
governed system of complex interdependency. 
 
Neo-realist account of SGC 
Neo-realist account of SGC is ontologically congruent with that of BTC, the two 
elements forming part of a wider geo-strategic confrontation in international oil politics, 
marked by the moment in the 1990s, “when the US decided to challenge Russia’s 
domineering hold on Central Asia and the Caucasus by championing the construction 
of independent oil and natural gas pipelines from these former Soviet hinterlands to 
the West” (LeVine, 2.12.2014; see also, Yergin, 2012, pp.341-343; Kandiyoti, 2012, 
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pp.163-172). The launch of Southern Caucasus Pipeline in 2006, a year after BTC, 
heralded the next round of inter-state competition for energy dominance, with Russia 
seeking to stem growing power of the US and the EU (Yergin, 2012, p.342; BP 4, 
2017). The same year Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute brought into sharp relief EU’s 
dependence not only on Russian gas but also on Russian-controlled gas transmission 
infrastructure in Europe (BBC News, 01.01.2006).  
 
With demand growing exponentially through 2000s, natural gas was increasingly being 
seen as the “fuel of the future” – a relatively low-carbon resource that could help 
reduce use of coal and oil in energy generation and transport (Yergin, 2012, p. 343). 
The EU was seeking to increase and to diversify its gas supplies and supply-routes, 
whilst the United States was seeking to expand influence in the post-Soviet sphere 
and across Central Asia (especially so in the wake of 9/11 attacks) (LeVine, 
02.12.2014; Kandiyoti, 2012, pp. 170-171). With BTC fully operational the stage was 
set for a new gas pipeline to bring “non-Russian gas to Europe by skirting Russia’s 
southern border” (Yergin, 2012, p. 342).  
 
The strategic rationale for what came to be Southern Gas Corridor was first laid out in 
the proposal for Nabucco gas pipeline (so called in reference to the Verdi opera) 
(Yergin, 2012, p.342; LeVine, 02.12.2014). That ambitious project envisaged a single 
transmission system carrying gas from Erzurum in Turkey all the way to Vienna, 
Austria but it never materialised (see Map 2).  In fact, 2000s was a period of intense 
competition between Nabucco and rival proposals for alternative pipelines, which soon 
followed. First, Russia announced its own proposal for an alternative South (or Blue) 
Stream gas pipeline to run across Black Sea to Turkey and onwards into Europe, and 
to be operated by Russia’s state energy giant Gazprom (Dempsey, 22.06.2006; 
Rodova,15.11.2012). Second, two other consortium-led projects – Trans-Anatolian 
Pipeline (TANAP) and Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) – offered politically more credible 
alternatives to Nabucco (Demirmen,19.12.2011; Socor, 04.04.2012).  
 
However, from neo-realist perspective these issues are of secondary importance – 
political actors remained primary forces throughout the process and the eventual 
outcome represented dominant state interests. Just as with BTC development of 
Southern Gas Corridor was primarily driven by strategic concerns of state actors. The 
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end-result was a product of interplay of competitive dynamics of gas-producing states 
such as Azerbaijan (Jafarova, 2017), actions of transit states such as Turkey 
(Tagliapietra and Bruegel, 02.07.2015), and gas-consuming EU member-states such 
as Greece and Italy (Geropoulos, 3.3.2016), as well as intergovernmental institutions, 
such as the EU Commission and public financial bodies under its jurisdiction. The fact 
that Nabucco Consortium operated without an understanding of the interests of key 
state actors and proceeded to engage with potential natural gas suppliers for its 
proposed pipeline (including Russia and Iran) from purely commercial standpoint, 
meant that key strategic objectives of key interested parties, including USA and 
Azerbaijan were not being met. In the end it was fatal lack of American support that 
killed the Nabucco project off, as it “withered on the branch, in the face of opposition 
from Washington” (Kindiyoti, 2012, p.194). 
 
Map 2. The route of the proposed Nabucco pipeline (Source: Deutsche Welle, 26.04.2012) 
 
The Commission played a particularly important role in stimulating SGC process – 
establishment of an East-West, Caspian to Europe gas transmission system was 
formally set out as a matter strategic priority in the 2007 EU “energy package” policy 
framework, although it has been on European Energy Union agenda since early 2000s 
(Van Aartsen, 2009, p.11). EU support was critical in generating political impetus 
necessary to realise such a complex strategic project as SGC.  
 
By prioritising SGC-related pipeline projects the Commission ensured that financial 
institutions under its jurisdiction, such as EBRD and European Investment Bank (EIB) 
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approve critical public financing and credit lines. For example, EBRD decision to 
allocate €500 million towards SGC was spelt out in terms remarkably similar to the EU 
gas-energy strategy (EBRD Project 48376, 18.10.2017): “Stretching across five 
countries of operations of the EBRD, the Southern Gas Corridor [] is an important 
strategic gas infrastructure project aimed at improving the security and diversity of the 
energy supply to Europe and Turkey (EBRD Policy Statement Document, 18.10.2017). 
International financial institutions, therefore, reflect interests of state financing them 
and make decisions on projects such as SGC in accordance to the political priorities 
of member-states, not by some autonomous institutional logic.  
 
TANAP was formally launched in 2012 by the governments of Azerbaijan and Turkey, 
and it offered Baku a reliable transit route for its Shah Deniz gas to the rapidly growing 
Turkish market. It will run from SCP termination point in Erzurum across Anatolia to 
Turkish-Greek border. TANAP consortium is dominated by Azerbaijani and Turkish 
state energy giants SOCAR and BOTAS, with BP holding a 12% minority stake 
(Agayev, 23.12.2011; Socor, 27.06.2012). As such it represents a perfect example of 
state-led energy policy, aimed at maximising political and financial interest – pipeline 
diplomacy redux.  
 
Then, in 2013, Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz gas consortium announced Trans-Adriatic 
Pipeline (TAP) as their chosen route for the export of Azerbaijani natural gas to 
southern Europe. TAP is a corporate-led project and comprises a proposal for pipeline 
running from TANAP’s termination point in Turkey across northern Greece, through 
Albania, along Adriatic seabed, to southern Italy (Tungland, 20.01.2013; TAP, 2017; 
TANAP, 2017).  
 
Speaking at a press conference after the decision Kjetil Tungland, TAP Managing 
Director, said: “This is the first and important step in opening up the Southern Gas 
Corridor and, as we look ahead, the Southern Gas Corridor will have a major role to 
play in Europe’s energy security and ensuring the diversification of gas supplies to 
Western and South Eastern European markets.” (TAP, 28.06.2013). TAP private 
shareholders understood from the outset that success of their business model would 
be determined by the extent to which it corresponded with interests of powerful state 
actors.  
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Pipeline wars were over, Nabucco was dead and SGC was born. Southern Gas 
Corridor (SGC), therefore, is not a single pipeline but a network of three interlocking 
pipelines – South-Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and 
Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), running from Azerbaijan to Italy: “The Southern Gas 
Corridor is one of the most complex gas value chains ever developed in the world. 
Stretching over 3,500 kilometres, crossing seven countries and involving more than a 
dozen major energy companies, it is comprised of several separate energy projects 
representing a total investment of approximately US$40 billion” (TAP 3, 2017) (see 
Map 3).  
 
 
Map 4. Southern Gas Corridor (Source: TAP 1, 2017).  
 
With works on SCP and TANAP nearing completion, TAP remains the last piece of the 
value-chain. It is currently in the funding stages and there are some obstacles to 
securing full funding from some of the international financial institutions involved. 
However, just as with BTC, these will be resolved – from neo-realist perspective 
strategic interests determine political outcomes, not normative concerns. For example, 
despite Azerbaijan withdrawing from the international transparency watchdog EITI in 
2017, EBRD and World Bank nevertheless approved funding for TANAP (EITI, 
20.03.2017). In fact, EITI’s own assessment of the costs of Azerbaijan’s withdrawal 
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concludes that “considering the importance of the Southern Gas Corridor Project 
(TAP&TANAP) for the European gas market, the government of Azerbaijan may 
expect that European and international investments in this project will remain actual” 
(Alili and Bittner, 2017, p. 10).  
 
SGC, therefore, is a geo-political mega-project which excludes Russia and Iran, is 
backed by the US and the EU, involves a dozen countries and strongly promoted by 
its chief gas supplier – Azerbaijan (The Jamestown Foundation, 13.09.2013). When 
fully operational by early 2020s SGC will be delivering six billion cubic metres of Shah 
Deniz natural gas to Turkey per year and a further ten billion to markets in Europe; 
early deliveries to Turkey are expected in 2018 (BP 5, 2017). SGC represents a piece 
of critical energy infrastructure that not only connects Caspian gas reserves to Europe, 
but also provides politically independent, non-Russian East-West gas route, 
analogous in significance to the BTC oil route a decade earlier.  
 
SGC serves the EU’s goal of diversifying both its gas supplies and gas supply routes, 
whilst meeting urgent energy demands in southern member-states. It fulfils US policy 
aims of strengthening independence of post-Soviet states and supporting EU energy 
security. For Azerbaijan the Corridor is a flagship national project of strategic 
significance, both politically and economically. For Turkey it represents a critical step 
in establishing the Republic as strategic energy transit hub. SGC reinforces Georgia’s 
role as the cockpit of the entire East-West energy transmission system, the key piece 
in the strategic chain. 
 
Neo-liberal Institutionalist account of SGC  
A neo-liberal institutional account of SGC envisages it as primarily a commercial 
mega-project representing key corporate interests of multinational oil and gas majors, 
especially BP. It is a financial mega-project requiring some $40 billion worth of 
investment (TAP 3, 2017) and involving a plethora of private and public international 
financial institutions (IFIs), including the World Bank, EBRD and the financial arm of 
the EU – the EIB (EBRD, 18.10.2017; Buckley and Foy, 18.10.2017). It represents a 
complex system of state, corporate and institutional interests – separate consortiums 
of private and state energy companies operate separate elements and segments of 
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SGC, with BP and SOCAR present if not dominant across the length of the Corridor 
(BP Magazine. 12.10.2017).  
 
First, it is essential to recognise foundational role played by private gas and pipeline 
companies in initiating what came to be SGC. The original Nabucco project, 
spearheaded in 2002 by a consortium of mostly European companies laid the 
foundations for subsequent developments and whilst it quickly won the backing of the 
United States and Europe, the business of Caspian gas transmission preceded the 
politics of it (Taylor, 22.02.2008; Cendrowicz, 13.07.2009). By the time the EU 
Commission identified it in 2009 as a project of strategic significance, a host of 
intergovernmental agreements were being signed between Nabucco Consortium and 
each of participating transit countries - Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Austria (Van Aartsen, 2009, pp.2-3; Turkish Press, 13.07.2009). By 2012 a financing 
framework was established, involving external private funding as well as participating 
states, companies and important international state financial institutions, including 
World Bank and the European Investment Bank (DW staff, 29.01.2009).  
  
The eventual failure of the Nabucco project was down to market-driven commercial 
factors – it was clear from the outset that Azerbaijan’s gas supplies from the Shah 
Deniz field will not be sufficient to make such a large project economically viable and 
that additional supplies from sources elsewhere in the region would be needed 
(Rowley, 2009; Conor, 5.06.2008; Kandiyoti, 2012, p. 184). Smaller more competitive 
alternatives to Nabucco, such as TANAP and TAP, offered better economic models 
and were designed to meet immediate needs of the BP-dominated Shah-Deniz 
consortium.  
 
Nabucco responded to these challenges by proposing a drastically revised and de-
scaled version of the project in 2012 – the so-called Nabucco-West (Socor, 
24.05.2012). What is essential to recognise here is that the 2013 decision against 
Nabucco-West and in favour of the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), was dictated 
primarily by Shah-Deniz commercial and corporate interests. As BP Azerbaijan 
president Gordon Birrell explained it at the time, BP and its partners considered 
plethora of factors before settling on TAP: "In the last two years, we have been 
considering various options for pipelines and have made the right choice. We have 
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been looking at for various aspects, including technical, financial and security issues 
as well as the possibility of extension” (Birrell quoted in Dadasheva, 23.06.2013).  
 
For BP and other energy majors TAP and the rest of SGC are a valuable asset in 
corporate portfolio, attractive to private investors reassured by support from various 
public IFIs. Neo-liberal institutionalism emphasises the importance of market forces 
and global economic trends and processes in shaping complex international 
infrastructure projects such as SGC. Strategic priorities of competing states will be 
served as long as market conditions are right. The emergent architecture of SGC – 
three interlocking pipelines – became reality only when they made commercial sense 
for investors: “Despite the political risks involved in all the Southern Gas Corridor 
projects, reducing EU dependence on Russian oil and gas is not proving as expensive 
as initially predicted in terms of borrowing costs” (Burroughs, 15.08.2017). 
 
Furthermore, SGC is an international legal regime, governed by a series of 
intergovernmental agreements and commercial contracts for each of the value chain 
pipelines – a complex legal structure representing a fine balancing act of multiple 
interests (TAP 3, 2017). It was subject to extensive social and environmental impact 
assessments in order to satisfy plethora of regulatory requirements for major 
international infrastructure and energy projects. International financial institutions such 
as EIB, World Bank, EBRD and others are not treated as subordinate agents of 
government action but as autonomous international actors which determine the legal 
basis of monetary relations underpinning complex enterprises such as SGC (Martin 
and Simmons, 2001).  
 
By end of 2017 SCP segment of the Corridor is nearing completion – the original Baku-
Tbilisi-Erzurum (SCP) pipeline has been significantly expanded to raise capacity to in 
excess of 20 billion cubic metres per year (BP 4, 2017). The work on TANAP went 
underway in 2015, with bulk of its financing already secured (Burroughs, 15.08.2017). 
TAP, meanwhile, is currently at the financing stage with funding secured from EBRD 
and a record €2 billion credit agreement is expected from the EIB, although it has 
recently been delayed until 2018 (Morgan, 13.12.2017).  
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In sum, the project is a perfect model of strategic interest alignment and cooperation 
between states, oil and gas majors and international institutions. It balances economic 
viability with geo-political realities and brings technological innovation to realise what 
in the end is a major engineering challenge. It is symbolic of the complex web of 
interdependency that characterises contemporary global energy order. 
 
Conclusion 
Discussion above demonstrates that BTC and SGC pipelines are underpinned by a 
materialist paradigm of oil and gas politics – these projects are ultimately about power, 
state and corporate. This is the core of rationalist models or rather model, for both 
projects ultimately constitute a single geo-political enterprise that has its antecedents 
in past historical power relations. Some of the players have changed but the structural 
properties of the game are the same, and are often referred to as such, e.g. the New 
Great Game (Yergin, 2012, pp.45-46; Cooley, p.3).  
 
From liberal and institutionalist perspectives, therefore, these projects represent far 
more than scattered pieces of geo-political infrastructure – they operate in a normative 
framework, reflecting social and political concerns, bringing together a wide variety of 
actors into a rule-governed system of complex interdependency. This argument is 
strongly opposed by neo-realists, who reject the assertion that trans-national 
economic factors such as oil corporations and global financial institutions undermine 
state sovereignty. Kenneth Waltz, whilst recognising the importance of natural 
resources in making up of national power, dismisses the idea of interdependency 
(1979, p. 152). States have displayed a considerable ability to challenge the conduct 
of MNCs and even when engaging with them were able to effective pursue national 
objectives). Agreements, such as those for BTC, which states enter with multinational 
corporations, “... may be viewed as an exercise of their sovereignty and not as an 
impairment of it” (Bull,1995, pp.261--263).   
 
What emerges from this debate is that contemporary rationalists accounts of pipeline 
comprise a “neo-neo” synthesis model of the project. In this rationalist model BTC 
operates as a geo-strategic pipeline fulfilling political objectives of participating states 
and as a commercial project resulting from operation of global market forces. It is 
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composed of a complex mesh of relations between South Caucasus states and the 
EU, Russia and Iran; the role of the United States, Turkey and Britain; balance of 
power in the region, the role of energy multinationals and international financial 
institutions, issues of public and private corporate funding, environmental concerns, 
issues of risk mitigation and management, and technological processes. 
 
Hydrocarbons remain the primary fuel of the global energy order. And oil geopolitics – 
“that high, thin stratum where the business and politics of energy merge into a single, 
swiftly moving current” (Roberts, 2005 [2004], p. 93) – remain at the heart of the neo-
realist and neoliberal institutionalist paradigms of international oil politics. The stories 
of BTC and SGC pipelines fit in this power-politics schematic of global energy order. 
Competing interests of global powers and regional states, market forces and 
multinational energy companies, global financial institutions with their social and 
environmental regulatory frameworks, technological processes and technical 
challenges all contributed to shaping and evolving BTC and SGC infrastructures. 
Multilateral financing, growing awareness of environmental risks, US-EU-Russia 
energy competition in Eurasia, European energy policy, rise of Azerbaijan as 
European oil and gas supplier are just some the themes emerging from these 
discussions. 
Yet, as much as neo-realists and neoliberals ignore the reflectivist turn in IR, its 
implications are inescapable and are made ever more pertinent as international events 
unfold. As debates about BTC and SGC continue to evolve, issues and subject matter 
long ignored and dismissed by positivist orthodoxy, and groups and interests 
marginalised and excluded by rationalist scholarship are increasingly finding their 
recognition and empirical attention in the Fourth Debate. Reflectivist analytical models 
of international oil politics and BTC and SGC projects are set out in the next chapter.   
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V  
Reflectivist Modelling 
Introduction 
This chapter sets out the reflectivist critique of the rationalist paradigm of international 
oil politics and sets out reflectivist models of BTC and SGC pipeline projects. The 
Fourth Debate has had a profound impact on debates around global energy and the 
environment and whilst the chapter explores these in broad terms, particular attention 
is paid to Marxism, critical theory and to poststructuralist and social constructivist 
insights, with a special focus on environmentalism.  
The chapter opens with a reflectivist critique of the problem-solving paradigm of 
international oil and gas politics. The task of the post-positivist critique is not only to 
unpick and problematize rationalist consensus on fossil fuels but to provide a 
theoretical alternative to the dominant orthodoxy around the prevailing social energy 
order and offer a praxeological direction to achieving that order (Cox, 1986). 
Differentiating between rationalist treatment of issues in the world of oil and gas and 
that of anti- and post-positivist approaches enables envisioning of alternative energy 
realities.  
The chapter explores these approaches and possible alternatives by examining BTC 
and SGC projects through the prism of a reflectivist critique – from classical Marxism 
to post-structuralism. This is by no means a comprehensive account but is intended 
to demonstrate an alternative vision of these pipeline projects, establishing these 
complex infrastructural assemblages as social, ideational, as well as material 
artefacts.  
Reflectivist critique of problem-solving theory of oil politics 
In his assessment of Hugo Chavez’ presidency, author Bart Jones argued: “Chávez 
has retaken control of the oil industry, implemented laws taking a larger share of profits 
from foreign companies, and instituted a historic shift of the revenues to the majority 
poor”, (2008, p.11). By contrast, Daniel Yergin argues that oil – “the soul of the 
Venezuelan state” – became subject of Chávez’ growing authoritarianism, as he 
asserted control over PDVSA, Venezuelan national oil company and used it to further 
consolidate his hold on power: “He could use the money as he wanted, whether social 
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spending and subsidies for favoured groups at home or pursuit of his political 
objectives within the country and abroad. More than ever before, Venezuela was truly 
a petro-state” (2012, p. 125). 
Such divergent perspectives may not be simply a result of some arbitrary biases of 
these particular scholars. They may reflect deeper underlying conditions borne out of 
these authors’ specific theoretical commitments, which in turn are tied to their specific 
temporal and spatial political standpoints. This observation could well serve as the 
starting premise in the discussion of the reflectivist paradigmatic models of 
international oil politics. What all reflectivist approaches share is a deep scepticism 
about mainstream definitions of what constitutes proper subject matter in the study of 
petroleum politics and those traditional methodologies most commonly associated 
with rationalist IR.  
Reflectivists, especially proponents of the Critical Theory, argue that “the way the 
academy limited the scope of IR has impacted, and continues to impact, drastically on 
the practice of world politics” (Sutch and Elias, 2007, p.14). From this angle comments 
on Hugo Chavez’ presidency above carry important implications.  As Robert Cox put 
it: “Theory is always for someone and for some purpose. All theories have a 
perspective. Perspectives derive from a position in time and space, specifically social 
and political time and space” (Cox, 1986, p. 207).  
In addition to being a Pulitzer Prize-winning author, Daniel Yergin is the Vice Chairman 
of IHS, Inc. and the founder of IHS Cambridge Energy Research Associates, a leading 
oil and gas industry consultancy. He also serves on the U.S. Secretary of Energy 
Advisory Board and is a member of the National Petroleum Council, among other roles 
(IHS website, 2016).  Meanwhile, Bart Jones is a journalist and social commentator, 
who had spent eight years in Venezuela, having worked as the Newsday and the 
Associated Press correspondent, and also as a Catholic mission worker in the 
Caracas slums (Milne, 2008).  
Of course, Yergin’s and Jones’ specific professional qualifications and experiences do 
not necessarily determine their respectively negative and sympathetic assessments 
of Chavez’ presidency. Rather, their perspectives on Venezuelan oil politics are 
determined by their implicit theoretical commitments. And theories are not merely 
explanatory tools – they inform and arbitrate on the very possibility of human 
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intervention and, as Smith argues, define “also our ethical and practical horizons” 
(1996, p. 13). Thus, theoretical commitments can serve particular purposes in an 
intellectual enterprise – explicitly or implicitly they reflect political choices, loyalties and 
identities of those who espouse them.  
Robert Cox (1986, pp.207-208) posited that as all theories have a perspective they 
ultimately serve one of two possible purposes: either help to solve the problems that 
arise within the framework of their original perspective, or reflect upon how that 
perspective came to be chosen for theorising in the first place and whether there may 
be another valid perspective which, if chosen, could give rise to an alternative world – 
the dichotomy of the problem-solving vs. critical theory. By such definition all of 
rationalist scholarship on international oil politics falls within the realm of the problem-
solving theory.  
This type of theory operates within a given socio-political framework, where power 
relationships and institutional arrangements are taken as a given reality and not called 
into question - for example, a pre-Chavez Venezuela. The purpose of such theory is 
to ensure that “these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively 
with particular sources of trouble” (1986, pp.207-208). According to Yergin, in the 
1980s and the early 1990s Venezuela’s sources of trouble were low economic growth, 
falling incomes, high inflation, rising foreign debt and rapid population growth (2012, 
p. 114). The solution, therefore, lay in economic reforms – privatisation, inviting back 
foreign oil companies and fiscal discipline – which failed in part due to opposition from 
special interests but most importantly because of Chavez-led failed coup of 1992 and 
his subsequent victory in 1998 presidential election (Ibid. pp. 114-122).  
Problem-solving theoretical approaches, exemplified by Daniel Yergin’s scholarship 
(1991; 2012), all start with a general a priori acceptance that the reality of the 
international petroleum order is a given fact –human progress in the Modern Era is 
driven by consumption of energy, derived largely through combustion of fossil fuels, 
and the task is to ensure that this process is as smooth and effective as possible. 
Problems arise because the process may well be driven by global energy markets and 
international oil companies but ultimately it takes place amongst competitive nation-
states, under conditions imposed by an anarchic international system. Energy 
resources are finite and their use produces externalities, such as pollution.  
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The task of problem-solving theories is to develop a sound political-economic 
understanding of the structural properties of all these challenges, which may in turn 
be used to devise comprehensive policy solutions to address them. The task is not to 
question the prevailing social order of international energy politics or to ask how and 
why it came about, or who benefits from it (and who does not). If anything, rationalist 
approaches serve to validate and legitimise the status quo. Daniel Yergin is particularly 
effusive in his celebration of the advent of the hydrocarbon dominance: “If it can be 
said, in the abstract, that the sun energized the planet, it was oil that now powered its 
human population, both in its familiar forms as fuel and in the proliferation of new 
petrochemical products… It was the Age of Hydrocarbon Man” (Yergin, 1991, p. 523).  
Rhetorical flourishes aside, what is evident here is a whole range of underlying 
normative assumptions. For example, growth and expansion are automatically 
assumed to be the desired outcome. Economic performance is the sort of measure 
that makes for “astonishing” in the rationalist world-view - one where there is nothing 
about human activity which does not have a material base and cannot, therefore, be 
measured and quantified, assessed and evaluated. This general attitude characterises 
much of the rationalist, or problem-solving thinking about global energy.  
It is, perhaps strikingly exemplified in the following passage from Scott L. 
Montgomery’s aptly named “The Powers That Be”: “A book, in short, is no static object 
but a kind of social container, bursting with resources and processes. The same, 
indeed, can be said for any other objet d’art, whether made of stone, canvas, film, or 
text. We may speak of genius and inspiration, higher pleasures and heavenly beauty, 
yet it is the things of this Earth – coal, petroleum, gas, water, wind – that give such 
brilliance a material reality. A simple truth, conveniently (and understandably) left out 
of courses on the humanities” (2010, p.5).  
Within this statement are contained elements of both: the self-legitimising positivist 
discourse of the rationalist orthodoxy and the epistemological mechanism for 
disciplining alternative modes of scholarship. Having bracketed (perhaps even 
reduced) the full complexity and entire intellectual capacity of the human condition to 
the framework of a purely materialist reality, positivist discourse seeks to delegitimise 
and exclude those insights and methods of enquiry which deal with the non-material, 
social and imaginative elements. Determining what counts as proper science, 
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therefore, allows for effective means of policing scholarship and deciding upon what 
constitutes legitimate questions and correct answers.  
For example, when it comes to dealing with a state oil company, the “right” question 
to ask is how to ensure that it is run professionally and effectively. By contrast, asking 
who benefits from the operations of that oil company and under what conditions is not 
the right question. Such judgements are not, however, made in accordance with some 
immutable universal standard of truth and objectivity, but are in fact reflections of 
scholars’ political and normative choices, forming a rationalist perspective, in favour 
of the existing set of power relations, within the given global energy order.   
This specific perspective gives rise to a problem-solving theory of international oil 
politics, as outlined in previous chapter. Its normative dimension cannot be overstated, 
for the underlying assumption of the problem-solving approaches is also a normative 
choice in favour of the status quo. Breaking down prevailing orthodoxies, questioning 
underlying assumptions, deconstructing various elements of the rationalist discourse 
are all hallmarks of critical analysis and reflectivist approaches more generally – a 
sociological project accompanying the normative and praxeological projects (Linklater, 
1992; see also Ibid., 1998; 2002).  
This persistent challenge to positivism is not limited to mid-level theory but is informed 
by varying degrees of scepticism about claims of immutability or universality of existing 
social structures in the global energy order. Not all these approaches are post-modern 
in terms of their normative commitments but they all hold modern conditions to have 
been historically constituted by way of complex social processes and that radically 
alternative social realities are possible and often desirable.  
Thus, dissatisfaction with mainstream IR explanations of complex phenomena in the 
realm of energy politics stimulated growth of theoretically and methodologically 
diverse, interdisciplinary research agenda. Drawing on Habermasian and Foucauldian 
analytical traditions, post-structuralism, feminism, post-colonialism and 
environmentalism, this body of scholarship took on the positivist arguments with 
renewed radicalism, whilst decisively moving on from the rigidly bounded neo-Marxist 
world-systems and dependency approaches. As Bronner (2002) argued, the very 
complexity of globalised, hyper-technological modernity required a more nuanced and 
comprehensive critical approach.  
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The critique should not, therefore, be limited to specific processes, institutions or 
subsystems of the prevailing social order because: “Commodities like oil link them 
together: they affect planetary society from the foreign relations undertaken by its most 
industrially developed governments, to the ways we breath, to the spills that devastate 
the environment, to the derivative products produced by economic subsystems” 
(Bronner, 2002, p. 253). Recognising this as a holistic analytical framework is the first 
step in moving towards a critical theory that is engaged not only with questions of the 
social character of modernity and modernisation but also with ethical implications of 
scientific and technological progress.  
Envisaging global energy order holistically, as an integrated production-consumption 
network, creates conditions and sets the terms for normative enquiry. In the first 
instance, the task of identifying the inequities and injustices of the prevailing energy 
order necessitates focus on the production end of the spectrum. This is because, 
contrary to problem-solving assumptions, there is “no reason to believe that the mere 
recognition of future risks will somehow cause the oil industry or nuclear energy to 
‘reform’ themselves... There is ultimately no way around it: achieving accountability 
with respect to nature requires achieving accountability in respect to production” 
(Bronner, 2002, p. 254).  
On empirical level in the domain of international oil politics this shift to a deep 
normative critique of the global energy order produced an expansive body of 
reflectivist scholarship, which not only served as a critique of rationalist explanations 
for various problems, but also as an epistemologically autonomous body of 
knowledge, which dealt with issues marginalised by mainstream academia and expert 
community. Partly, as discussed elsewhere, this was the result of the determined effort 
by the rationalist mainstream to ignore and exclude radical approaches. Partly, this 
was a result of a conscious or perhaps reflexive efforts of radical authors who believed 
in democratising the debate around issues of technological and scientific progress, 
and argued that it is “incumbent upon critical theory to prevent the scientific enterprise 
from remaining identified with the discourse of experts (Bronner, 2002, p. 254; 
Feenberg, 1991).  
It is clear that reflective engagement with oil politics is an essential counter-balance to 
excessive positivism and rationalist dogma of much of the debate on the issue. By 
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revealing underlying social structures and political value of knowledge, reflectivist 
critique offers a way for a normative engagement with international politics of Caspian 
oil and provides a framework for the emancipatory mission in learning.  Reflectivist 
approaches are diverse and eclectic and there is no space here to explore the full 
range of possible post-positivist paradigms of BTC and SGC pipelines, such as 
colonialism or feminism. However, critical accounts of Baku oil and its pipelines set 
out below, provide for a broad range of post-positivist theoretical analysis, from 
Marxism to critical theory, poststructuralism and social constructivism.  
 
Reflectivist critique of BTC and SGC pipelines 
Marxism 
It can be argued that Marxist thinking and influence in IR predates its establishment 
as a formal field of theoretical study inside the discipline – a process that in any case 
was “belated, partial and problematic”, bound as it was by the Cold War dynamic 
(Teschke, 2008, p. 163). Today it can be argued that in contemporary International 
Relations Marxism constitutes “a vibrant and rich subfield that produces some of the 
most trenchant challenges to mainstream international relations theory and general 
social science” (Ibid., p. 164). This is true of critical and other reflectivist approaches 
influenced by Gramscian political theory, and through which Western Marxism sought 
to reformulate its materialistic framework and to develop powerful critiques of 
economic determinism and positivism more generally (Rupert, 2013, p. 167). 
In classical Marxist analysis the quest for raw materials and new markets, and the 
export of capital drives competing capitalist alliances (cartels and monopolies) towards 
securing direct political control over extra-territorial colonies, leading to empire 
formation and creation for rival national blocks (Ibid., p. 375). Lenin repeatedly 
underscored a critical role played by natural resources in stimulating imperialist 
competition – “…и мы видели, с каким рвением международные союзы 
капиталистов направляют свои усилия на то, чтобы вырвать у противника 
всякую возможность конкуренции, чтобы скупить, например, железорудные 
земли или нефтяные источники и т. п.” (Lenin, 1961 [1917], p. 382)13.  
                                                          
13 “…and we have seen the ferocity with which international capitalist unions direct their efforts to 
remove from their opponents all possibility of competing, to purchase, for example, iron-ore deposits 
or petroleum sources and so on”.  
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For Marxists, therefore, the period of the first Baku oil boom at the turn of the 20th 
Century is that of social radicalism and organised resistance to imperialism and 
international capital, providing fertile ground for various competing political and 
religious ideologies and social movements (Suny, 1972). Rising Bolshevik party and 
various other socialist and Marxist organisations thrived in the industrial underbelly of 
Baku, Batumi and other oil towns of the Caucasus. Joseph Stalin established himself 
as key Bolshevik operative by organising strikes, robberies and kidnappings of oil 
barons and managers all over Azerbaijani and Georgia in the 1900s (Sebag 
Montefiore, 2008, p. 195-198). It was in Baku that Stalin established printing press 
facilities for the Bolshevik flagship publication “Iskra” and other propaganda materials 
(Marriott and Minio-Paluello, 2013, p.44). 
Marxist analysis of this period focuses on charting how “the real control of the oil 
industry steadily drifted from the city to foreign investors with their headquarters in St. 
Petersburg or abroad” and how monopolisation of Baku oil stimulated class and 
nationalist antagonisms and struggles (Suny, 1972, p.5). The rise of Bolshevism and 
establishment of the Baku Commune in 1918 signalled popular resistance to capitalist 
hegemony and a possibility of a radically different social vision: “Amid the chaos of the 
oil rush and the gushers of Balakhani grew a vision of a new order, “the Promised 
Land that is called a Socialist World” (Marriott and Minio-Paluello, 2013, p.46).  
According to Muttitt and Marriott, the Baku Commune set a model “for 20th century 
resistance to capital” ([PLATFORM], 2002, p.20). It captured attention of a generation 
of Marxist scholars and historians, who often drew analytical parallels with the 
experience of the French Revolution of 1871 and the Paris Commune (Suny, 1972, 
pp.353-362). The Soviet period of Baku oil, especially during WWII, often completely 
overlooked and ignored in mainstream scholarship, is accorded particular attention in 
Marxist and neo-Marxist analyses (Muttitt and Marriott, 2002, p.21; Werth, 1964; 
Omarova, 1998). 
Critics of BTC and SGC pipelines often point out that the projects had their origins in 
the discoveries and technological innovations of Soviet planners, who pioneered off-
shore drilling in the Caspian oil and gas fields off Baku half a century ago (Hoffman, 
1999). The fact that off-shore fields, Azer-Chiraq-Guneshli (ACG), were not explored 
by the Soviet authorities, however, made BTC and SGC possible (Muttitt and Marriott, 
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2002, p.24) - it was these reserves that Western energy companies returned to 
develop, once Azerbaijan regained its independence with collapse of USSR in 1991 
(Adams, 2002, pp. 75-77). It is perhaps emblematic of changing reality of Baku oil that 
the ACG off-shore oil field (and its Shah-Deniz gas sibling) were once named after the 
twenty-six Baku commissars – commanders of the Baku Commune (Marriott and 
Minio-Paluello, 2013, p.50). 
Meanwhile, Robert Cox’s (1983) introduction of Gramscian concepts, such as 
hegemonic power as an irreducible transfiguration of dominant ideas, institutions and 
world orders, heralded the anti-positivist challenge of the Critical Theory. This (coupled 
with the positivist backlash in the 1980s and 1990s), in turn, stimulated a later revival 
in classical, political Marxism (see, for example, Halliday 1994), which can be said to 
represent a re-foundation of Marxist IR as an international historical sociology 
(Teschke, 2008, p.177). This sociological framework extended into Marxist critique of 
mainstream globalisation theory, prompting a renewed interest in imperialism and neo-
imperialism (see, for example, Robinson, 2002; Hardt and Negri, 2000)14. 
It is clear that what lies at the heart of Marxist analysis of international oil politics is its 
normative commitment to an emancipatory international intellectual and political 
project. And for neo-Marxists, adherents of the world-systems and structural 
dependency theory (which remains a productive theoretical field in its own right) the 
rationalist consensus serves to legitimise, consolidate and reinforce structural 
domination of the industrial North over the developing South. For example, 
Hinnebusch (2003) casts international energy issues in the context of anti-imperialist 
and Arab nationalist struggles of the 1960s and 1970s, charting what he characterises 
as local resistance to Western hegemony and the power of multinational corporations 
through to the collapse of the Soviet Union and US victory in the struggle for regional 
dominance (see also, Dannreuther, 2010).  
Other Marxist-inspired approaches to international oil politics Wallerstein’s (1976) 
world-systems theory and (re)prioritise Western, and specifically US hegemony as a 
key unit of analysis. Partly prompted by increasing marketization of the oil trade and 
growing power of producing nations, authors such as Simon Bromley sought to refocus 
                                                          
14 Neo-Gramscian International Political Economy (Critical Theory), sociological Marxism and neo-classical 
Marxist theory in the study of international politics of oil are discussed at greater length in Chapter VI.   
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attention on the expansion of US hegemony in the global energy order, arguing that 
“the structural reach of its power has increased and remains qualitatively and 
quantitatively more extensive than that of its competitors (1991, p.2). In doing so 
Bromley was implicitly and explicitly responding to neo-realists and neo-liberal 
institutionalists, such as Stephen Krasner (1985) and Robert Keohane (1989) and who 
claimed, to greater or lesser extent, that Western oil hegemony was in decline, 
especially in light of the rise of OPEC and growing relative power of producer-nations 
(Bromley, 1991, p. 3; 1994). 
Hence, the “return” of the West - governments and companies – to Baku oil after Soviet 
collapse represents reassertion of structural reach of Western power as it asserted 
itself across former USSR. For example, some have alleged that BP and the American 
oil giant Amoco (which later merged) played a role in the removal of Azerbaijan’s 
democratically-elected government in 1993, paving the way for the rise of authoritarian 
regime of President Heydar Aliyev (see Leppard et al, 2000). Others point to the 
outcome of post-coup negotiations and highlight differences in the final composition of 
companies taking part in the project and allocation of shares.  
Thus Muttitt and Marriott contend that Azerbaijani state oil company SOCAR lost out 
considerably in the final negotiations with Western companies, with Azeri state share 
was eventually cut to just 20 per cent ([PLATFORM] 2002, p.23): “The grandiose title 
given to the deal, the ‘Contract of the Century’, suited all the signatories. It is still used 
today, yet few ask for whom it was the contract of the century – for the Azeri people, 
for the Aliyev clan, or for the oil corporations who had signed an immensely profitable 
deal and gained control over a major new resource base?” (Marriott and Minio-
Paluello, 2013, p. 60).  
 
Consequently, pipeline projects which emerged out of the 1994 Contract, similarly 
served interests of oil companies and Western governments. For example, when in 
2004 UK’s Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) approved $150 million of 
public funding for the BTC pipeline, its critics claimed the decision was politically 
motivated: “It's pretty obvious that the ECGD has decided to back the BTC project for 
the same reason everybody else has: massive political pressure from the US" (Anders 
Lustgarten, Baku-Ceyhan Campaign quoted in Kurdish Human Rights Project, 
December 2013). When in November 2004 left-wing activists occupied ECGD offices 
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in London in protest against final approval of BTC funding agreement, they claimed it 
was because, “The ECGD is now the single largest source of taxpayer subsidy for big 
multinationals seeking to offload onto the public the risks of their unwanted and 
exploitative projects in the South.” (Rising Tide, 11.11.2004).  
 
Marxist materialist conception of history and analysis of economic factors, class, 
property relations and production have important implications for the study of Caspian 
oil. The region’s history, and experimentation with Marxism during the Baku Commune 
and the Soviet periods, offer an ontological basis for assessment of Marxist 
propositions about international energy politics. Both Marxist and critical theories 
share common epistemology but an explicitly Marxist analysis of pipeline politics would 
be essential in a future expanded synergetic study. Although Marxist approach to 
international relations suffers from considerable weaknesses, it can still provide a 
valuable means of analysis (Linklater, 1996, p.150).  
 
Critical theory 
Key issues affecting biological survival of the human race should be the first purpose 
of study in IR (Cox, 2008, p. 87). Critical theory, as if anticipating the coming concerns 
of global environmentalist movement, helped ground this discourse within an explicitly 
normative domain: “Its willingness to emphasize the human price of progress, the 
costs of alienation and reification, the implications of scientific reason for moral 
capacities, and the potential ‘revenge of nature’ were all major contributions” (Bronner, 
2002, p. 252).   
Critical theory views realist-liberal consensus as problematic because it does both – 
condones the structural injustices of the prevailing global order and helps to 
perpetuate them by devising problem-solving policy prescriptions, whilst, as in the 
case of the liberal tradition, espousing seemingly benign universal moral principles 
and ethos (Monbiot, 2006). Inspired, as it is, by Marxist tradition, critical theory is post-
Marxist in espousing an explicit normative agenda behind the intellectual enterprise - 
“…the normative purpose of the inquiry precedes and facilitates the definition of the 
object of inquiry” (Linklater, 1992, p. 92).  
As Robert Cox argues: “When we think now of “change” in world politics and society 
we think of what has to be done to ensure the survival of the human race and to 
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moderate conflict among peoples. The primary task of the study of international 
relations along with the other departments of knowledge about human affairs is to help 
people to organize so as to achieve this” (2008, p. 87). Therefore, whilst the process 
begins with a substantive critique of the dominant rationalist discourse, it must then 
necessarily move into the praxeological domain of political and civic action aimed at 
bringing about substantive change (this is important in the context of international 
politics of oil).  
As a matter of intellectual priority critical theorists are concerned with the politics of 
knowledge. Knowledge is not power-neutral but reflects perspectives and vested 
interests of those who produce it. Cox’s differentiation between problem-solving and 
critical theory has important implications for the study of BTC/SGC projects, as 
knowledge produced about them can be tested on that criteria (1986, pp.207-209). 
Rationalist approaches fail because they are “oblivious to the way power and interest 
precede and shape knowledge claims” (Devetak, 1996, p. 160). It is clear that most 
enthusiastic support for the BTC project and its backers is found in the literature within 
the “neo-neo” model of the project. 
Thus, for example, one of the few major contemporary studies produced on BTC and 
highly supportive of the project - “BTC – Pipeline: The Oil Window to the West” by 
Frederick-Starr and Cornell et all, (2005) - was published by the Central Asia-
Caucasus Institute at John Hopkins University– an international think-tank with HQ in 
Washington and funded by US government grants and corporate donations. 
Knowledge claims are not produced in a political vacuum but reflect the agendas of 
those producing them. It does not automatically invalidate them, but whether 
acknowledged or not, the purpose of these “problem solving” approaches to BTC or 
SGC is, having accepted the prevailing framework of the project with its implicit power 
relationships, institutions and processes, “... to make these relationships and 
institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble” 
(Cox, 1986, p. 208).  
It is taken for granted that oil and gas had to be extracted from its land-locked location 
in the Caspian and the problem is how to do it with minimum cost and maximum 
benefit. Critical theory seeks from the start to question the prevailing order and asks 
how it came about. This requires a historicist approach and an ever-present concern 
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with “a continuing process of historical change” (ibid, p. 209). Furthermore, the 
knowledge critical theory produces is not neutral either – “it is politically and ethically 
charged by an interest in social and political transformation” (Devetak, 1996, p.161). 
This interest is amplified by a praxeological enterprise aimed at achieving political 
goals. From the outset BTC and attendant gas projects were met with fierce opposition 
from organised civil society. 
In the case of BTC this took form of the Baku-Ceyhan Campaign (Baku-Ceyhan 
Campaign website, 2017). Launched in 2002 it brought together local and international 
NGOs, human rights and environmental groups and activists to oppose the pipeline, 
not least by raising “public awareness of the social problems, human rights abuses 
and environmental damage that are being caused by the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil 
pipeline” (Baku-Ceyhan Campaign website, About Us, 2017). The Campaign aimed to 
show how international treaties between the AIOC consortium and governments of the 
countries traversed by BTC have largely exempted BP and its partners from any laws 
in those countries – present or future – which conflict with the company’s project plans: 
“The agreements allow BP to demand compensation from the governments should 
any law (including environmental, social or human rights law) make the pipeline less 
profitable. The agreements have for these reasons been described by non-
governmental organisations (NGOS) as ‘colonialist’” (Baku-Ceyhan Campaign 
website, Colonialism, 2017). 
Considerable research was also carried out to demonstrate how BTC contributes to 
conflict, human rights abuses and militarisation of the Caspian region (KHRH et al, 
2004) and how it hampers social development and promotes corruption in Azerbaijan, 
Georgia and Turkey (Baku-Ceyhan Campaign website, Social Impacts of BTC 
pipeline, 2017). On climate change the Campaign argued: “The climate impact of this 
project will dwarf the combined impacts of all UK initiatives to combat climate change. 
The emissions from the oil and gas coming through the pipelines would be more than 
twice the emissions saved through the UK's 12.5% reduction under the Kyoto Protocol 
(73,000 tonnes CO2) and ten times more than the emissions saved through the UK's 
target of meeting 10% of electricity demand from renewables (wind, sun, water power) 
by 2010” (Baku-Ceyhan Campaign website, Climate Impact of BTC, 2017).  
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The central focus of anti-BTC opposition was directed at international financial 
institutions, such as the World Bank and EBRD, and export-credit agencies, such as 
the UK’s Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) (Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline 
website, Financial Institutions, 2017). The Campaign criticised the lack of due 
diligence efforts of these international funding institutions, pointing out the 
compromising extent to which IFIs have relied on information and factual verification 
provided solely by BP (Baku Ceyhan Campaign, 06.09.2004).  
Critics charged that BTC was “the most controversial oil pipeline in the world”, due to 
its “damaging geo-political, environmental and social impacts, its role in augmenting 
the power of corporate interests over national governments… as well as allegations of 
corruption, incompetence and malpractice” (Lustgarten, 2005). When in 2003 ECGD 
agreed to underwrite £150 million credit line for BTC project with public funds Human 
rights groups dismissed the decision as politically motivated, arguing that ECGD 
should not be using taxpayers’ money to support projects “that will further fuel climate 
change. We're bitterly disappointed that despite its so-called commitments to the 
environment, ECGD is still supporting unsustainable projects" (Hannah Griffiths of 
Friends of the Earth quoted in Baku-Ceyhan Campaign press release, 13.12.2003).  
Opposition to the BTC project, both political and academic persisted even after the 
project was completed and operational – see for example, Marriott and Minio-
Paluello’s seminal “The Oil Road” (2013). More importantly, the same coalitions of 
global civil society groups, environmental NGOs and human rights campaigners came 
together to organise against the next phase of pipeline projects – specifically the 
Southern Gas Corridor (CounterBalance, 28.01.2016; CEE Bankwatch Network, 
2017). The thrust of the campaigning is again directed at international financial 
institutions and public credit funds with the aim at preventing public funds from being 
used to enable fossil fuel projects (Bill McKibben, Naomi Klein et al, CounterBalance, 
30.06. 2017; Marriott and Minio-Paluello, 2013, p.348; Gotev, 29.03.2017; Stone, 
30.11.2017; Bacheva-McGrath, 2015).  
Similarly, critical opposition to SGC project, comprising praxeological project and 
empirical programme, is motivated by a normative commitment to stopping the project. 
Preventing public funding of SGC is the centre-piece of an ongoing political campaign 
by coalitions of NGOs, local community and civil society groups, human rights 
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campaigners and environmentalists, involving political lobbying, grassroots activism 
(CounterBalance, 28.01.2016; CEE Bankwatch Network, 2017). The entire campaign 
is a direct political appeal to multilateral financial institutions, such as EBRD and EIB, 
as well as the EU Commission not to fund any of the SGC pipelines (McKibben, Klein 
et al, CounterBalance, 30.06. 2017).  
Popular resistance, indigenous struggles and grass-root, local communities’ 
opposition against corporate and state interests is an important empirical strand in 
critical engagement with international energy and mineral politics (Dunning and Wirpsa 
(2004).  For example, protests at Standing Rock against Dakota Access pipeline in 
2016 and 2017 helped reprioritise indigenous local opposition to the energy industry 
and served to recast the issue in terms of resistance to colonial oppression (Hayes, 
2016). A clear connection is maintained between local/subnational, national and 
international factors, along with a normative assessment of the causes and 
consequences of resource-linked conflict.  
Each segment of the SGC project (SCP, TANAP, TAP), requiring multilateral funding 
has been subjected to the same consistent opposition, aimed at preventing funding 
from public financial institutions (NHC, 19.12.2016). The very same structural 
mechanisms of standard-setting, environmental and social impact assessment 
criteria, reporting-compliance and procedural-administrative architecture of SGC 
financing is utilised with the aim of precluding any potential financing agreements. For 
example, when in early 2017 Azerbaijan was suspended from transparency watchdog 
EITI for non-compliance on human rights grounds human rights NGOs have sought to 
use the issue to raise doubt over viability of public financial support for SGC (EITI 
Board paper 36-5-A, 09.03.2017; Allili and Bitner, 2017, p.3; pp.6-7).  
 
On grassroots level opposition to SGC manifested as angry protests by local 
communities that greeted SGC pipeline along its route. In Puglia region of Italy local 
farmers vociferously protested construction of the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline. (Stone, 
30.11.2017). In Azerbaijan, former presidential candidate in Azerbaijan, widely 
believed to be unjustly imprisoned by the government of President Ilham Aliyev, 
declared himself to be an “inmate of Southern Gas Corridor”, arguing that: 
“International investment in fossil fuel extraction is making me and other Azerbaijani 
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political prisoners hostages to the Aliyev regime” and mobilising opposition groups 
against SGC (Mammadov, 20.01.2017; CoE Committee of Ministers, 25.10.2017).  
Anti-SGC political praxeological project is informed and energised by a critical 
research programme which aims to expose the true extent of negative social and 
environmental consequences of SGC (CounterBalance, Platform and Re:Common, 
08.03.2016). Its empirical output comprises a plethora of methodologies e.g. in-depth 
environmental and social impact assessments, which challenge results of corporate 
and institutional ESIAs produced to support SGC projects (Banktrack and 
Counterbalance, 20.02.2017). These efforts aim to show that SGC fails on its own 
terms e.g. economic viability or to meet energy diversification targets and on human 
rights, environmental, climate change and other criteria (Sol, 24.09.2017; Bacheva-
McGrath et al, 2015; CEE Bankwatch EBRD Brief, May 2017).  
 
Signatories of a letter to the EIB President argued that “…the Southern Gas Corridor 
is one of the biggest and most controversial infrastructure projects that have ever seen 
the light in Europe. This massive financial investment entails serious environmental 
and geopolitical risks and is likely to become the European equivalent of the Keystone 
XL pipeline. Therefore, we call for no public money to go to the Southern Gas Corridor” 
(ACT Alliance EU, Les Amis de la Terre (France) and Others, CounterBalance, 
28.01.2016).  
 
Another group of NGOs challenged EIB over human rights impact of SGC, especially 
in Azerbaijan and Turkey, arguing that: “…the development of the Southern Gas 
Corridor will only strengthen oppression in these countries where civil liberties and the 
security of individuals are currently being drastically impaired. This runs contrary to 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights which binds the EIB to not finance projects that 
would encourage or support human rights violations. Therefore, we call on the EIB to 
adhere to the principles of fundamental rights and withdraw its offer to finance the 
project in light of such prevailing conditions” (Article 19, Banktrack and others, 
12.09.2017).  
When in December 2017 EIB postponed funding decision on Trans-Adriatic Pipeline 
organisations and communities opposed to SGC greeted the news as vindication of 
their campaign (Nuttall, 13.12.2017). Political effect of this critical praxeological project 
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does not only represent success for the anti-SGC movement but also of wider efforts 
“to make European public finance a key driver of the transition towards socially and 
environmentally sustainable and equitable societies” (CounterBalance, 2017). This 
effect was amplified when on the same day as the EIB postponement of SGC 
financing, the World Bank announced that it will be divesting from fossil fuel projects 
altogether (World Bank, 12.12.2017). Analytical critique of SGC and praxeological 
project to prevent the harm it may bring is an ongoing process and the issue has not 
yet been settled. 
Poststructuralism  
Poststructuralist analysis of international energy politics is set within a wider critical 
inquiry which asks existential questions about relationship between humans and 
nature; about the status of nature as material reality and as a social, imagined kind; 
about science and progress as social forces and how they account for distribution of 
power; and about possibility of change in the prevailing energy order. 
Poststructuralism represents a radical anti-positivist challenge to the rationalist 
mainstream – an epistemological and ontological reordering of social-scientific 
enterprise. 
For rationalists, materialism underpins the entire historical structure. Whatever 
ideational or imaginational quality oil might possess, its status as an energy-generating 
natural kind precedes that and defines its relationship to humanity; as such it is 
perennial: “Here’s a humbling truth: despite all our advances and wealth, the 
fundamental forms of energy today echo those at the dawn of society… Above all, we 
remain a world lit, built, and moved by fire… It is fire that brings electricity and modern 
civilisation into most of our lives, that powers our technology and our modes of 
transport. Indeed, discovering new forms of fire making defines a hallmark – perhaps 
the hallmark – of the modern energy era” (Montgomery, 2010, p.14).  
This is a positivist view of history as unchanging, structurally-determined, shaped by 
material reality of human condition. Reflectivist approaches reject this view outright. 
Burning fossil fuels is not a value-free act of energy production: “All of this cornucopia 
has been powered by a liquid distilled from fossilised ecosystems, from plants and 
animals that lived from the Jurassic to the Tertiary era. These visions of the future 
have been dependent upon the ceaseless combustion of ancient rocks, just as Victor 
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Frankenstein constructed his dream from the organs and limbs of the dead” (Marriott 
and Minio-Paluello, 2013, p.334). There is the implicit scepticism about claims for 
material foundations of modern social orders but also a clear recognition of the 
constitutive role natural, physical kinds fulfil in creating, constructing, inventing, 
imagining social kinds. Therefore, a poststructuralist critique of BTC and SGC pipeline 
projects makes for a consistent challenge to the rationalist consensus around the 
projects and is animated by a single overarching paradigm – that there are historical 
alternatives to the social order represented by these fossil fuel enterprises.  
BTC and SGC are not products of some immutable “natural” laws of energy politics 
but are outcomes of historically-constituted, politically significant, normative choices – 
choices that are different to those made by societies in the past or might be made in 
the future: “For centuries the Absheron Peninsula was a place of pilgrimage, a shrine 
of fire. Burning gas leaked from the ground since the last Ice Age. This was the most 
sacred site of Zoroastrianism which, prior to Islam, was the dominant faith in the 
region. The oil-bearing rocks drew people to this place, not to extract petroleum and 
carry it off to some other site of burning, but to worship it here in the sheets of flame, 
among the rock” (Marriott and Minio-Paluello, 2013, p.23). 
Hence, post-modernist critiques of Baku oil and of BTC/SGC projects proceed from 
treating the subject as unique historical events unprecedented in the region’s history, 
to one with profound normative implications (Muttitt & Marriott, 2002, p.9-14; Thomas, 
2004). This is a rejection of positivist view of history as unchanging, structurally-
determined and ethically-neutral. Regularities and repetitions in human behaviour in 
different historical periods are not evidence of any universal quality to balance of 
power processes (Cox, 1986, p.244).  
As Marriott and Minio-Paluello forcefully argue, completely different historical 
structures existed in the region in the past and the materialist conception of 
hydrocarbons, as opposed to an alternative, rarefied, ideational, is itself constructed 
by prevailing social orders and dominant ideologies: “As other faiths arrived – Sunni 
and Shia Islam, Russian Orthodoxy, Marxism and Capitalism – the holy fire of this 
peninsula was transformed into a material to be extracted and exported” (Ibid.). 
Poststructuralist paradigm seeks to problematize, question and unpick the very idea 
of BTC/SGC projects, arguing that political and environmental costs, especially the 
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impact on global climate change amongst other factors, are unacceptably high (Muttitt 
and Marriott, 2002, p. 162).  
Poststructuralist thinking on oil and wider issues of energy politics, therefore, requires 
understanding of the impact it had had on the wider environmental movement and the 
growth of global awareness of ecological issues. As Arran Gare put it: “Reflection on 
the postmodern condition and reflection on environmental crisis have much in 
common. They both involve efforts to understand the culture of modern civilisation and 
how it has come to its present state” (1995, p.1).  
Yet first, it is important to distinguish ‘post-modernity’ as “the cultural, economic, social, 
and political formation within modernity that results from changes in time-space 
relations”, and poststructuralism as a reflectivist analytics that “critically engages with 
the production and implication of these transformations” (Campbell, 2013, p. 231). For 
poststructuralism, the ethical prerogative (of saving the world from environmental 
catastrophe) raises intellectual stakes; it predicates and prioritises a normative 
engagement with the issue. It can be argued that this by itself constitutes a 
foundational paradigm which, in turn accounts for the tension between 
poststructuralism’s imperative to critique and the eco-political imperative to act “to 
change the world”.  
However, poststructuralism does not present itself as another IR paradigm but rather 
as “a critical attitude, approach, or ethos that calls attention to the importance of 
representation, the relationship of power and knowledge, and the politics of identity in 
an understanding of global affairs” (Campbell, 2013, p. 225). As such, 
poststructuralism is a meta-theoretical critique of positivist International Relations, 
which aims to unsettle the subject of IR (Lawler, 2008, p. 380).  When it comes to 
critique of fossil fuel projects such as BTC or SGC, the aim is not to solve problems 
with these projects or to alleviate or compensate for their negative repercussions but 
to question the prevailing order underpinning them in favour of an alternative action, 
e.g. a non-fossil fuelled vision of the future.  
It is not surprising therefore that the critique and opposition to BTC were generated by 
the kind of active, campaigning grassroots global civil society that poststructuralists 
believe will generate transformational change in world political order. Environmental 
and human rights groups, such as Friends of the Earth and PLATFORM, carried out 
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extensive research into BTC in the early 2000s and sought to mobilise international 
public and political opinion against the pipeline (Muttitt and Marriott, 2002).  
Poststructuralist critique of BTC is set within a wider post-structuralist inquiry, where 
oil is envisaged as a historical social force: “The presence of crude in the body of 
society since 1870s has fuelled a kaleidoscope of visions for future social orders… 
Above all, as planes and cars burst into our consciousness, it has fuelled ‘modernity’ 
– the imagination of the machine age” (Marriott and Minio-Paluello, 2012, p. 334). 
Thus, social construction of modernity is located in the material potential of oil at a 
particular historical juncture.  
Similarly, critique of and opposition to SGC can be viewed as a poststructuralist 
intellectual praxeological dynamic of a kind that seeks to unbalance prevailing 
narratives about the issue and to empower marginalised voices, previously excluded 
and silenced. Whether it is through producing documentaries telling the stories 
Azerbaijani prisoners of conscience and community organisers in Melendugno, 
southern Italy protesting against the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (CounterBalance, 
Platform and Re:Common, 08.03.2016) or carrying out research showing how 
alternatives to SGC are not only possible but credible, the cumulative aim is to make 
a sustained argument against public funding of the project: “Preventing the use of 
public money for massive fossil fuel projects such as the Southern Gas Corridor can 
open space for more serious efforts on energy efficiency and sustainable forms of 
renewable energy” (Bacheva-McGrath et al, 2015). 
 
From social constructivism to analytic eclecticism  
In contrast to poststructuralism, social-constructivist critique of rationalism has not 
involved wholesale rejection of positivist scientific method. Constructivism does 
emphasise immaterial, ideational and social dimensions of international relations and 
challenges instrumentalist materialism that underpins neo-realist and neo-liberal 
assumptions. For example, when Mearsheimer (1995) states: “the distribution of 
material capabilities among states is the key factor for understanding world politics” 
(p. 91), he is articulating the rationalist argument that material objects such as oil, 
determine political outcomes, regardless of any ideas that actors – people – might 
attach to them (Hurd, 2008, p. 300).  
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Constructivists reject such instrumentalist logic and shift focus instead on the 
ideational properties in IR – the central role of beliefs, expectations and interpretations 
in shaping international affairs; the social, rather than the material, content that makes 
up state interests and identities; the effects of various interactions between structures 
and agents, and that these are mutually constituted (Ibid., p. 304). What this may 
suggest is that the constructivist debate with rationalist approaches is primarily 
ontological, rather than epistemological (Fierke, 2013, p. 193).  
One result of marrying a social ontology to an epistemology indebted to positivism was 
a thriving research tradition, and consistent and rigorous empirical defence of 
constructivist arguments (Price, 2008, pp. 317-318). However, a key question is 
whether this combining of a constructivist ontology with an empiricist method of 
knowledge generation is consistent? For example, constructivism is not specific about 
what constitutes primary unit of analysis in IR – inquiry proceeds at different and all 
levels, often treating actors and processes as “a given”. However, does taking oil 
companies, for example, as a given imply that previous social construction of these oil 
companies as institutions is somehow to be set aside?  
Underlying these questions is an assumption that rationalism and constructivism are 
two irreconcilable ontological commitments. Hurd (2008) suggests an alternative 
position, which holds that “the two are relevant to the same subject matter, but their 
different emphases allow, when combined, for greater insight into a problem than is 
provided by each alone” (p. 312). Whatever the case, this internal ontological tension 
does nonetheless go some way to account for both – the breadth and volume of 
constructivist empirical input on substantive issues in international energy politics, and 
the often contentious dynamics in social constructivists’ debates with fellow 
reflectivists and rationalists alike.  
For example, it is interesting to contrast post-positivist IR social-constructivism with 
the anti-positivist radicalism of critical theory and poststructuralist approaches, in their 
discussion of environmentalism. Here, constructivism has had significant impact, 
especially in the field of environmental sociology, where some have argued it acquired 
“prime paradigmatic status” (Hannigan [1995], 2006, p. 29; see also Freudenburg, 
2000, p. 103). Lockie (2004, p.29) similarly suggests that the idea that the environment 
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is socially constructed may well be the key foundational concept in environmental 
theory.  
However, this does open up charges of relativism, with critics painting social 
constructivism as Hannigan put it, as “a sort of Darth Vader, perverting the force of 
sociological understanding and ignoring the “reality” of environmental crisis ([1995], 
2006, p. 29)”. But this is a misreading of constructivist claims. Just because something 
is interpreted as having been socially constructed does not mean it is not real: 
“Pollution does cause illness, species do become extinct, ecosystems cannot absorb 
stress indefinitely, tropical forests are disappearing. But people can make very 
different things of these phenomena and – especially – their interconnections, 
providing grist for political dispute” (Dryzek, 2005, p.12, cited in Hannigan, [1995] 
2006, p. 31).  
Social constructivism moves beyond positivist materialism and rejects 
oversimplifications of nature-centric ecological approaches. It focuses attention on 
how environmental issues and related subjects are framed and presented in public 
discourses; on the norms and belief systems which inform various political and social 
processes that, in turn, shape public understanding and decision-making on 
environmental matters; and on how these norms and values came to be in the first 
place (Savigny and Marsden, 2011, pp. 237-238; see, for example Yearley, 2002). 
Steven’s “The Social Construction of Environmental Problems” (2002) is a good 
example of such scholarship as it explores precisely the kind of ways in which specific 
environmental problems are “constructed” and how this “construction” of 
environmental discourses serves as “an arena for social action or policy interventions”, 
leading to some topics to rise to the top of political agenda and the centre of public 
attention, and others not. 
Turning to other substantive issues in the study of energy, social constructivist 
scholarship is characterised by this combination of epistemological pluralism, 
normative humility and the “deep ontology” of its social theory. Oil politics, for example, 
provide fertile ground for empirical constructivism. Starting with rejection of crude 
materialism of rationalist approaches, constructivists proceed to develop complex 
socio-historical modes analyses of various substantive issues. This is because, as 
Ross Coen (2012, p.6) notes, “an oil strike requires more than simply oil in the ground, 
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men with a daring spirit, and state-of-the-art machines at their disposal”. Social 
constructivism offers a more useful paradigmatic lens to the study of oil politics 
because it helps reveal how different stages of energy exploration, discovery, 
production and transportation “always occur within particular set of political, social, 
economic, and historical circumstances whose cumulative influence equals if not 
exceeds the mere physical nature of the operation” (Ibid.). 
As is with environmentalism, the social construction of oil politics is simultaneously the 
act of imaginational construction and an arena for social and political behaviour of 
various actors; and when it comes to political outcomes what is “counted in” matters 
as much as what is “counted out”. Ross’s study “Breaking Ice for Arctic Oil” (2012), is 
the story of the oil-tanker SS Manhattan, the first commercial vessel to successfully 
complete the transit of the North West Passage. It was hoped that the ship’s epic 
journey would herald the advent of a new transit route for recently discovered Alaskan 
oil. But the plans failed to materialise and the story came to be largely forgotten, a 
non-event. However, as Ross argues: “Non-events such as Manhattan provide an 
important perspective… the history of development schemes that did not pan out may 
prove as instructive as those that did” (p.6).  
Constructivists often turn attention to the role of markets and international corporations 
in shaping energy politics but here again the empirical interest is centred on the role 
of identities (those of directors, shareholders, regulators and so on) and the social 
relations which inform the energy and environmental trajectory of capitalism in a long-
term historical context (see, for example, Prasad and Mir, 2007; Pulver, 2007). 
Nonetheless, it can be argued that constructivist model of international energy politics 
is overall state-centric.  This is not to suggest constructivists neglect other actors or 
system-level analysis but simply to highlight the consistent overlap between social 
constructivist and more traditional, positivist approaches, notwithstanding their 
different ontological focus – different lenses through which to examine the same 
phenomena.  
Positivists, such as Yergin (1991; 2012), have undoubtedly paid considerable attention 
to the ideas which inform and shape international politics of energy, and fossil fuels in 
particular. Strands of constructivist thinking, various combinatorial logics and often 
explicit responses to postmodernist critiques can be found across rationalist 
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scholarship on oil reviewed in Chapters IV. This should not be surprising; as Scott L. 
Montgomery argues: “It is because energy issues evoke some of the most 
fundamental questions about the nature of society. Name any related subject – the 
place of nuclear power, a plan for a carbon tax, the need for public transport – and in 
the timbre of discussion you will hear, close by, ideas about whether our civilization 
has been progressive or regressive, whether it is a bringer of treasures or tragedies, 
and whether it now requires revision or revolution” (2010, pp.11-12).  
This would suggest that rationalist approaches to energy issues require a more 
nuanced reading, which in turn would enable a more reflective engagement with 
various normative critiques juxtaposed against them. It could be that positivists such 
as Montgomery and Yergin, are in fact making a normative claim – that modern life is 
good, certainly better than the harsh and brutish pre-industrial existence. Their 
scepticism about postmodern claims stems not from some sort of dogmatic 
materialism and reactionary opposition to emancipatory change but out of genuine 
concern for the future of humanity and appreciation for the complexity of the global 
energy order. They acknowledge that “perhaps more than ever before, a stance on 
energy implies a philosophical, even an ethical, outlook” (Montgomery, 2010, p. 12).  
It is precisely because Yergin considers growth of the environmental concerns to be 
extremely important that he characterises them as challenging “the basic tenets of the 
industrial society” (1991, p. 14). Much of “The Quest” (2012), Yergin’s follow-up to 
“The Prize” (1991), is devoted to exploring the possibility of a non-fossil fuel energy 
order. Energy is a problem field that requires a problem-solving approach, and that in 
itself is a normative commitment: “A famous geologist once said, “Oil is found in the 
minds of men”. We can amend that to say that the energy solutions for the twenty-first 
century will be found in the minds of people around the world. And that resource base 
is growing” (Ibid., p. 724).  
There is a danger, therefore, in binary readings of energy debates or employing single-
paradigmatic analytical frameworks, which bracket these debates and often turn them 
into polemical discourses. As Montgomery points out, “Complexities are endemic to 
positions on energy” (2010, p. 12). Prominence of these complexities accounts at least 
in part for the internal tensions in critical and poststructuralist debates around issues 
such as environmentalism. The pragmatic imperative to do something about existential 
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threats facing humanity and the world comes up against anti-positivist impetus for a 
normative critique that views these threats as embedded in and constituted by the 
prevailing social order, with its inequitable distribution of power and marginalisation of 
oppressed and marginalised interests and groups.  
Analytic eclecticism, as proposed by Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein (2008; 2010), 
proposes to overcome these contradictions. Complexity and messiness of everyday 
social life encourages political leaders and policy makers to seek out complex, 
pluralist, multi-level explanations of the problems facing them (Sil and Katzenstein, 
2010, p.12). What is effective is what matters in the end. Excessively abstract 
ontologies, self-imposed analytical brackets and foundational principles of single-
framework paradigmatic approaches impede production of practically relevant 
knowledge – a task that “cannot wait for the emergence of a definitive consensus on 
methodological procedures or axiomatic principles that may reveal “final truths” (Sil 
and Katzenstein, 2008, p. 113).  
Examples of eclectic theorising about international politics of energy characteristically 
focus on middle-range theory, multi-causal explanations of specific empirical problems 
or themes (Falola and Genova, 2005; Branden, 2008;). Analytic eclecticism proceeds 
from identifying important substantive questions to integrating empirical observations 
and causal stories set out in separate paradigms, in order to posit less simplified, more 
interactive and comprehensive assessment, aiming not only for scholarly but also 
practical relevance (Frankel and Ernst, 2007). What is not clear is whether analytic 
eclecticism with its pragmatic combinatorial logic, epistemological pluralism and 
praxeology-orientated ontology, constitutes a normative agenda or if it is simply a 
framework for problem-driven research. As discussed earlier, in its eschewal of 
foundationalism eclecticism risks attracting the charges of conceptual haziness and 
theoretical inconsistency.  
Rationalists engaging in eclectic theorising might seek to overcome these 
antagonisms by integrating elements of social-constructivist analysis into a broadly 
positivist framework; for example, by engaging with BTC and SGC projects as both 
material and ideational constructs: “The challenge is how to understand the role of 
materials in political life in a period when existence of materials is becoming 
progressively more bound up with both the production and the circulation of 
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information” (Barry, 2013, p.5). Material artefacts, including major infrastructural 
assemblages such as oil and gas pipelines increasingly play a highly visible part in 
political life, and are therefore becoming increasingly determined by ideational and 
normative factors underpinning the projects (Ibid.).  
This in turn necessitates complex regulatory, legal and administrative systems to 
create normative and material regimes to acquire legitimacy and to ensure effective 
management and operation of the physical pipelines (Carroll, 2010). Carroll 
demonstrates how deployment of corporate social responsibility techniques by 
corporations and the formalised process through which funding for BTC was procured 
make up a socially constructed and procedural legitimisation and risk mitigation 
structure for global capital and political interests (p. 17). There is an on-going interplay 
between international and domestic law on the one hand, and various 
intergovernmental environmental, social and developmental standards adopted by 
global financial institutions, on the other. At the same time energy corporations have 
also undergone a shift in their projected identity in response to normative shifts in wider 
society (e.g. rebranding of BP into Beyond Petroleum in early 2000s). In aggregate, 
these processes constitute a new social neo-liberalism (Ibid, p. 8).  
 
Or to take another example - if SGC project can be explained in a parsimonious 
structural model populated by interest-maximising states, multilateral lender-
organisations and markets, then what explains certain persistent anomalies? For 
example, why has it taken Italy nearly two years to authorise construction of the Trans-
Adriatic Pipeline, the final leg and a key component of SGC (Gotev, 29.03.2017)? The 
matter was finally resolved through a complex legal process, subject to challenges in 
local and national courts and submission of extensive environmental and social impact 
assessments for each country traversed by the proposed pipeline – Albania, Greece 
and Italy (Jamestown Foundation, 30.04.2017: TAP-AG, 2017).  Such delays in the 
implementation of the project proved a constant irritant for SGC planners and those 
backing the project (Gotev, 4.10.2016). 
 
This suggests that a purely rationalist conception of the structure of international gas 
politics is at least incomplete. It cannot account for persistent anomalies which 
manifest as real world political outcomes in the evolution of SGC project. This is 
169 
 
because social forces, shaped by normative identities of various actors engaged in the 
project, have significant consequences on these political outcomes. For example, 
strategic priorities do indeed inform EU energy policy, as set out in the European Union 
Energy Security Strategy (EU Commission, 2018; EU Commission Working Document 
SWD(2014)330,  02.07.2014). But so do environmental, climate change and social 
concerns and these are reflected in the EU’s 2030 Framework for Climate and Energy 
(EU Commission, 2018; EU Commission Working Document SWD(2014)255, 
23.7.2014). Together the two regulatory frameworks form the core of the Energy Union 
– EU’s overall energy strategy that “…will lead to a sustainable, low carbon and 
environmentally friendly economy, putting Europe at the forefront of renewable energy 
production, clean energy technologies, and the fight against global warming” (EU 
Commission, 2018).  
 
A situation, therefore exists where support for SGC and other natural gas projects is 
coupled with a commitment to reduce carbon emissions and transition to renewable 
sources of energy. Apparent contradictions of this position give rise to normative 
reflection and social constructivists seek to raise possibility of alternative courses of 
action by asking, for example, whether SGC is the only viable method of supply 
diversification and Europe’s energy security (Siddi, 2017)? The argument here is not 
only that EU can acquire sufficient and affordable energy resources by other, already 
existing means but that the goal of the EU’s climate agenda implementation is at odds 
with the EU’s financial and political support for long-term, fossil fuels import project, 
such as the SGC (Ibid. p.19).  
 
Eclectic theorising enables expansion of structural conception of energy politics to 
allow for ideational as well as material elements. For example, when it comes to 
multilateral financing of complex international infrastructure systems, such as the 
SGC, political decision-making process does not occur in a normative vacuum but is 
mediated through a continuously evolving complex web of politically relevant inter-
subjective beliefs. These are constituted through clearly defined and codified 
normative frameworks e.g. permissibility standards, compensatory mechanisms, 
environmental and social impact assessment criteria, policy goals derived from 
international treaty obligations, and so on. Hence, each segment of the SGC pipeline 
(SCP, TANAP, TAP) had to meet certain material standards in delivering the project 
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in order to qualify for funding. These assessments are legal documents, part of 
regulatory architecture of the SGC project. Their significance demonstrates the extent 
to which norms are politically actualised – as a) the material articulation of socio-
normative aspirations of participating actors and b) standard setting-mechanisms 
necessary for successful implementation of a project (TAP ESIAs 2012-2014; SCP 
ESIAs 2013; TANAP ESIAs 2014-2015).  
 
Complimentary application of social-constructivist insights to the structuralist model of 
SGC financing helps understand how strategic and normative priorities of states and 
institutions are mediated, formalised through procedural, standard-setting and 
administrative mechanisms, and internalised by actors in the discourses about the 
issue.  
Conclusion 
Regardless of specific demands of individual campaigning NGOs, the key argument 
of critical theoretical and poststructuralist challenges to BTC and SGC projects is that 
opposition to these projects is part of a wider rejection of the prevailing energy order; 
that the latter is determined and shaped by political and normative choices, and that 
possibility of alternative choices is therefore credible: “A society fuelled by community-
controlled renewable energy systems might look very different from one dependent on 
gas controlled by private and state organisations. So this is also a struggle between 
different social structures. Our current dependency on fossil fuels may frighten us 
away from experiments and freeze imaginations. Yet when we break out of the internal 
logic of the Oil Road, we begin to envision other futures” (Marriott and Minio-Paluello, 
2013, p. 355).  
As BTC pipeline goes on transporting oil and the SGC saga continues to unfold, the 
future of Caspian and European energy future is still undecided. Ultimately, BTC and 
SGC – the ‘oil road’ and the ‘gas road’ – are representative of a particular political and 
social order that can be changed - “…this headlong rush to lock our societies into 
further fossil fuel dependence can be prevented” (Ibid., p. 354). To achieve this, it will 
not suffice to simply critique these specific projects, not least because those “who 
benefit from the current system are opposed to changing it, so stepping off the Oil 
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Road and preventing the Gas Road from being locked in will require a struggle” (Ibid., 
p. 355). 
This chapter outlines various reflectivist approaches to oil and gas politics and 
proposes a reflectivist model – an analytic critique of BTC/SGC pipeline systems and 
the social orders these projects represent. Different theoretical strands of the Fourth 
Debate offer different diagnostic prisms, enabling specific angles of normative 
reflection on energy politics, the environment and the existential threat of climate 
change. Cumulative effect of looking through these post- and anti-positivist 
paradigmatic lenses – from their classical Marxist foundations to robust postmodernist 
take-downs of underlying power structures – is to discern an overarching tapestry of 
discontent with the material reality of fossil fuels’ production, transmission and 
consumption in modern society.  
This discontent manifests itself as two mutually-reinforcing elements: 1) systematic 
critique of BTC and SGC super-structures and 2) as a praxeological programme aimed 
at thwarting these projects and changing the wider global energy reality. The first aims 
to expose environmental, social and human rights costs of the projects and informs 
the second - a political imperative to act to prevent these. Anti-positivist critiques of 
international oil politics and anti-BTC/SGC campaigns constitute a common theoretical 
and praxeological framework – a foundational, not simply paradigmatic, challenge to 
the prevailing social order represented by these grand energy infrastructure projects.      
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VI  
Synergetic Modelling 
Introduction 
Synergetic analysis of any given problem or puzzle in international relations begins 
with a systematic application and modelling of individual IR paradigms. Preceding 
chapters set out broad overviews of rationalist and reflectivist approaches to 
international oil politics and their application to the case-studies of BTC and SGC 
pipeline projects. What is immediately clear is that all of IR literature on oil politics and 
indeed on energy in general, much of such policy-relevant research and the bulk of 
empirical output are at least implicitly theoretical, with key arguments and positions 
underpinned by various theoretical assumptions found in the IR paradigmatic matrix. 
It can and should be analysed, characterised and classified as such, and then placed 
in its appropriate paradigmatic location on the IR “periodic table”, which then serves 
as a “road map” of the vast empirical field that is politics of oil and energy in general. 
The fact that it is a complex empirical field is another important observation – different 
paradigmatic analyses are telling different strands of the same story occurring in real 
time, e.g. much of the SGC project is still ongoing. Theory-synergetic approach is 
intended to develop a more dynamic, real-time and less parsimonious reading of this 
deep ontology of oil and gas politics driving these projects. The chapter sets out 
synergetic readings of examples of cross-theoretical conceptual overlaps and 
thematic convergences to demonstrate how synergetic analysis can help reveal 
deeper multidimensional understandings of contemporary political problems.  
 
Synergetic theoretical readings of energy politics 
Theory-synergetic approach starts out by casting off epistemological determinism 
altogether and recognising that all these paradigmatic perspectives are exploring 
different aspects and dimensions of the same social phenomena. A question ‘which 
theory gets it right?’ is arbitrary. The important questions are what theory uncovers 
which part of the deeper ontology of the subject matter and how these parts relate to 
each other within a historical timeline? And such questions can only be addressed on 
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empirical level, upon substantive matters. Prioritising empirical engagement ahead of 
theory selection allows for a more nuanced understanding of ontological complexity of 
a given problem-field. Synergetic approach does not mean abandonment of normative 
inquiry but it does involve eschewal of partisanship in the conduct of the inquiry.  
Paradigmatic dynamism of the synergetic approach requires systematic application of 
specific theoretical models upon substantive questions and issues, with the aim of 
generating a synergetic outcome that would be greater than the sum of its constituent 
parts. Therefore, judgements about which theoretical perspective offers better causal 
explanations or responds better to the normative agenda of a particular research 
project and so on, should be made upon assessment of the empirical output, and not 
on a priori assumptions or partisan standpoints.  
Theory-synergetic approach does not require glossing over these real epistemological 
differences and divergences in normative agendas between different paradigmatic 
traditions. How and why particular theoretical research strand arrives at a specific 
empirical observation and what conclusions are drawn, matters as much as their 
substance. It makes it all the more interesting when such observations of the same 
social phenomena carried out within different single-theoretical frameworks arrive at 
the same empirical finding, albeit with different normative assessments of it.  
Attenuated empiricism of the theory-synergetic approach enables clear identification 
of these multidimensional linkages between various paradigmatic standpoints and 
allows for more nuanced assessments of their normative implications. Regardless of 
epistemological and ontological divergences, IR empirical project proceeds under its 
own dynamics. Events took place, processes occurred and so on - facts are facts, 
although interpretations of them differ. Hence, there may be a theoretical consensus 
on the material outcomes, for example, of 1967-1974 period in international oil politics 
but not on what these outcomes mean and represent. Such convergences occur often 
across the empirical timeline of oil politics and often they do not. It can be that analysis 
of the same empirical phenomena within different single-paradigmatic frameworks will 
produce widely different interpretations and conclusions.   
Differing theoretical assessments of the same events and processes provide 
synergetic potential of equal, if not greater, value to when different paradigmatic forms 
of analysis converge on the same substantive arguments. Different epistemologies, 
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varying conceptions of ontology, competing normative agendas is what makes for the 
kaleidoscopic quality of IR theoretical matrix. A choice of this or that theoretical 
research agenda will produce empirical results informed by epistemological, 
ontological and normative properties of the chosen paradigmatic model. From the TSA 
standpoint the question is not which theory “gets it right” but how different theoretical 
models of the problem-field fit together in the grand synergetic tapestry - the expanded 
and the deep(er) ontology of the empirical puzzle.  
Turning first to the classical theories of international politics, it is worth reiterating again 
that arguments for multi-theoretical engagement with Liberalism, Realism and 
Marxism are not new (Williams, 2005; Rengger, 2008). There are clear cross-
paradigmatic conceptual overlaps and thematic commonalities that cut across the 
three traditions and this often manifests on empirical level. What characterises a 
synergetic quality of analysis is the systematic identification and examination of such 
empirical intersections – the inter-paradigmatic pivots. A priori assumptions regarding, 
for example structure/agency, do not inform decisions about what constitutes proper 
units of synergetic analysis. This is determined by substantive issues in a given 
research.  
In the case-study of Baku oil and BTC and SGC projects it gave rise to, these single-
paradigm research strands can be synergised in a common research programme built 
around a number of inter-paradigmatic pivots. These are essentially points of empirical 
intersection, where single-paradigm explanations converge upon common substantive 
matters - various conceptual overlaps and thematic commonalities. One clear theme 
that runs through liberal, realist and Marxist theoretical accounts is that of the rise, 
growth and expansion of the great oil majors. This thematic commonality covers the 
stories of Standard Oil, Royal Dutch Shell, Nobel Petroleum, Anglo-Persian/BP and 
other industry pioneers. Each single-paradigm approach views the role of oil 
companies through its own epistemological prism.  
Liberal research programme begins with the examination of the birth of the modern oil 
industry and its evolution in the 19th and early 20th century (see Chapter IV). Key areas 
of interest here is the establishment and growth of the industry, financialisation of the 
oil business, technological innovation in production and transportation, and the 
increasingly global nature of oil trade. For classical Liberals oil companies, exemplified 
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represented key agents of a growing oil business and their behaviour determined the 
contours of the emerging market.  
Marxist research programme examines emergence of oil as “use-value” commodity 
and charts its entry into the capitalist production cycle (see Chapter V). Marxist 
tradition is concerned with the nature of historical change whereby oil production 
transforms from a cottage industry into an increasingly global trade, a fundamental 
part of the international capitalist system. Classical Marxist analysis charts the growth 
of oil companies from their early, pre-capitalist origins to consolidation and eventual 
cartelisation, and is centred on the relationship between European and US imperialism 
and corporate monopolism (Lenin, 1961 [1917], p. 88). Competition between oil 
cartels, such as Standard Oil, Anglo Persian and Bnito is set in the context of global 
imperial conflicts, with dominant powers facing off challengers (Suny, 1972).  
For realists the importance of oil stems from its strategic value in the European power 
politics in the run up to WWI (see Chapter IV). Oil as a key commodity in determining 
preparedness for war and the political struggle over its control amongst states are 
principal directions of a classical Realist research programme. Oil companies are 
viewed as instruments of state policy, rather than truly independent agents in their own 
right. Each of these single-paradigm account of the problem-field represents only a 
partial reading of the role of oil companies in the early stages of the petroleum order. 
One direction for a future comprehensive synergetic study of the history of Baku oil 
would be to establish a synergetic understanding of this puzzle contributes to 
elucidating a more multidimensional conceptualising of this thematic convergence.  
For example, realists view developments such as the British government acquisition 
of controlling stake in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company or the establishment of the 
Export Credit Guarantee Department to publicly finance private overseas enterprise, 
especially in the realm of oil exploration, as examples of the subordinate role oil 
companies play in view of the dominance of state policy in the evolution of the oil 
industry. As Carr argues, “…powerful countries found their “natural” markets in areas 
where their political interests lay and where their political interests could be most 
readily asserted” (Ibid., p. 116). Carr, hardly a Marxist and generally sceptical of 
socialism did, however, acknowledge that “The Twenty Years’ Crisis” was “strongly 
impregnated with Marxist ways of thinking, applied to international relations” (Carr, “An 
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Autobiography”, pp. xvi-xvii quoted in Cox, 2000). Carr brings up the example of 
Britain’s Export Credit Guarantee Department, set up by the government to apply its 
purchasing power as an international political asset, by issuing guarantees for 
overseas private projects considered to be “in the national interest” (Ibid, p. 116). 
One advantage of incorporating Marxist historical critique of Baku oil into a synergetic 
historical analysis of the role of oil companies is to help understand contemporary 
issues facing BTC and SGC projects. For example, debates that followed the 2004 
Export Credit Guarantee Department approval of public funding for the BP’s BTC 
pipeline could be better understood if Realist and Marxist understandings of the role 
of institutions such as ECGD are synergised: “It's pretty obvious that the ECGD has 
decided to back the BTC project for the same reason everybody else has: massive 
political pressure from the US" (Anders Lustgarten, Baku-Ceyhan Campaign quoted 
in Kurdish Human Rights Project, December 2013). And the incident in November 
2004 mentioned in Chapter V, when left-wing activists occupied ECGD offices in 
London in protest against final approval of BTC funding agreement was justified in 
neo-Marxian terms: “The ECGD is now the single largest source of taxpayer subsidy 
for big multinationals seeking to offload onto the public the risks of their unwanted and 
exploitative projects in the South.” (Rising Tide, 11.11.2004). These normative critical 
claims are set out in terms which underline trans-historical saliency of Marxist, realist 
and liberal insights.  
 
Another example of a thematic commonality cutting across theoretical models is the 
issue of environment and BTC pipeline. This specific narrow empirical issue offers 
juxtaposition of competing conceptualisations of the same substantive questions 
about BTC. In previous chapters several key narratives emerge in empirical treatments 
of environmental issues and BTC: tanker-traffic through the Straits of Bosporus in 
Istanbul; global climate change and local impact on the environment; the role of oil 
companies and corporate social responsibility; international environmental regulatory 
framework.  
Contemporary mainstream studies and commentary on BTC emphasise the ecological 
dimension of the BTC project and point to the final routing of the pipeline as serving 
an environmental objective of reducing tanker-traffic through the highly-congested 
Straits of Bosporus in Istanbul (Blatchford, 2005, p.119). Nearly two million barrels of 
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oil in addition to other goods was being transported through the Straits by 2005 (Elkind, 
2005, p.39). Practically all the new oil from the Caspian region and Russia went to 
global markets from Black Sea onto Mediterranean via Bosporus. Frequent leaks and 
accidents added to increasing costs for the companies involved in trade and shipment, 
as congestion, administrative tariffs and insurance fees rose (Ibid).  
A neo-liberal focus on the issue conceives the environmental factor as an economic 
one. BTC route was chosen because environmental costs precluded additional tanker 
traffic through Istanbul. Risk assessments and technical studies identified BTC as the 
optimal method of transportation in terms of managing environmental risks and costs 
(Ibid). Similarly, the idea of Corporate Social Responsibility as expressed in extensive 
Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIA), consultation and local 
environmental risk assessments, as well as systematic engagement with NGOs 
carried out by BP, the project operator is seen in the context of business needs, 
corporate policy and international institutional regulatory framework (Ibid, p.59).  
Neo-realists, however stress the strategic dimension of the environmental factor. 
Increased tanker traffic through Bosporus represented a physical security threat to the 
city of Istanbul. Baran argues that whilst oil companies measured Bosporus in terms 
of its commercial value as a transportation route, the Turkish government considered 
it to be “...a highly sensitive lifeline of Istanbul and the Black sea region” (2005, p. 105; 
see also Yergin, 2012, p.60). Neo-realists are, therefore, interested in showing how 
environmental factors are in fact political and are deployed as such in the sphere of 
international relations in the form of state-enacted regulation, standards, tariffs and 
fees, with which non-state actors must comply. States measure the environmental 
factor in terms of its material impact on their security (and how to mitigate it) and as a 
political asset to be utilised through national policy (see Kandiyoti, 2012, pp.29-48).  
Critics of BTC echo this concern with state power and its utilisation of environmental 
security logic to serve political goals. Muttitt and Marriott, for example, point out that 
Turkey’s intentions over the Bosporus issue were far from “green” ([Platform], 2002, 
p. 30). Since the Straits are classified as “international waters” Turkey would be neither 
able to collect commercial tariff fees from additional oil passing through them nor 
control an energy route, whereas pipeline met both those objectives (Ibid.). Critical 
engagement challenges knowledge claims about environment and BTC. It identifies 
178 
 
“problem-solving” nature of mainstream approaches and seeks instead to provide an 
alternative understanding of the problem (Thomas, M. 2004; Platform et al. 2006; 
Platform et al. 2008; Memorandum from Concerned Non-Governmental 
Organizations, 2002).  
Critics do agree with the need to reduce oil transport through Bosporus, but place it 
within a wider context of climate change and the need to stop the use of fossil fuels 
altogether and not add to it by opening up new reserves such as the Caspian. They 
demonstrate a direct link between current modes of production and the oil industry in 
particular, whilst warning against local, regional and global impact of BTC, arguing, for 
example, that once burnt the one million barrels of oil transported daily through BTC 
(working at full capacity) would contribute 160 million tonnes of CO2 emissions per 
year, whilst contributing to BP’s profits (Muttitt and Marriott [Platform], 2002, p. 159). 
Operationalising environmental problem-field as an inter-paradigmatic pivot in a 
synergetic analysis of BTC reveals its full ontological depth. The historical timeline of 
the pipeline is no longer limited to its physical existence – it is set in a global temporal 
space, where it occupies its place in relation to the very notion of modernity. Inter-
paradigmatic pivots upon which elements of this grand empirical timeline of Baku oil 
rotate can be constructed upon myriad of conceptual overlaps and thematic 
commonalities occurring at multiple junctures along the way.  
This is particularly true of a broad conceptual convergence around the theme of 
financing of energy projects. Classical realist, Marxist and liberal traditions address 
this issues at length, from the role of private banking dynasties to government 
institutions such as ECGD (see Chapters IV and V). The theme runs consistently 
through the story of the Contract of the Century in 1994 right up to present day debates 
around the financing of SGC pipelines. EIB decision to postpone TAP funding until 
2018 is but a latest twist in this thematic paradigmatic timeline. What follows below is 
a demonstration of how an inter-paradigmatic pivot could be constructed around a 
specific empirical problem of SGC financing.  
 
Rationalist consensus on the issue proceeds from a starting premise that “securing 
financing is of primary importance for this strategic energy transit corridor’s timely 
implementation” (Gurbanov, 2017). This is a problem-solving approach, characterised 
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by attempt to identify obstacles to successful realisation of the SGC project and ways 
to overcome them (Cox, 1986, p.208). How states, international financial institutions, 
multilateral agencies, multinational energy corporations and other actors approach 
questions of oil and gas project financing in general is determined by the interplay of 
strategic and economic factors, set within the structure of international energy politics 
(see, for example, Economou et al, 2017, for a structural model of world oil market).   
 
Political developments outside the realm of oil and gas markets and regulatory 
frameworks (e.g. wider geopolitical events or processes) are treated as exogenous 
factors. Meanwhile, issues such as investment dynamics within the oil/gas sector are 
treated as endogenous factors, and outcomes are determined by the interplay 
between the two. For example, volatile oil and gas prices, domestic supply squeezes 
or fluctuations in global supply chains may affect financial viability of a complex 
regional infrastructure project such as the SGC (Pirani, 2016; Rzayeva, 2018). Yet 
such endogenous factors are mitigated and mediated by the strategic pull of 
extrageneous forces – interests of gas-producing states such as Azerbaijan (Jafarova, 
2017), actions of transit states such as Turkey (Tagliapietra and Bruegel, 02.07.2015), 
or gas-consuming EU member-states such as Greece and Italy (Geropoulos, 
3.3.2016), as well as EU institutions, such as the Commission and financial bodies 
under its jurisdiction.  
 
The latter are particularly important. EU Commission has been exploring possibility of 
a natural gas infrastructure link to Caspian energy reserves for over ten years, having 
identified early proposals as a strategic priority in the 2007 “energy package” policy 
framework (Van Aartsen, 2009, p.11). Since then, as the project evolved into SGC the 
EU Commission continued to provide robust support because of underlying strategic 
priorities of its member states: “A key part of ensuring secure and affordable supplies 
of energy to Europeans involves diversifying supply routes. This includes identifying 
and building new routes that decrease the dependence of EU countries on a single 
supplier of natural gas and other energy resources. [ ] Many countries in Central and 
South East Europe are dependent on a single supplier for most or all of their natural 
gas. To help these countries diversify their supplies, the Southern Gas Corridor aims 
to expand infrastructure that can bring gas to the EU from the Caspian Basin, Central 
Asia, the Middle East, and the Eastern Mediterranean Basin” (EU Commission, 2017).  
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To achieve this EU policy is to include component pipeline infrastructure projects 
needed for the Corridor on the EU's list of Projects of Common Interest. This means 
they can benefit from streamlined permitting process, receive preferential regulatory 
treatment, and be eligible to apply for EU funding. EU is also committed to cooperating 
closely with gas suppliers in the region including Azerbaijan, Iraq and Turkmenistan, 
with transit countries including Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey and to a long-term goal 
of negotiating with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan on a Trans-Caspian pipeline to 
transport gas across the Caspian Sea, thus securing more supplies (EU Commission, 
2017).  
 
These strategic priorities are then translated into financial policies of multilateral 
lending organisations such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) and European Investment Bank (EIB), functioning under EU and 
other inter-governmental jurisdictions. Thus, EBRD policy statement on Southern Gas 
Corridor reads:  
 
“Stretching across five countries of operations of the EBRD, the Southern Gas Corridor 
[] is an important strategic gas infrastructure project aimed at improving the security 
and diversity of the energy supply to Europe and Turkey. It will expand gas supply 
options and provide new energy transportation routes enabling Europe to access gas 
from the Caspian region and, in the longer term, beyond it, including the Eastern 
Mediterranean, Central Asia and the Middle East” (EBRD Policy Statement Document, 
18.10.2017). 
 
In justifying its decision to allocate five hundred million dollars’ worth of public funds to 
finance a key component of SGC, the Bank argued that the project will “support the 
diversification of gas supply sources in Europe and Turkey… The enhancement of 
energy security and diversification of energy supplies are important elements of well-
functioning economies” (Ibid). Securitisation of financial planning in relation to SGC is, 
another important feature of rationalist modelling of the issue (Jafarova, 2017; Verda, 
2016; Karagöl and Kaya, 2014; D’Agostini, 2014; Manolis, 2014).  
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Neo-liberal institutionalists might emphasise interdependent role of funding 
institutions, public lenders, oil companies and global financial markets in determining 
outcomes. Strategic priorities will be served and political risks ameliorated, provided 
market conditions are right: “Despite the political risks involved in all the Southern Gas 
Corridor projects, reducing EU dependence on Russian oil and gas is not proving as 
expensive as initially predicted in terms of borrowing costs” (Burroughs, 15.08.2017). 
Neo-realists, however, emphasise pivotal role of states and their strategic interests. 
Economic factors, such as price volatility, are not seen as determining decisions of 
individual states and multilateral lenders, because in the end strategic interests prevail: 
“The difficult economic environment notwithstanding, the timely implementation of the 
SGC is unlikely to be affected given the potent commitment of the international 
financial institutions and Azerbaijan’s government, which underlines the strong 
political will to deliver the project” (Gurbanov, 2017).  
 
As argued in Chapter V, eclectic theorising enables expansion of structural conception 
of energy politics to allow for ideational as well as material elements. For example, 
when it comes to multilateral financing of complex international infrastructure systems, 
such as the SGC, political decision-making process does not occur in a normative 
vacuum but is mediated through a continuously evolving complex web of politically 
relevant inter-subjective beliefs. Complimentary application of social-constructivist 
insights to the structuralist model of SGC financing helps understand how strategic 
and normative priorities of states and institutions are mediated, formalised through 
procedural, standard-setting and administrative mechanisms, and internalised by 
actors in the discourses about the issue. For example, in the quote above, a senior 
SOCAR executive, Vitaly Baylarbayov (Gotev, 4.10.2016) lists environmental and 
social benefits of the pipeline in an almost exact match to key parameters set out in 
the various EISAs for the project, (TAP ESIAs 2012-2014). And from post-structuralist 
and critical standpoints this is a major problem. 
 
Critique of and opposition to SGC financing can be viewed as a post-structuralist/neo-
Gramscian intellectual/praxeological synthesis of a kind that seeks to unbalance 
prevailing narratives about the issue and to empower marginalised voices, previously 
excluded and silenced. Whether it is through producing documentaries telling the 
stories Azerbaijani prisoners of conscience and community organisers in Melendugno, 
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southern Italy protesting against the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (CounterBalance, 
Platform and Re:Common, 08.03.2016) or carrying out research showing how 
alternatives to SGC are not only possible but credible, the cumulative aim is to make 
a sustained argument against public funding of the project: “Preventing the use of 
public money for massive fossil fuel projects such as the Southern Gas Corridor can 
open space for more serious efforts on energy efficiency and sustainable forms of 
renewable energy” (Bacheva-McGrath et al, 2015).  
 
Post-structuralist and critical standpoints on SGC financing would not be included in 
theoretical eclectic mix of the kind advocated by Sil and Katzenstein (2010). Their 
analytic eclecticism is rooted in theoretically-bound realist/liberal/constructivist matrix 
on the grounds that these theories are “the most established and most viable 
contenders for paradigmatic dominance” in International Relations (Ibid., p.25). 
Rationale for locating analytic-eclecticism in the dominant theoretical Triad is dictated 
by the results of recent TRIP surveys, showing that most IR scholars work within these 
three traditions (Jordan et al, 2009, p.18). It might be a rhetorical question but does 
real world really work in accordance with TRIP survey results?  
 
If post-structural forms of knowledge and critical claims about SGC are not valid and 
are to be excluded from analytical mix, then why do they appear to have effects in real 
world? From a critical realist philosophical standpoint – why do they meet the 
correspondence theory of truth test if they are assumed not to be true? Specifically, 
for example, why the European Investment Bank (EIB), the financial arm of the EU, 
decided not to approve record €1.4bn investment package for the crucial western 
segment of SGC – the Trans Adriatic Pipeline and postponed the decision to 2018 
(Nuttall, 13.12.2017)?  
 
There was widespread expectation that financing will be approved; all the strategic 
conditions for support of the project were in place, including direct lobbying of EIB by 
the European Commission itself - vice president Maroš Šefčovič and climate and 
energy commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete wrote to the bank’s president Werner Hoyer 
to make clear the importance of the project, arguing that the Southern Gas Corridor 
“is a strategic project for the EU, directly contributing to the diversification of gas 
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sources and security of supply objectives of the European Energy Union strategy” 
(13.07.2017 in Mathiesen, 27.11.2017).  
 
All the environmental and social impact assessments have been logged and formally 
processed; EBRD has already approved €500mln worth of funding for SGC (EBRD 
Project 48376, 18.10.2017). Nevertheless, in December 2017 EIB delayed financing 
SGC, a spokesperson citing “a number of due diligence issues that merits proper 
discussion” as the reason (Nuttall, 13.12.2017). This might have been in reference to 
hundreds officially logged representations and formal complaints raised with EIB 
compliance and accountability mechanisms against SGC (EIB Accountability, 2018).  
 
EIB decision came out of the blue, leaving the project in limbo and it is just one 
anomaly that mainstream scholarship and commentary on the issue of SGC financing 
- single-paradigm, synthetic and eclectic - failed to explain, let alone predict. 
Structuralist/constructivist framework alone simply cannot account for this real-world 
outcome – all the strategic interest boxes were “ticked”, all insufficiencies, problems 
were “solved” and yet the empirical outcome did not correspond to theoretical claims 
about it. This is because analytic-eclecticism remains a theoretically-parsimonious 
analytical framework and its empirical reach is circumscribed by its foundational 
theoretical commitments.  
 
It is true that most IR scholarship does fall within the paradigmatic Triad of realism, 
liberalism and constructivism (Jordan, et al 2009, p 18). The field of international 
energy politics is no exception and much of its empirical research comes from within 
this dominant paradigmatic matrix (see Chapter 3). For example, the Oxford Institute 
for Energy Studies (OIES, 2017) carries out its research programmes within clearly 
defined ontological boundaries – oil, natural gas and electricity – and sets them out 
across clear epistemological parameters, described as “the disciplines of the Institute: 
economics, politics and sociology, international relations of gas-producing, consuming 
and transit countries”; issues of environment are explicitly bracketed in terms of their 
relevance to primary ontological focus areas – fossil fuels and generation of electrical 
power (OIES, Natural Gas Research Programme, 2017). 
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There is logic to arguing that since the Triad is closest to achieving paradigmatic 
dominance it makes it convenient to locate multi-theoretical efforts here. Sil and 
Katzenstein justify this choice for this reason precisely: “Thus, it is in the context of 
debates between realists, liberals and constructivists that we find it most useful to 
elaborate on the significance of analytical eclecticism for the study of world politics” 
(2010, p.25). But useful for whom? Analytic-eclecticism is ostensibly posited as a 
problem-orientated research programme, concerned with producing knowledge of 
relevance “for real-world dilemmas facing political and social actors” (Ibid., p.9). 
Single-paradigm analytical frameworks are viewed as deficient precisely because in 
pursuit of parsimony they lead us to overlook complexity of social life, thus inhibiting 
policy-relevant research (Ibid, p.12). 
 
Yet, there does not appear to be a causal connection between this pragmatic 
normative motivation for analytic-eclecticism (i.e. policy-relevant, real-world orientated 
scholarship) and its internal criteria for theory selection (i.e. the means by which such 
scholarship is to be generated). The latter is in fact determined and justified chiefly by 
implications drawn from TRIP survey results, not by any would-be empirical 
needs/demands of political and social actors, nor by any substantive standards for 
assessing scholarly or practical significance of a given problem. And as the example 
of EIB decision anomaly demonstrates, there are real-world, practice-level 
implications and costs in such arbitrary exclusion of certain types of knowledge and 
means of attaining it – empirical results can end up contradicting theoretical 
assumptions underpinning research models.   
 
Analytic eclecticism therefore fails even by its own pragmatist test, e.g. what use does 
an Italian energy minister, an environmentalist campaigner or BP corporate executive 
have for SGC forecast models, research briefs, journal-published papers and complex 
technical and sociological explanations, and policy prescriptions on institutional 
dynamics of multilateral funding bodies etc., when they are suddenly faced with the 
actual reality of the EIB decision, leaving a $2bln budget hole in a major international 
energy infrastructure project for which they are responsible?  
 
If post-structuralist knowledge forms and critical claims about SGC are not valid, they 
should not be having real effects in real-world situations. If they are found to be having 
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such effects, as determined so on empirical grounds, then they should be included in 
synergetic analytic framework. Their validity is not absolute, e.g. EIB may change its 
position and approve funding in the future as other international financial institutions 
already have. All theoretical claims remain open to empirical challenge but the focus 
always remains on the ontological pivot around which these contested claims are 
being made. And it is not enough simply to extricate theoretical concepts, logics, 
mechanisms from single-paradigm or synthesis models of SGC and then attempt to 
translate and selectively integrate them into a new holistic analytic framework.  
 
Synergetic theorising must go further and requires looking at causal dynamics and 
reactive relationships between these analytic elements in real time and identifying how 
these are manifested in real world situations and in political outcomes, for example, 
the EIB decision on SGC funding. Post-structuralist challenge to SGC funding is 
clearly a normative standpoint grown out of concern over environmental, social and 
economic consequences of the project. Yet it is not simply a case of opposition to a 
specific modernist enterprise, but a statement against the prevailing social order that 
the project represents and the EIB decision, therefore, is assessed in these contexts.  
For example, interests of marginalised groups affected by the pipeline are set within a 
wider counter-hegemonic narrative of a post-fossil fuel energy future: 
    
“Communities in Italy, like the people of Melendugno, have been bravely resisting this 
pipeline in the face of fascist-era laws. Now, everyone that has been demanding the 
European Investment Bank defund the Trans Adriatic Pipeline just got the decision on 
a €1.5bn delayed until next year. This is a massive blow to this dangerous new pipeline 
– we’re turning the tide on new fossil fuel projects. TAP will not go ahead” (Ratcliffe, 
in CEE Bankwatch, 12.12.2017).  
 
“The climate paradox at the heart of the project, together with the human rights abuses, 
impacts on local communities and corruption links associated with it have made it 
harder and harder for the EU’s bank to endorse.” (Sol in CEE Bankwatch, 12.12.2017).  
 
From a neo-Gramscian critical perspective the focus of counter-hegemonic efforts is 
not the state but institutions such as the EIB and EU – transnational networks 
underpinning global capitalist hegemony (Cox, 1981; 1983). The thrust of the anti-
186 
 
SGC campaign, led by international coalition of counter-hegemonic forces, is directed 
at these networks, with the aim of redirecting their function towards advancement of 
emancipatory interest. In fact, these forces are often purposefully formed to target 
specific elements of these transitional networks – anti-SGC NGOs such as 
CounterBalanace operate on a normative mission “to make European public finance 
a key driver of the transition towards socially and environmentally sustainable and 
equitable societies” (CounterBalance, 2017). 
 
Rationalists underestimated pertinence of post-positivist insights and normative 
concerns, just as proponents and sponsors of SGC underestimated potency of civic 
forces opposing them. The extent of these mistakes is underscored by the wider turn 
taking place – EIB decision is a reflection of changes transforming global energy order, 
as it moves away from fossil fuels towards renewable, sustainable future: “Clearly it 
was too much even for the EIB to fund this fossil fuel mega project on the anniversary 
of the Paris Agreement – now they should make sure that 2018 sees them end support 
for fossil fuels entirely’’ (CEE Bankwatch, 12.12.2017) 
 
EIB decision on SGC not only coincided with the second anniversary of the Paris 
Climate Accord but occurred on the same day as the One Planet Summit – gathering 
of global financial organisations to develop strategies for implementing the Paris 
climate accord and “to strengthen the financial sector's involvement in combating 
climate change, financing the energy transition and the adaptation to global warming” 
(Climate Finance Day. 11.12.2017, No 252, 11.12.2017; Harvey, 12.12.2017). On the 
same day, 12 December 2017, the World Bank, one of SGC funders, announced its 
divestment from fossil fuel projects: “As a global multilateral development institution, 
the World Bank Group is continuing to transform its own operations in recognition of a 
rapidly changing world.  To align its support to countries to meet their Paris goals: The 
World Bank Group will no longer finance upstream oil and gas, after 2019. (World 
Bank, 12.12.2017). 
 
As important and symbolic as these developments undoubtedly are, it is worth 
considering that World Bank, EBRD and other financial institutions, as well as 
individual states, have already agreed and approved funding for various sections of 
SGC project. Furthermore, EIB merely postponed its decision and may still approve 
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the €1.5bln record-breaking credit to the TAP segment of Southern Gas Corridor (APA, 
09.01.2018). For all their claims, post-positivist empirical programme and its 
associated normative-political project cannot account for persistence of power 
relations between states and the extent to which material factors determine state 
identities and interests. This leads to persistent overemphasising of ideational factors, 
even in the face of obvious empirical facts.  
 
For example, Azerbaijan’s withdrawal from the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) in 2017 was widely heralded as the death knell for prospects of 
international financing of SGC: “The withdrawal throws into doubt current and future 
financing for Azerbaijan’s contribution to the $46bn Southern Gas Corridor pipeline to 
connect its Caspian Sea gasfields to European markets” (Foy, 10.03.2017). EITI is an 
international organisation, comprised of governments, NGOs and energy companies 
that sets “the global standard for the good governance of oil, gas and mineral 
resources” (EITI Standard, 2017). The Standard is meant to ensure transparency and 
accountability in energy politics across a broad spectrum of criteria, from how 
exploration rights are issued, to how the resources are monetised and how this 
advances public interest in resource-rich countries (Rogan (Ed.), 2016).  
 
European Investment Bank, EBRD, World Bank, European Commission and other 
multilateral institutions are partners of EITI and employ its country assessments and 
compliance reports as regulatory frameworks in assessing funding applications; 
therefore, Azerbaijan’s withdrawal raised questions over SGC: “Azerbaijan’s EITI 
status has taken on greater significance amid discussions with international lenders 
such as the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
for billions of dollars in loans to fund its share of the Southern Gas Corridor project” 
(Farchy, 26.10.2016). In early 2017 Azerbaijan was suspended for non-compliance on 
human rights grounds, after EITI International Board found that the country “did not 
fully meet the corrective actions related to civil society space” (EITI Board paper 36-
5-A, 09.03.2017). The very next day Azerbaijan unilaterally withdrew from the 
organisation (EITI, 20.03.2017). 
 
Human rights NGOs have sought to use EITI Standard to hold Azerbaijani government 
accountable over human rights abuses and persecution of civil society, and argued 
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that the country’s suspension and withdrawal from the body should “…raise red flags 
for international financial institutions… which have publicly endorsed the EITI and 
committed to participation, transparency, and accountability (Gogia, 10.03.2017). 
Funding SGC and other Azerbaijan-led energy projects would lead to erosion of public 
scrutiny and international normative standards (Mammadov, 20.01.2017). Revoking 
EITI membership was widely assessed as having major detrimental impact on SGC 
financial viability: “Azerbaijan’s membership in the EITI is considered a key asset to 
the country’s oil and natural gas economy. As a result of leaving the EITI, Azerbaijan 
might be regarded as ineligible for future loans by the World Bank and other 
international institutions for projects, such as the Southern Gas Corridor Project 
(TAP&TANAP)” (Allili and Bitner, 2017, p.3; pp.6-7).  
 
In reality, however, SGC continued to receive financial support from multilateral 
organisations, with EBRD and World Bank (EITI partners) proceeding to approve new 
funds despite Azerbaijan’s withdrawal and civil society protests. In November 2017 
Trump administration took the United States out of EITI compliance mechanisms and 
the organisation dropped out of SGC debates (Simon, 02.11.2017). There are, 
therefore, limits to how far post-positivist claims can be taken. Post-structuralist single-
paradigm models on their own fail to sufficiently account for persistence of state power 
and strategic-materialist interests underpinning it. 
 
In summary, neo-realist analysis sets developments around SGC funding in the 
context of state action - environmental and energy politics as platforms for exercising 
state power and advancing strategic interests (see Chapter 4). Neo-liberal argument 
explains state action in terms of ideas, such as climate change, and institutions, such 
as the EIB (see Chapter 4). Social-constructivism, in turn, examines how state power, 
actions and interests are constituted by ideational forces – “the meaning of power and 
the content of interests are largely a function of ideas” (Wendt, 1999, p. 96; p.134; see 
Chapter 5). Anti-positivist, post-structuralist critiques challenge dominant ideational 
orthodoxies and set out alternative normative and political agendas for changing the 
prevailing social order, and these are now beginning to have political effects (see 
Chapter 5).  
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These single-paradigm models as well as their synthetic and eclectic configurations, 
provide useful analytical frameworks that shed light on specific elements of a puzzle 
and explain certain aspects of a phenomena, as they spin on a single ontological pivot, 
in this case the issue of SGC financing. The resulting synergetic picture is larger than 
the sum of its constituent parts. There are clearly multiple causal explanations for why 
the European Investment Bank had not agreed funding for the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline 
segment of Southern Gas Corridor and had not rejected it so far either. States have 
multiple identities and interests, which come about through continuous interplay of 
both social and material forces – they are not necessarily in alignment. The European 
Commission, representing collective interests of EU member states, is committed to 
implementing Paris Climate Accord commitments and to building new gas 
transmission pipelines:  
 
“By 2020, the EU aims to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by at least 20%, 
increase the share of renewable energy to at least 20% of consumption, and achieve 
energy savings of 20% or more” (EU Commission, 2020 Energy Strategy, 2018).  
 
“A key part of ensuring secure and affordable supplies of energy to Europeans 
involves diversifying supply routes. This includes identifying and building new routes 
that decrease the dependence of EU countries on a single supplier of natural gas and 
other energy resources” (EU Commission, Gas and Oil Supply Routes, 2018).  
 
EIB’s decision or rather prolonged indecision on SGC funding arises out of this 
maelstrom of competing identities and contradictory interests as they are manifested 
in state actions and institutional dynamics. Ideas about the environment, climate 
change and energy are undergoing a major shift, not least due to growing democratic 
pressure, global environmental movements and coordinated actions of international 
civil society. Changing norms cascade through institutional architecture of energy 
politics as states and other actors adapt to this new normative environment – from 
standard-setting international quangos, such as EITI to integration of environmental, 
social and human rights standards into decision-making processes around fossil-fuel 
projects. It is symbolic, perhaps, that research critical of SGC project, an EU-supported 
initiative, is often funded directly by agencies of the European Union (CEE Bankwatch, 
May 2017; Bacheva-McGrath et al, January 2015).  
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However, this change is running against a prevailing energy order, made up of 
powerful material and ideational forces – economic, technological, social and cultural 
forces borne out of over two centuries of fossil fuel consumption (see Yergin, 1991; 
see Chapter 3). EIB decision on SGC funding is mediated by material realities of 
European energy order and reflects European Union’s key energy priorities. EU 
Commission identifies dependence on energy imports as “…a particularly pressing 
issue, with the EU currently importing over half its energy at a cost of €350 billion per 
year. Other important challenges include rising global demand and the scarcity of fuels 
like crude oil, which contribute to higher prices. In addition, the continued use of fossil 
fuels in Europe is a cause of global warming and pollution” (EU Commission, Energy 
Strategy and Energy Union, 2017).  
 
EU states’ structural dependence on fossil fuels and dependence on Russia as chief 
supplier of natural gas, delivered through Russian-controlled pipelines is one factor 
determining EU energy strategy: “About one quarter of all the energy used in the EU 
is natural gas, and many EU countries import nearly all their supplies. Some of these 
countries are also heavily reliant on a single source or a single transport route for the 
majority of their gas. Disruptions along this route caused by infrastructure failure or 
political disputes can endanger supplies. For instance, the gas dispute between 
Russia and Ukraine in 2009 disrupted supplies to some EU countries” (EU 
Commission, Secure Gas Supplies, 2017).  
 
This may well explain why in 2018 EIB may well approve final finding for TAP and why 
SGC will become eventually become a reality. What is revealed by synergetic readings 
of the SGC financing issue is the causal interplay between social and material 
conceptualisations of energy order and how it manifests in real-world situations. What 
the above reveals is that future fossil fuel projects may well stall in the face of a new 
political paradigm that is moving away from hydrocarbon energy status quo. SGC may 
go ahead but will other projects such as TAPI (briefly discussed elsewhere in the 
thesis)? Those opposed to SGC may well have underestimated strategic significance 
of the project but BP and SOCAR executives working on SGC seriously 
underestimated the power of counter-hegemonic grass-root communities, armed with 
alternative vision for a global energy order. These mistakes have real practical 
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implications for actors involved in energy politics and TSA offers a way to overcome 
them.   
 
The role of oil companies in establishment of the Baku oil industry, environment as a 
factor in BTC debates and financing of SGC are some, arbitrary examples of thematic 
commonalities and conceptual convergences, constituting inter-paradigmatic pivots. 
A future, comprehensive study of Baku oil or BTC and SGC pipelines specifically may 
well reveal other such commonalities. But it is demonstrated here how this is possible 
and how reading differing theoretical accounts of the same empirical questions can 
reveal novel insights and help understand contemporary problems facing political 
actors. 
Conclusion 
Operationalising tanker traffic through Bosporus or the EIB decision anomaly as inter-
paradigmatic pivots in synergetic analytical framework shows that these substantive 
issues emerge out of a deeper ontology of global energy, comprising a complex multi-
layered socio-political dynamic that cannot be reduced to or explained by reference to 
any single element or factor. Any theoretical claims about it can only be assessed or 
verified on the extent to which they correspond to the reality of political outcomes - it 
is only possible to make relatively more accurate judgements on balance of empirical 
evidence. By not excluding certain paradigmatic approaches in favour of others TSA 
maximises intellectual opportunity of a given research enterprise and expands the 
breadth and depth of the empirical pool.  
 
Synergetic modelling of BTC and SGC projects enables greater elucidation of the co-
constitutive function of socio-normative and physical-material elements that make up 
these complex, international structures. Perhaps the clearest empirical implication of 
synergetic theorising about these pipelines is discovering the extent to which 
postmodernist, environmentalist, critical counter-narratives have impacted on political 
outcomes over the past twenty years. By ignoring or underplaying transformative effect 
of structural normative change, rationalist paradigms consistently failed to account for 
political changes it brings, not least implications of growing inter-state cooperation 
against the threat of climate change e.g. Paris Agreement. By ignoring or underplaying 
strategic and geo-political factors, post-positivist approaches failed to account for 
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persistence of power-relations and growing resource competition between states and 
historically consistent role played by national and international oil and gas companies, 
and multilateral financial institutions.  
 
In November 2017 EU Commission included Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP) proposal 
into its list of Project of Common Interest, opening up possibility that the BTC/SGC 
system might be expanded East, opening up Turkmenistan’s vast hydrocarbon 
reserves to European markets (EU Commission, 23.11.2017; Caspian Policy Centre 
Editorial, 13.12.2017). Caspian energy politics will continue to evolve and will continue 
to be shaped by competing dynamics of strategic and normative interests 
characterising them.  How TCP is to be funded will again be at the heart of these 
tensions and antagonisms. Synergetic readings of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Southern 
Gas Corridor pipelines can help better understand the course these future debates 
might take.  
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Conclusion 
This thesis opened with Buzan and Little’s question, “Has International Relations failed 
as an intellectual project?” (2001). The proposal for theory-synergetic approach set 
out in this thesis is animated by a belief that not only International Relations is not a 
discipline in decline but that it is a thriving intellectual project, which has the potential 
to serve as a meta-disciplinary enterprise, bringing together different strands of social 
science to bear upon issues of existential importance of global significance. Buzan 
and Little’s ambition for IR as a holistic theoretical framework with a cross-disciplinary 
reach is realistic and credible (Ibid., p. 22). 
 
TSA is an explicitly IR analytical technique that absorbs and integrates heritage of the 
Great Debates as essential elements in the genealogy of the discipline (Smith, 1995, 
pp.1-37; Schmidt, 2013, pp. 3-28; Waever, 2011, p.98). TSA is grounded in 
historiography of International Relations – the structure of the discipline, shaped in the 
Great Debates, is viewed not as an impediment to scholarship in IR, but as its road-
map - the intellectual prism through which to analyse substantive problems in world 
politics. Theories of international relations   are the tools of our trade, the elements of 
our periodic table, the equipment of our laboratories, kaleidoscopic lenses through 
which we view the world.  
 
As full implications of the Fourth Debate become clear, the field of IR is recast and 
reconstituted, with a significantly expanded ontology and widened epistemological 
reach far beyond the narrow confines of positivism. Rather than view this as a 
challenge to IR disciplinary identity, TSA instead is designed to take advantage of new 
empirical opportunities. TSA is an argument in favour of ontological primacy in 
International Relations – the purpose of the discipline is to get at the deeper ontology 
of world human affairs. Critical Realism provides TSA with its philosophical 
foundations and imbues it with a commitment to an open-ended social-scientific 
project, aimed at getting at the reality of international relations, without excluding or 
bracketing various forms of knowledge.  
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Taking theoretical pluralism in International Relations seriously requires moving away 
from attempts to place epistemological brackets on knowledge-production. We have 
seen that mid-range theorizing and eclectic approaches are limited in their pluralist 
applications by their restricted ontologies and metatheoretical assumptions. One of 
the key conclusions in this thesis is that excluding knowledge claims based on a priori 
foundational assumptions carries significant empirical costs – any advantages brought 
to research by enhanced parsimony are offset by considerable loss of explanatory and 
predictive analytical power. 
 
TSA does seek to produce scholarship relevant to practice of world politics – the 
choice of international oil and gas politics as the empirical field and BTC/SGC projects 
as case-studies was not arbitrary. TSA, however, is not a proposal for a practice-
orientated research programme; at its core, it is a proposal for applied critical realist 
philosophy of science in IR – an argument that echoes Pearson’s remark: “The unity 
of science consists alone in its method, not its material” (1892, p.15). 
 
A normative challenge for TSA, therefore, is that there are no in-built ethical 
commitments inherent to what is essentially a method or a technique for approaching 
substantive issues in international relations; in other words, anyone can use it. 
Providing that normative commitments are set out throughout intellectual process 
involved in any given research project, TSA could be used with equal success by 
adherents of any paradigmatic school of thought in IR or sponsors of any political 
cause.  
 
It has been shown in this thesis how applying different theoretical models 
synergetically increases the empirical yield of the study and enhances its analytical 
impact by pooling different bodies of scholarship, bodies of information, knowledge 
claims and normative arguments in a maelstrom of ontological and epistemological 
contestation. It is hoped that the case-study of oil politics in this thesis served to 
underline its key argument that theoretical disagreements in IR can be used as tools 
to advance knowledge about substantive issues in international relations.  
 
195 
 
To harness inherent power of IR theoretical pluralism TSA is advanced as a common 
methodological culture – a language, an analytical toolkit - by means of which scholars 
can utilise and apply different theories to the limitless substantive field of the science 
of international relations. A metaphor for IR theories as lenses through which to see 
different aspects of the same material reality has sometimes been employed (Smith, 
2014). The objective is both – to find out about things that occur in stories and about 
their effect in any given story (Tolkien, 1983, p.121).  
 
Oil is a fascinating topic in its own right; it has a primordial and perennial quality to it 
and yet is pervasive and persistent in its presence in everyday life. Questions about 
oil and energy go to the very heart of foundational and normative debates in IR and at 
the same time have immediate, urgent relevance to real-world political practice. It is 
arguably an existential global phenomenon, which is perhaps why it generates such 
partisan academic coverage and public debate. Yet, it was shown in this thesis that a 
deeper, truer reality of international oil politics is to be found in the empirical overlaps 
and commonalities between competing claims and bodies of knowledge. Synergetic 
analysis pivots upon these inter-paradigmatic connections, constructing more holistic, 
multidimensional representations of the reality of various problems in oil politics, than 
is possible in single-paradigm or even eclectic approaches.  
 
Rationalist discourses around BTC and SGC pipelines are underpinned by a 
materialist paradigm of oil and gas politics – these projects are ultimately about power, 
state and corporate. This is the core of the rationalist models or rather model, for both 
projects constitute a single geo-political enterprise, that has its antecedents in past 
historical power relations. Reflectivist critiques, meanwhile, pose a foundational 
challenge to the dominant materialist-rationalist conception of the role BTC, SGC and 
Caspian hydrocarbons play in international energy order. They fundamentally question 
the prevailing fossil-fuelled social order, expose its costs and existential risks it poses 
and sets out a politically and normatively charged praxeological programme aimed at 
preventing the pipelines from being built in the first place.  
 
Modelling these competing paradigmatic accounts within a common empirical timeline 
offers new theoretical-comparative perspectives, establishing clear conceptual 
overlaps and thematic commonalities across theoretical spectrum. Operationalising 
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these overlaps and commonalities (e.g. BTC environmental factors or the EIB’s SGC 
funding decision) as inter-paradigmatic pivots in synergetic analytical framework 
shows that theoretical claims about substantive issues can only be assessed or 
falsified upon the extent to which they correspond to the reality of political outcomes 
(to empirical truth).  
 
For example, persistence of empirical anomalies in single-paradigm mono-causal 
explanations pivoting upon the EIB financing of SGC pipeline, reflects both, the extent 
to which anti-positivist intellectual agenda has been ignored and excluded by 
mainstream scholarship on gas and pipeline politics, and the extent to which post-
positivist approaches overlook strategic factors and overemphasise prescriptive 
normative politics. Applying synergetic reasoning illuminates these shortcomings in 
single-paradigm (and eclectic) theorising and reveals underlying cross-theoretical 
causal mechanisms determining outcomes in pipeline politics. Applying TSA 
systematically across the entire political expanse of the Caspian hydrocarbons helps 
identify evolving trends in global energy politics and draw conclusions about other 
pipeline projects elsewhere in the world.   
 
Rather than viewing these mono-theoretical or synthetic accounts in opposition to 
each other, TSA generates greater empirical clarity and insights by engaging with 
them simultaneously in real time. The idea that stories in IR can be told approached 
this way and in the resulting narrative produce a whole greater than the constituent 
theoretical parts that make it up is the defining feature of the theory-synergetic 
approach. TSA is proposed as a common language through which to communicate 
across the breadth of IR spectrum and with the world beyond; a language to express 
theoretical pluralism and to cover the expanded ontology of International Relations - a 
type of IR culture.   
 
J.R.R. Tolkien’s description of synergy as set out in his philological essay “On Fairy 
Stories” can serve as a metaphor for the theory-synergetic approach – “It is indeed 
easier to unravel a single thread — an incident, a name, a motive — than to trace the 
history of any picture defined by many threads. For with the picture in the tapestry a 
new element has come in: the picture is greater than, and not explained by, the sum 
of the component threads.  ((1947, 1964), 1983. p. 121). TSA is about envisaging 
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International Relations as a picture tapestry and each theory as a particular thread in 
that picture, all operating in synergy, to constitute a picture greater than the sum of the 
individual threads that make it up: 
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